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To recognize and investigate the hypotheses that opportunistic behaviour of project participants in infrastructure public–private partnerships (PPPs) changes over the project’s life cycle. Case study methodology is adopted. The first Indian highway PPP project, awarded with negative grant, is used as the case context. Opportunistic behaviour is a continuous game played by the project stakeholders. Its manifestation depends on the vulnerability of the other party at that point in time in the project life cycle and the past display of opportunism. Because the study is limited to a highway project in an emerging economy, the findings may lack generalizability for which further research is recommended. PPP is increasingly popular. Stakeholders recognize that the existing ex-ante contractual arrangements that seek to mitigate opportunism are not enough for project success. This study addresses this difficulty by providing a closer understanding of how opportunistic behaviours evolve over projects’ life cycle and what steps are necessary to negotiate. Failure to address the antecedents of opportunistic behaviour in time leads to a competition to be more opportunistic, in which the common public gets short changed. This study is an attempt to advance understanding of stakeholders’ behaviour outside the ambit of contract. The extant literature is largely silent on the timing and vulnerability of opportunistic behaviour, viewing it as a static concept. The study demonstrates the changing nature of opportunism that manifests in different forms over the projects life cycle.

We use a laboratory experiment to examine a multitask environment common to practice, in which managers have multiple responsibilities, including both managerial reporting, as in participative budgeting settings, and effort provision toward daily tasks. Consistent with typical contracting arrangements, we examine incomplete contracts where honesty and effort are not enforceable. In such a multitask environment, when employers choose to offer comparatively generous wages to managers, we predict that managers will elect to provide higher effort. Meanwhile, we remain agnostic ex ante about the degree of misreporting due to findings in studies on gift exchange, moral licensing, and moral wiggle room. Overall, we find evidence that reciprocity, consistent with the gift-exchange model, does extend across both tasks. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.

In United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., United Shoe Machinery (USM) was found guilty of illegal monopolization due to its leasing practices. Existing scholarship on this case largely focuses on the issue of leasing versus selling. In this article, we provide a more comprehensive analysis of this important decision. In addition, we examine USM’s antitrust experience before and after the famous 1953 case. We find that USM’s business practices were largely procompetitive and, therefore, did not warrant condemnation.

The emphasis on inter-organizational systems gave rise to concerns about inter-organizational relationships as trading partners became aware of the socio-political factors and trust that affect their relationships. This paper examines the importance of inter-organizational-trust in business-to-business E-commerce organizations. It examines how inter-organizational relationships impact trading partner trust, perceived benefits, perceived risks, and technology trust mechanisms in E-commerce that can in turn influence outcomes of business-to-business E-commerce. This paper develops a conceptual model and tests the model using a case study research methodology. The aim is to solicit qualitative in depth understanding of inter-organizational-trust in business-to-business E-commerce. Eight organizations from a cross section of industries that formed four bi-directional dyads participated in the third stage of this study. The first two stages include exploratory case studies in three organizations in the automotive industry that applied EDI via Value-Added-Networks in 1997, and a nationwide survey of organizations that examined the extent of E-commerce adoption in Australia and New Zealand in 1998. The findings identify the need for trustworthy business relationships in an E-commerce environment.

This chapter addresses social embeddedness effects on ex ante management of economic transactions. We focus on dyadic embeddedness, that is the history of prior transactions between business partners and the anticipation of future transactions. Ex ante management through, for example, contractual arrangements is costly but mitigates risks associated with the transaction, such as risks from strategic and opportunistic behavior. Dyadic embeddedness can reduce such risks and, hence, the need for ex ante management by, for instance, making reciprocity and conditional cooperation feasible. The chapter presents a novel theoretical model generating dyadic embeddedness effects, together with effects of transaction characteristics and management costs. We stress the interaction of the history of prior transactions and expectations of future business. Hypotheses are tested using new and primary data from an extensive survey of more than 900 purchases of information technology (IT) products (hard- and software) by almost 800 small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Results support, in particular, the hypotheses on effects of dyadic embeddedness.

Purpose — This chapter aims to argue that in some cases, dishonesty in international partnerships may be beneficial from the dishonest firm’s perspective.Design/methodology/approach — The chapter is based on three cases of dishonest Chinese firms that cheated their American or German partners.Findings — We argue that dishonesty does not always lead to negative consequences for the dishonest/opportunistic firm and if it does, benefits may be larger than costs.Practical implications — It is not always easy to avoid partners’ dishonest behavior especially if they hope to benefit considerably from this and if the probability of getting caught and punished is low.Originality/value — The consequences of dishonesty in international partnerships — especially, relationship dissolution and positive impacts of dishonesty for the dishonest firm — have not received considerable research attention yet. We argue that despite relationship dissolution caused by the Chinese partners’ dishonesty, two of the dishonest firms gained.

In a study of conflict in organizations, Lindenberg’s relational signaling theory is used to develop hypotheses on the impact of relationship strength, network embeddedness, and organizational change on social escalation. Social escalation is defined as the involvement of one or more third parties in a conflict. An empirical test is conducted with data on 67 conflicts involving 22 managers, gathered during three years of ethnographic fieldwork and a longitudinal network study in a management team of a German paper factory. Multilevel analysis indicates that strong ties between conflicting parties decrease the level of social escalation, whereas informal power advantage of one party increases the chances for social escalation. Both effects disappear over time. It is argued that the dissolving impact of relationships and networks is due to the disappearance of so-called solidarity frame-stabilizing activities in the firm. The results highlight the context-dependence of network effects and escalation processes.