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Reports on a cross‐cultural study of retail bargaining behaviour between American and Chinese customers. The framework of the Fishbein behavioural intention model is applied to the retail bargaining setting, and bargaining style is treated as an action “caused” by bargaining intention, which is in turn affected by the subjective norm and bargaining attitude. The respondents were 100 American and 100 Chinese Singaporean customers. The findings of this study suggest that the Fishbein behavioural intention model can be used to explain the retail bargaining behaviour of both American and Chinese customers. The study also found that Chinese people have a higher level of bargaining intention and a more competitive bargaining style than the Americans, although the bargaining attitudes and subjective norms of the two groups do not differ.

This paper aims to study companies’ strategic responses to regulative institutional pressures on sustainability reporting. Particularly, it investigates the role of multiple stakeholder demands in shaping corporate responses to Law 11/2018 that transposes the EU Non-Financial Reporting Directive in Spain.

Informed by Oliver’s framework, the study analyzes the 2018 non-financial information of Spanish listed companies mandated to report under Law 11/2018 to explore the relationship between adopting a particular strategic response and companies’ stakeholder configuration.

Companies facing multiple stakeholder pressures tend to use a compromise strategy favoring the disclosure of relevant topics to a specific stakeholder type. Specifically, environmentalists are the most influential stakeholder in determining the coverage of sustainability topics to the detriment of other stakeholders when companies suffer from regulatory pressures.

The study contributes to disentangling the factors determining how companies respond to sustainability reporting regulation. Future research could perform longitudinal and large multinational analyses to study the evolutionary process of corporate responses.

The study is relevant to managers and policymakers as it highlights that sustainability reporting regulation should promote the coverage of relevant topics to less influential stakeholders.

The study explores the extent to which current sustainability reporting regulation can increase transparency on sustainability issues for all stakeholders.

In contrast to previous literature exploring the extent to which firms comply with regulation, the study considers that companies can respond more actively to mandatory sustainability reporting requirements.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate how resort managers respond to employment legislation (Law No. 02/2008).

The qualitative case study data from seven self-contained tourist resorts in the Maldives were used to investigate the managerial responses to employment legislation.

Resort managers’ responses ranged from passive compliance to active resistance, with decoupling through opportunism as the dominant strategy used to circumvent the legislation. Some human resource management (HRM) practices emerged from resort managers’ interactions with external stakeholders and employees. Strategic responses and HRM practices were driven by a search for legitimacy or efficiency and sometimes both. The findings show that there are differences between strategic responses and HRM practices by organisational subfield, local resorts and international hotel chains. The resorts’ market orientation also influenced resort managers’ responses and HRM practices.

The findings of this paper have limitations because it was limited to a single industry/sector and to a particular piece of legislation. However, it demonstrates the complexity of the relationship between institutional context and HRM.

This paper shows that responding to employment legislation entails a high level of interplay between the institutional environment and HR actors, and between stakeholders (e.g. employees) and HR actors. It demonstrates the difficulty of reconciling institutional requirements with the preferences of different stakeholders and organisational interests. HR actors actively make sense of institutional requirements and modify HRM practices to accommodate stakeholders’ varying perspectives and preferences. This suggests that in countries such as the Maldives, uneven institutional coverage (e.g. incomplete employment legislation) allows room for organisations to innovate – for better or worse.

Looks at the 2000 Employment Research Unit Annual Conference held at the University of Cardiff in Wales on 6/7 September 2000. Spotlights the 76 or so presentations within and shows that these are in many, differing, areas across management research from: retail finance; precarious jobs and decisions; methodological lessons from feminism; call centre experience and disability discrimination. These and all points east and west are covered and laid out in a simple, abstract style, including, where applicable, references, endnotes and bibliography in an easy‐to‐follow manner. Summarizes each paper and also gives conclusions where needed, in a comfortable modern format.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of reward systems on team performance and analyze how satisfaction with rewards can result in better working performance and cohesiveness in the job environment.

Data was collected from 32 single members of different teams working in 10 selected banks from the Middle East and North Africa region.

The analysis from empirical findings reveals that there is a positive link between reward systems and team performance. More particularly, profit sharing has positive effects on team performance and collective bargaining reward systems affect significantly team cohesiveness. These links create an opportunity for employers to use reward systems as a motivating factor to direct team behavior toward more employee retention.

This study contributes to the teamwork performance research stream by empirically studying how rewards improve team performance and cohesiveness in Eastern contexts. Studies in such contexts are relatively rare.

This paper aims to explore the role of public sectors auditors in strategically responding to institutional pressures to conduct a performance audit of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) implementation in Ghana.

To gather in-depth and rich empirical data, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 12 senior and middle management auditors of Ghana's Supreme Audit Institution (SAI).

The findings indicate that the International Organisation of Supreme Audit Institutions, the government, auditees, political executives and the Audit Service Board all exert institutional pressure on Ghana's audit of SDG implementation. In response to these pressures, the SAI deploys acquiescence, compromise and manipulation strategies that result in the coupling, and in some cases, the loose coupling of SDG audit practices.

Observation method of data collection would have given the researchers first-hand knowledge of the role of auditors, the institutional pressures to SDG audit and the strategic response to the institutional pressures. The authors were unable to accompany the public sector auditors to their field audits. This would have aided in obtaining more detailed empirical data.

The findings suggest that external and internal factors affect public sector audit of SDG implementation. Because the SAI of Ghana is dependent on the central government for budgetary allocation and auditees for miscellaneous logistics, it is under coercive pressure to meet rent seeking demands of political executives. As a result, SAIs in emerging economies must revisit the other side of accountability by reinforcing a constructive dialogue with those held accountable, particularly politicians and auditees.

This study's contribution is the exploration and application of institutional theory and Oliver (1991) model for responding to institutional pressures to a novel research area, namely, SDG implementation audit by public sector auditors in an emerging economy.

The first issue that requires examination is the question of how we got to this point to begin with. The answer to this question, of course, is a function of who “we” happens to be. The lawyers can blame Oliver Wendell Holmes (1897, p. 469), who made “the man of the future … the man of statistics and the master of economics.” The future, it would seem, is now. Legal Realist/Institutionalist lawyer-economists such as Walton Hamilton and Robert Lee Hale, who were economists on law school faculties before that tradition got started at Chicago, had something to do with this too, although neither they nor law-minded economists such as John R. Commons can be given credit or blame for the economic analysis of law – at least not directly.³ The birth of the economic analysis of law is very much a Chicago story – Coase, Becker, and Posner – although we must allow that Guido Calabresi also had more than a bit to do with these things.⁴

Through a survey of 200 employees working in five of the thirty establishments analysed in previous research about the microeconomic effects of reducing the working time (Cahier 25), the consequences on employees of such a reduction can be assessed; and relevant attitudes and aspirations better known.

In the short space of this article I can do no more than paint, with a broad brush, an impressionistic picture of the development of employment relations, confining myself to the advanced “market” economies, ie the OECD countries. There is nothing new about employment relations, and one might wonder why, with 200 years of industrial life behind us, we have not evolved a stable model; and further, that we have such a variety of decidely less than perfect models, many of which are showing clear signs of stress.