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The article aims to investigate the effects of ownership and capital structure on postacquisition operating performance.

The article extends the ongoing literature from an operating loss perspective and provides empirical evidence on the probability of acquirers’ operating loss in relation to ownership and capital structure. The operating performance of publicly listed manufacturing firms in China was tracked up to five years since the completion of the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) during 2003–2014.

The empirical results show that, in a five-year postacquisition period, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are more likely to experience operating loss than non-SOEs. The likelihood of the operating loss is negatively associated with ownership concentration, implying that concentrated ownership may serve as an effective corporate governance mechanism in the emerging economy and improve postacquisition performance. The rise in leverage increases the likelihood of postacquisition operating loss, indicating that the costs of debt may outweigh the benefits.

The findings contribute to the literature on ownership, debt governance and post-M&A performance from an emerging economy perspective.

This paper investigates whether and how Directive 2014/95/EU affects financial performance as well as its moderation effect on the relationship between financial and non-financial performance, involving different stakeholders' perspectives.

We adopted the panel data approach to perform random effects regression analysis on a sample of 435 European listed non-financial companies, considering a timeframe of six years. Furthermore, the moderation effect of the Directive 2014/95/EU on the relationship between financial and non-financial performance has been tested.

NFD regulation negatively affects firms' operating profitability and shareholder value while produces no effects on debtholders' returns. Nevertheless, the Directive 2014/95/EU has general positive moderating effects on the relationship between non-financial and financial performance, mitigating the direct costs induced by pursuing non-financial performance.

Shifting from mimetic to coercive isomorphism caused a strengthening of the complementarity between financial and non-financial performance dimensions, extending the concept of performance itself. The analysis carried out is limited to a short-term timeframe and on non-financial companies subject to the Directive 2014/95/EU.

The paper highlights trade-offs between the costs induced by non-financial activities and the benefits of being compliant with the non-financial disclosure (NFD) regulation, supporting managers in allocating business resources.

This paper is among the first that investigates the impact of mandatory NFD on the relationship between non-financial and financial performance. It is also one of the earliest in finding some pieces of evidence on the direct impact of Directive 2014/95/EU on EU companies' financial performance.

The article investigates the patterns of asset impairment recognition in search of signs of “big bath” earnings management practices across an internationally diversified sample of public companies. It also elucidates the incentives that may underlie such practices and explores possible safeguards embedded in the existing corporate governance mechanisms.

The article applied static panel and binary logit models to an international firm-level panel dataset of 1045 public companies observed between 2003 and 2018.

Our empirical results suggest that recognition of asset impairment has no determinate impact on earnings volatility. Investigating the possibility of “big bath” earnings management practices, the authors found no impact of asset impairment recognition on total senior executive compensation in firms, which pay performance-based remuneration. The quality of corporate governance has appeared to impact the firms’ intertemporal proclivity to recognize asset impairment with those having the more entrenched and management-controlled boards being more likely to time impairment recognition by delaying it during exceptionally good and exceptionally bad years. While generally unlikely, recognition of asset impairment in a period with a recorded negative operating performance is found to be closely associated with key executive departures.

The article corroborates the salient role of corporate governance mechanisms in shaping the intertemporal patterns of asset impairment recognition. The possible remedies to the phenomenon should be derived therefrom.

Foreign subsidiaries incur substantial institutional conformity costs because they have to respond to host-country institutional pressures (Slangen & Hennart, 2008). The purpose of this paper is to study this type of cost from institutional and regulatory perspectives. The authors argue that these costs decrease when the host country adopts concepts of international regulations that multinationals may be familiar with due to their own home country regulation experience. This prior regulatory experience gives foreign subsidiaries an advantage of foreignness (AoF), which can offset their liability of foreignness (LoF).

This study compared the returns on assets of 35 domestic firms with those of foreign subsidiaries in the Brazilian energy industry between 2002 and 2021, using regression dynamic panel data.

