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The purpose of this study is to examine the odious debt concept in Greece. In Greece, the odious debt concept received high attention during recent financial crisis and Greek or Hellenic Parliament decided to establish a Special Committee.

The Greek Parliament Truth Committee on Public Debt investigated the public debt in Greece, and the main findings are: increase of debt was related to the growth in interest payments, high public spending in defence expenditures associated with corruption scandals, falsification of public deficit and debt statistical data and illicit capital outflows and adopting the euro led to a drastic increase in private debt.

Based on above the third Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) and the August 2015 loan agreement, according to Greek Parliament Truth Committee on Public Debt are illegal, illegitimate and odious because they fail to recognize the odious character of Greece’s existing debt, and the nature of the instruments by which this debt was financed from 2010 until early 2015. The Third MoU and the August 2015 loan agreement violate the fundamental human rights of the Greek people (both civil and political as well as socio-economic rights) as set out in the Greek Constitution and under international law (treaty-based and customary).

On the other side of results, Greece was a democratic regime during the time it contracted the vast majority of its loans and membership into the Eurozone, which benefitted country by gaining the highly low interest rates that euro currency involved. Also, substantial borrowing for Greece spent directly on the people via social welfare and public sector wages and infrastructure development.

Therefore, Greece, instead of the odious debt doctrine, should resort to other debt solutions such as simple debt repayment, restructuring or “haircut” of the debt (principal and interest) or declare bankruptcy without invoking the odious debt doctrine. Although this recourse avoids the dangerous precedent-setting risks of the odious debt doctrine, it also involves numerous other complexities and policy problems because with default, the banking system would collapse.

It is the first study examining the topic of odious public debt in Greece.

In October 2020, Zambia failed to make a $42.5 million interest payment on $1 billion in Eurobonds maturing in 2024, becoming the first African country to default on its debt obligations in the aftermath of COVID-19. Zambia's default highlights the fragmented nature of governance in sovereign debt markets. The Zambian default also underscores the continuing impact of colonial hangover in former colonies in Africa. Fragmented governance and colonial overhang create incentives for both debtors and creditors that contribute to cycles of sovereign debt. These cycles of debt pose a particular hazard to residents within countries that issue such debt. In African contexts, this has led to flows of funds for debt repayment that may significantly jeopardize the well-being of people who are already poor. Zambia's default also reflects the increasing need of African countries to navigate among different external actors, particularly China, which has given loans throughout Africa for varied projects, including infrastructure lending as part of its Belt and Road Initiative. The Zambian default draws attention to the significant amount of Eurobond debt African countries have incurred in recent years and the burdens that such debt may impose. The circumstances of Zambia's default, as well as recent disputes about external debt in Mozambique, reflect continuing issues about transparency and public scrutiny of sovereign debt transactions and the broader societal impact of debt internally within African countries and in relations between African countries and varied external powers.

This chapter addresses the issue of the Global South external debt by mobilizing insights from Modern Monetary Theory, Ecological Economics, and Dependency Theory. It argues that the external debt problem of Southern governments is a reflection of their subordinate economic and monetary status. It shows why the argument of foreign currency shortage often used to explain the need for Southern governments to issue foreign currency debts remains superficial. In contrast to the usual focus on creditors, the chapter highlights the role played by foreign direct investment in the genesis of the chronic external indebtedness of most Southern countries. It argues then that the external debt of the South must be understood holistically not only as a manifestation of the unequal ecological exchange between the North and the South but also as an instrument that has contributed to reproducing and amplifying this pattern. Under these conditions, the cancellation or restructuring of the South's external debt stock and a few other unlikely concessions by the Northern countries will not be enough to abolish the “debt system.” This is an important lesson from the antiimperialist critique of the mid-1970s New International Economic Order (NIEO) agenda that current movements for Southern debt cancellation and Climate Justice would do well to remember.

