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This paper first attempts to analyze the issue of brand proliferation by a monopolist allowing transfer pricing as a channel to bridge headquarters and brand divisions, and then to view how the headquarters uses transfer pricing as a strategic device to encounter intra‐brand competition, inter‐brand competition and cross‐border profit‐shifting under an oligopolistic market.

This paper models cross‐country interactions in a Cournot‐Nash framework, and characterizes equilibrium that involves both transfer pricing and output decision. MNE's behavior is based on a two‐stage process in which the centralized headquarters' prior action on setting transfer pricing is to backup the decentralized subsidiaries in their output decision‐making.

It is demonstrated that MNEs have the incentive to manipulate their transfer prices in order to shift profit cross‐border. Higher transfer pricing enables brand divisions to collude easier in the intra‐brand competition model, and the level of transfer price hinges upon the strength of intra‐brand competition and inter‐brand competition. In addition, transfer pricing is affected by tax differences between two countries.

This paper provides the theoretical underpinning to see how headquarters may use transfer pricing as a strategic device to face intra‐ and inter‐brand competition that is visibly evident in many diverse industries.

This paper aims to examine how the “wage premium,” the percentage by which wages earned by skilled workers exceed those of unskilled workers, varies across industries characterized by different levels of competitiveness.

A theoretical model employing constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function and constant returns to scale production function is developed and analyzed to derive the effects of industry competitiveness on the wage premium. Econometric methods are applied to Chilean manufacturing data to test implications of theoretical model.

Once the relative factor endowment is being controlled, market competition significantly reduces the wage premium. More specifically, given with the same relative factor endowment, the wage premium is significantly higher under oligopolistic competition than under monopolistic competition. Empirical evidence from Chilean manufacturers supports our theoretical conclusions.

During economic development, the reallocation of production factors from unskilled labor-intensive to skilled labor-intensive industries raises the wage premiums received by skilled workers. Besides, skilled workers will earn higher wages by working in more highly concentrated industries instead of more competitive industries. This needs to be considered by government policymakers who must balance promotion of technical change with prevention of extreme the income inequality.

This paper examines how market structure affects wage premiums, providing new insights into a well-established literature that largely maintains that wage premiums are primarily a function of relative factor endowments or international trade.

Focuses on the use of short‐term price deals with regard to pricing. Introduces a set of subjective factors as predictors of price dealing intensity, in addition to traditional objective indicators. Reveals that retailers” perceptions appear to add to the structural imperfections in the market‐place. Suggests that inclusion of goal and perceptual variables may give market structure and industrial organization more powers.

States that assessment of competition policy in Australia shows that the policy is focused on competition regardless of any imbalances of market power or of its effects on income distribution. Describes briefly the policy and its background and argues that it: ignores established economic theory; that there is inadequate recognition of constraints; and that there is unsupported aversion to expert, industry‐specific regulators. Shows that acceptance of crudely defined economic efficiency as the dominant objective is likely to result in significant and frequently inequitable effects on income distribution.

Prior research has found that firms' adoption of digital technologies (i.e. digitalization) enhances transaction efficiency and improves firm performance. However, this finding is based on the assumption that firms respond to consumers' adoption of digital technology (market digitalization) in a timely fashion. The study investigates the impact of market digitalization on firm performance in Latin America, where resistance to change is often higher, despite the positive impact on performance when companies respond to the environmental shock of digitalization by restructuring.

Using data from seven Latin American countries from 1997 to 2018 (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela and Mexico), fixed-effects panel regression robustly supports the results.

Most Latin American firms fail to capitalize on the benefits of market digitalization, and their performance declines as a result. The authors extend research on digitalization by incorporating theoretical insights from the restructuring literature, finding that implementing a substantial restructuring strategy is a viable way to overcome market digitalization.

The authors demonstrate that the digitalization–firm performance relationship is more complex than has been described in studies using samples from developed economies. The authors establish restructuring as an effective adaptation strategy in Latin America, although the institutional environment's characteristics may constrain or discourage firms from adopting it.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the barriers to entry for Indigenous businesses into the Australian construction industry.

A national survey was conducted with 33 Indigenous businesses operating in the Australian construction industry.

The findings show that Indigenous enterprises face similar challenges to many small non-Indigenous enterprises wishing to enter the industry. These include adjusting to unique construction industry cultures and practices, breaking into existing business networks and building social capital and being under-cut by industry incumbents and competitors when tendering for projects. These barriers are similar to those faced by other non-Indigenous social enterprises, although Indigenous enterprises do appear to experience relatively greater difficulty in starting-up their businesses and in securing sufficient capital, finance and assistance to enable them to scale-up and tender for normal work packages at a competitive price.

The results are limited to Australian Indigenous businesses. The survey does not allow a comparison of non-Indigenous and Indigenous businesses, although comparison of results with existing non-Indigenous research into small to medium-sized firms in construction does allow some tentative insights. These need to be explored further.