The existence of a relationship between the international regulatory norm and the Brazilian regulator has transformed the LoF into an advantage of foreignness to compete with local energy firms. The results also suggest that the better the regulatory quality of the subsidiary’s country of origin, the better its performance in Brazil, as it can reduce compliance costs. Finally, the greater the psychic distance between Brazil and the foreign subsidiary’s home country, the worse its performance.

The research suggests that one of the keys to competitiveness in host countries is local regulatory ties. Prior international regulatory experience gives foreign subsidiaries an asset of foreignness (AoF). This result complements the current institutional and regulatory foreignness studies on emerging economies (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Mallon et al., 2022) and the institutional asymmetry between home and host country (Mallon & Fainshmidt, 2017).

This research suggests that one of the keys to competitiveness in host countries is local regulatory ties. Prior international regulatory experience gives foreign subsidiaries an asset of foreignness (AoF). This result complements the current institutional and regulatory foreignness studies on emerging economies (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Mallon et al., 2022) and the institutional asymmetry between home and host country (Mallon & Fainshmidt, 2017). The practical implication is that the relationship between conformity costs, capital budget calculation and strategic planning for internationalization will be related to the governance quality of the home country of multinationals. The social implication is that a country interested in attracting more direct foreign investment to areas that need foreign technology transfer and resources may consider adopting international regulatory standards.

The social implication is that a country interested in attracting more direct foreign investment to areas that need foreign technology transfer and resources may consider adopting international regulatory standards.

This research discuss firm and local regulator tie is one of core competitiveness in host countries (Yang and Meyer, 2020). This study also complements the current institutional and regulatory foreignness studies in emerging economy (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Mallon et al., 2022). Second, prior regulatory experience of multinational enterprise in similar environment can affect its foreign affiliate performance (Perkins, 2014). Third, this study confirms current literature that argues that knowledge and ability to operate in an institutionalized country can be transferred from parent to affiliate. In the end, this study investigates whether AoF persists when host governments improve the governance of their industries.

Because systemically important banks' takeovers in the US were expected to contain the 2008 global financial crisis (GFC) but were found to have imposed large cost on shareholders, this paper examines the effectiveness of these acquisitions during the GFC and investigates what went wrong with the market for corporate control of large banks.

This paper presents a model of the disciplinary takeover based on the efficient market hypothesis which provides appropriate measures for it to examine the financial performance of acquiring banks after takeover.

The results indicate that the takeover market for large banks was ineffective in two aspects: the market did not distinguish strong banks from weak banks before the crisis and acquirers performed worse after takeover. Such ineffectiveness reflects the fundamental deficiencies of large bank takeovers arising from some key distinguishing characteristics of large banks.

The sample size of systemically important banks' takeovers is small so large-sample standard statistical inferences cannot be used.

The deficiencies of large bank takeovers need to be rectified in order to aid in resolving future crises.

This paper provides rare and detailed insight based on case studies of large US bank takeovers during the GFC.

Loan default risk or credit risk evaluation is important to financial institutions which provide loans to businesses and individuals. Loans carry the risk of being defaulted. To understand the risk levels of credit users (corporations and individuals), credit providers (bankers) normally collect vast amounts of information on borrowers. Statistical predictive analytic techniques can be used to analyse or to determine the risk levels involved in loans. This paper aims to address the question of default prediction of short-term loans for a Tunisian commercial bank.

The authors have used a database of 924 files of credits granted to industrial Tunisian companies by a commercial bank in the years 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006. The naive Bayesian classifier algorithm was used, and the results show that the good classification rate is of the order of 63.85 per cent. The default probability is explained by the variables measuring working capital, leverage, solvency, profitability and cash flow indicators.

The results of the validation test show that the good classification rate is of the order of 58.66 per cent; nevertheless, the error types I and II remain relatively high at 42.42 and 40.47 per cent, respectively. A receiver operating characteristic curve is plotted to evaluate the performance of the model. The result shows that the area under the curve criterion is of the order of 69 per cent.

The paper highlights the fact that the Tunisian central bank obliged all commercial banks to conduct a survey study to collect qualitative data for better credit notation of the borrowers.

