Search results

This study investigates the relationship between lean manufacturing practices, management accounting and performance measurement (MAC & PM) practices, organizational strategy, structure, and culture, and facility performance. We extended past research by examining the relationships between lean manufacturing, MAC & PM practices and performance in a broader organizational context. Our study was performed using survey data provided by managers and executives at 368 facilities that had contacted the Shingo Institute for information or that had entered a Shingo Prize competition. Consistent with past research we found a significant positive association between lean manufacturing practices and lean MAC & PM practices. We found that greater employee empowerment, use of process performance measures, and use of lean accounting practices were driven primarily by lean strategy and secondarily by the extent of lean manufacturing practices. We also found that changes in organization structure to support lean are driven primarily by lean strategy and secondarily by lean manufacturing practices. Change toward lean culture, on the other hand, is driven by the extent of lean manufacturing practices. Further, we found that emphasizing process performance measures does not reduce emphasis on results performance measures and emphasizing results performance measures leads to improved financial performance. Process and results measures are being used in tandem and value stream costing has not replaced traditional accounting. The results of our study provide important insights for managers of companies engaged in lean transformation and for academics who teach or research lean accounting.

Our study examines CEO compensation for firms that announce layoffs during the 1993–2001 period. We find that overall there is a large increase in CEO equity-based compensation in the year prior to and the year of the downsizing. Our sample of downsizing firms has small improvements in operating performance following the announcement. However, these performance improvements manifest themselves in the low but not the high equity-based compensation firms. We find that the announcement period returns are higher for downsizing firms that are larger, hire a new CEO in the year prior to the downsizing, have higher leverage, and better operating performance.

This chapter investigates the impact of venture capitalists on the operating and market performance of firms going public on the French Nouveau Marché, the German Neuer Markt and the British techMARK. Considering different variables that reflect the quality of venture-backing, the findings suggest that venture-backed firms do not generally outperform those without venture-backing. However, a subgroup of internationally operating venture capitalists has positive effects on the performance of portfolio firms. The outcome is interpreted as evidence of heterogeneity among venture capitalists in the European market.

We investigate the impact of the creation of a new incentive structure for CEOs resulting from firms introducing equity-based compensation (EBC) as a means of paying top executives on policy decisions. Contrasting a firm’s stock and operating performance in the period the CEO is compensated with EBC (EBC period) and the period when EBC is not a component of the same executive’s pay (No EBC period) leads us to conclude that awarding stock options and restricted shares to executives is not associated with improved firm performance. However, firms initiate EBC after superior performance suggesting that CEOs are awarded compensation in this form as a reward for past performance. Firms have higher unsystematic and total risk levels in the EBC period suggesting EBC influences CEOs’ risk-taking behavior and reduces agency costs arising from managerial risk aversion. While there is no change in R&D expenses and cash ratios there is a decrease in capital expenditures in the EBC period, which is consistent with reduced overinvestment agency costs. Finally, leverage and payout ratios are similar in both periods implying that firms’ financing policy is not influenced by changes in CEOs’ compensation structure.

Many argue that the design of compensation contracts for public company chief executive officers (CEOs) is often not guided by a goal of value maximization. Yet, there is limited direct empirical evidence on the negative consequences of the proposed inefficient contracting between shareholders and CEOs. Using data on CEO bonus contracts of the S&P 500 firms, we investigate potential firm performance implications of the use of qualitative criteria such as leadership and mentoring in those contracts. We maintain that unlike quantitative criteria, qualitative criteria are difficult to define and measure on an objective basis, possibly resulting in an inefficient and biased incentive structure. Twenty-five percent of the sample observations have CEO bonus contracts that include a qualitative criterion for bonus payment determination. Our results show that employee productivity, asset productivity, capital expenditures, and future abnormal stock returns are lower for firms that use a qualitative criterion in CEO bonus contracts than those that do not. Further, contrary to the argument in prior literature that earnings management decreases with the use of subjective performance indicators in incentive contracts, we find that income-increasing accruals are actually higher when the CEO bonus contract includes a qualitative criterion. We recommend that compensation committees set concrete, measurable performance goals for CEOs, providing CEOs with better guidance and helping improve their corporate decision making.

This study focuses primarily on the business operating departments (hereinafter, DMUs) of a case telecom company (hereinafter, the Company) in the northern and eastern areas of Taiwan. In 2007, the Company finished the first stage of its reorganization by consolidating 14 DMUs into 12. In 2011, the Company completed the second stage of its reorganization by consolidating the 12 remaining DMUs into 8. This study intends to explore the effects of each stage of the Company’s reorganization on the efficiency and ranking of the various DMUs. The results show that the DMUs became more efficient after each stage of the Company’s reorganization. Moreover, the efficiency and ranking of the new DMUs, A6, A7, and B7 increased post-consolidation. This suggests that both the first and second stages of the reorganization were necessary. The findings of this study could help the Company and other telecom companies to design strategies for the future consolidation of other units, and thereby maintain their competitiveness and continued growth.

We examine the benefits for firms participating in collaborations funded via minority equity placements. Selling firms, on average, realize significant increases in share value – strongly correlated with the size of the equity stake, its beta, and the relatedness of the two firms (by industry). Shares of purchasing firms, though, show neutral responses on average (but positive response for R&D intensive alliances). Further, purchasing firms have better financial performance than their industry peers in the years surrounding the announcement (suggesting, unlike joint ventures, that poor performance is not their motivation). Selling firms, however, may be motivated by poor operating performance.

Prior research shows that companies that achieve high performance excel at certain financial objectives. This chapter addresses the question: Do companies that excel at these financial performance objectives also excel in integrated reporting and sustainability reporting?

We compare a sample of high performance companies (HPC) with a sample of companies that purport to support integrated reporting, and a sample that purport to support sustainability reporting. Our hypotheses are that HPC will equal or exceed the integrated reporting and sustainability reporting practices shown by International Integrated Reporting Committee (IIRC) and Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) companies and US companies will be less at these practices than non-US companies.

Our findings indicate that IIRC companies and GRI companies generally do not meet the high financial performance measures of the HPC. Based on an integrated reporting and sustainability reporting matrix, we show that HPC exhibit equal performance on the practices of sustainability and integrated reporting compared to GRI companies, but both HPC and GRI are lower on these practices than IIRC companies. Also, US companies disclose less information in sustainability reports and integrated reports as compared to non-US companies. Overall, all three groups fall short of full compliance with standards of integrated reporting and sustainability reporting.

This chapter provides evidence as to the financial performance and the current state of integrated reporting and sustainability reporting among HPC, GRI, and IIRC companies. This chapter highlights the global need for a generally accepted set of standards for sustainability and integrated reporting practices.