These results indicate that there are significant barriers to be addressed within the Australian construction industry if government indigenous procurement policies are to achieve their stated aims of increasing the number of Indigenous firms in the industry. The results also have important implications for Indigenous businesses and for non-Indigenous firms operating in the Australian construction industry.

This is an important gap in knowledge to address if countries like Australia are to redress the significant inequalities in income and health suffered by Indigenous populations.

In countries like Australia, with significant Indigenous populations, governments are seeking to address persistent disadvantage by using new social procurement initiatives to create quasi construction markets for Indigenous enterprises to participate in the construction industry. While there is an emerging body of research into the barriers facing mainstream small to medium-sized enterprises and, to a lesser extent, social enterprises in construction, the barriers to entry facing Indigenous construction enterprises have been largely ignored.

This paper aims to investigate the role of certification in providing information and reducing market inefficiencies when the “certification process is imperfect”. In the setting, eco-labels imperfectly signal environmental product quality to consumers where the error in the process of certification could be either Type 1 or Type 2 error. The paper examines firms' incentive to get certified, equilibrium quantities and profits. The authors use perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept for the analysis. They then examine conditions for separating and pooling equilibrium to exist and welfare implications of certification process.

The paper uses a vertical product differentiated model where firms are competing in quantities. Consumers are unable to observe the environmental quality of the product. To signal the product quality to consumers, firms may adopt certification by a third party. Using a framework where certification process is imperfect, the paper derives conditions for Perfect Bayesian separating and pooling equilibrium to exist.

The paper shows that the existence of separating and pooling equilibrium depends on the certification fee. A separating equilibrium, where one firm seeks certification and other firm does not seek certification exists for an intermediate value of certification fee. A pooling equilibrium, where both firms seek certification, exists only when the certification fee is sufficiently small. The paper shows conditions for the certification fee for which welfare will be higher under separating equilibrium as compared to pooling equilibrium and analyses welfare implications for subsidy policy for the certification fee.

The paper contributes to the literature by examining the role of labelling under imperfect certification.

The purpose of this paper is to re-visit and re-invigorate the oligopolistic industry perspective on multinational corporations (MNC) strategy.

Based on insights from the industrial organization tradition and strategic management, the paper brings the original insights of the oligopolistic industry perspective into a modern context by outlining a conceptual framework that may guide future international business (IB) research on MNC strategy in oligopolistic industries.

This paper demonstrates how contemporary IB literature pays little attention to a key insight of the early IB literature, namely, that foreign direct investment (FDI) often is driven by strategic interaction among MNCs in oligopolistic industries. Instead, the contemporary IB literature focuses on the FDI as a way to reduce transaction costs and/or as a way to leverage and build capabilities across borders. The paper argues that progressing global concentration in many industries warrants a rediscovery of the oligopolistic perspective on FDI.

The paper provides a comprehensive and unique literature review of the literature on MNC strategy in oligopolistic industries. Based on this review, the paper develops a novel conceptual framework that may inspire future IB research on MNC strategy in oligopolistic industries.

The purpose of the paper is to study how technology choice is affected by capital accumulation when there is unemployment and firms engage in oligopolistic competition.

In this infinite horizon model, unemployment results from the existence of efficiency wages. Consumers choose saving optimally, and there is capital accumulation. Firms producing intermediate goods engage in oligopolistic competition and choose technologies to maximize profits. A more advanced technology has a higher fixed cost but a lower marginal cost of production.

In the steady state, it is shown that an increase in population size or a decrease in the discount rate leads intermediate good producers to choose more advanced technologies and the wage rate increases. Interestingly, the equilibrium unemployment rate decreases with the size of the population.

In this model, unemployment results from the existence of efficiency wages and firms engage in oligopolistic competition. One difficulty with efficiency wage models is that saving is not allowed. However, in this model, consumers choose saving optimally, and capital accumulation is allowed. With oligopolistic competition, the authors show that an increase in population size or a decrease in the discount rate leads intermediate good producers to choose more advanced technologies and the wage rate increases. The equilibrium unemployment rate decreases with the size of the population.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the competition in the UK construction industry and the key sectors that supply it, thereby identifying the degree of industrial concentration affecting the construction product.

The research is based on Official Statistics giving details of the concentration ratios of 127 industrial sectors in the UK. The quantitative information on concentration is backed up by qualitative data from reports by the Competition Commission and its predecessors plus enquiries from the Office of Fair Trading. This is used to grade each industry and weight the key inputs by their relative importance to obtain an overall picture of competition in construction.

The paper concludes that construction is one of the most competitive sectors in the economy and its input structure is also amongst the least concentrated. This is measured by taking the industrial sectors that supply construction and weighting them in terms of their contribution.

The data used are not totally comprehensive as certain information is withheld because of commercial confidentiality. The sectors concerned, including banking and real estate, might warrant further investigation.

The implications are that construction remains a highly competitive sector and there is little to be gained by regulation other than the work currently being undertaken on collusion in bidding, and on mergers and acquisitions. The key point is to ensure that competitive bidding is free from collusion.

The paper goes beyond most of the existing research in challenging the conventional view that construction has a highly concentrated input structure.