El riesgo de incumplimiento de préstamos o la evaluación del riesgo de crédito es importante para las instituciones financieras que otorgan préstamos a empresas e individuos. Existe el riesgo de que el pago de préstamos no se cumpla. Para entender los niveles de riesgo de los usuarios de crédito (corporaciones e individuos), los proveedores de crédito (banqueros) normalmente recogen gran cantidad de información sobre los prestatarios. Las técnicas analíticas predictivas estadísticas pueden utilizarse para analizar o determinar los niveles de riesgo involucrados en los préstamos. En este artículo abordamos la cuestión de la predicción por defecto de los préstamos a corto plazo para un banco comercial tunecino.

Utilizamos una base de datos de 924 archivos de créditos concedidos a empresas industriales tunecinas por un banco comercial en 2003, 2004, 2005 y 2006. El algoritmo bayesiano de clasificadores se llevó a cabo y los resultados muestran que la tasa de clasificación buena es del orden del 63.85%. La probabilidad de incumplimiento se explica por las variables que miden el capital de trabajo, el apalancamiento, la solvencia, la rentabilidad y los indicadores de flujo de efectivo.

Los resultados de la prueba de validación muestran que la buena tasa de clasificación es del orden de 58.66% ; sin embargo, los errores tipo I y II permanecen relativamente altos, siendo de 42.42% y 40.47%, respectivamente. Se traza una curva ROC para evaluar el rendimiento del modelo. El resultado muestra que el criterio de área bajo curva (AUC, por sus siglas en inglés) es del orden del 69%.

El documento destaca el hecho de que el Banco Central tunecino obligó a todas las entidades del sector llevar a cabo un estudio de encuesta para recopilar datos cualitativos para un mejor registro de crédito de los prestatarios.

Curva ROC, Evaluación de riesgos, Riesgo de incumplimiento, Sector bancario, Algoritmo clasificador bayesiano.

Artículo de investigación

Debt, dividend and investment policy constitutes a company's important financial decisions to determine firm performance. The research emphasizes on the problem of overinvestment, a phenomenon that worsens firm operation. Furthermore, it clarifies the moderation role of debt and dividend policy in mitigating the negative effect of overinvestment on firm performance in the case of Vietnamese listed companies.

The research uses all financial statement of non-financial Vietnamese listed companies on Ho Chi Minh and Hanoi Stock Exchange in the period of 2008–2018. The data are collected from Thomson Reuters Eikon. The final data set is comprised of 669 listed companies. The study measures overinvestment though investment demand function and HP filter. Moreover, the research employs the dynamic model, so it has to apply the SGMM method to deal with the problem of endogeneity caused by the lagged dependent variable.

The research finds that overinvestment is negatively associated with firm performance. Debt or dividend policy separately can moderate the negative effect of overinvestment on firm performance. However, when these two policies are combined, they lessen the positive interaction impact of each policy due to the substitution between debt and dividend policy.

The research may have two limitations. Firstly, the research measures overinvestment indirectly through investment demand function and HP filter. These two measures only help identify the sign that companies may have the problem of overinvestment because we cannot determine whether they overinvest or not in reality. Secondly, when using interaction variables, the problem of multicollinearity may be higher, and this may adjust the signs and significance level of variables in the models.

Practically, the research proposes three policy recommendations. Firstly, a company can exploit debt or dividend policy to limit excessive free cash flow in order to constrain the problem of overinvestment. Secondly, a company should enhance its corporate governance to resolve agency problems. Thirdly, the government should make the financial sector more transparent and effective to improve monitoring functions of various parties in the capital market.

Overinvestment sometimes can cause social issues. Overinvestment means that companies make ineffective investment. If they continue this situation over a long time, companies may have financial distress or even go bankruptcy. As a result, it will slow down economic growth and increase unemployment in the economy.

The research is supposed to make two great contributions to the existing empirical studies in two aspects. Firstly, it is the first attempt to take into consideration the interaction between overinvestment and financial policies. Secondly, it helps enhance the fundamental stance of the agency theory, which supports the interdependence of debt, dividend and investment policy.