With the debt crisis that has been impacting many countries in the Global South since 2015, its spectacular acceleration following the collateral effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the ever-increasing weight of “new” creditors (China, Gulf countries, and private creditors), the old debate for the creation of an international sovereign debt restructuring mechanism under the aegis of the United Nations has resurfaced. Although such a mechanism could constitute a real advance compared to the current situation, it remains very hypothetical, both because of its limits and because of the complexity of the process to be undertaken in view of the adoption of an international treaty endorsing its creation. Above all, it ignores the sovereignty of states and the right to self-determination of peoples. Other solutions exist, which are less complicated, less expensive, and not at all less legitimate, among which the establishment of a moratorium with interest freeze and the creation of an audit committee with citizen participation aiming at canceling or repudiating the illegitimate debts with regard to international law and national legal provisions.

The cycle of external indebtedness of dependent countries has become a huge constraint on any strategy for radical social change.

Argentina has recently entered a new process of debt overhang and renegotiation with the International Monetary Fund and private global creditors. The dominant debate around the country's foreign debt revolves around the conditions that can guarantee the sustainability of repayment. The underlying objective is to remain in the debt system that produces and reproduces dependency.

This chapter will seek to analyze the question of debt sustainability from another point of view: Is it possible to guarantee the (financial) sustainability of the debt at the same time as guaranteeing the sustainability of life? Our argument is that by remaining in the global debt system, Argentina creates conditions that violate the requirements for the sustainability of human and nonhuman life. Drawing on a discussion from Marxist dependency theory and the traditions of Marxist feminism and environmentalism, we will discuss how the debt sustainability argument presupposes the impossibility of reproducing life. In particular, we will show how the conditions required to guarantee debt sustainability in Argentina entail the deepening of the superexploitation of the “productive” and “reproductive” labor force, and the exacerbation of extractivism, putting social reproduction in crisis.

Virtually, all countries in sub-Saharan Africa (perhaps with the exception of South Africa) have still not achieved the economic, social and political self-sufficiency that the pioneers of decolonization had envisaged by the closing years of the millennium. Despite the active presence of the World Bank (WB) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) on the sub-region development scene, initial gains immediately after colonial rule have disappeared, resulting in economic and social stagnation and, in extreme cases, disintegration (Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of Congo and Liberia). According to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (1996, 2000) in many post-colonial countries, real per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has fallen and welfare gains achieved since independence in areas like food consumption, health and education have declined. As a whole, in sub-Saharan Africa, per capita incomes dropped by 21% in real terms between 1981 and 1989.¹ Madagascar and Mali now have per capita incomes of $799 and $753, down from $1,258 and $898 twenty-five years ago. In 16 other sub-Saharan countries per capita incomes were also lower in 1999 than in 1975.² Nearly one-quarter of the world's population, but nearly 42% of the population of sub-Saharan Africa, live on less than $1 a day. Levels of inequality have also increased dramatically worldwide. This phenomenon is vividly reflected in the well-known graphic presentation of the UNDP (1992) in Fig. 1.

The management of external debt among highly indebted poor countries (HIPCs) in Africa still remains a challenge despite numerous packages and attempts to ameliorate the consequences of such odious debt. The purpose of this paper is to establish the factors that contribute to the growth rate of external debt and how these factors respond to shocks to external debt growth rate in Africa.

Data were obtained from 24 African countries and analyzed using a panel vector autoregression estimation methodology.

The study found that external debt growth rates respond positively to unit shock or changes in government investment spending, consumption spending, and domestic borrowings over a long period of time. In the medium term, external debt growth rates respond negatively to shocks in tax revenue, inflation, and output growth rates. The paper also provides empirical support that external debt may be consumed rather than invested among HIPCs in Africa.

The findings of this paper are limited to only HIPCs in Africa.

This study has some few debilitating implications for external debt management among HIPCs in Africa. First, the paper suggests that debt repayment may be a problem. This is largely because external debt is consumed rather than invested. External debt sustainability needs a holistic approach in less developed countries. The findings place much emphasis on improvements in gross domestic product and tax revenues as the principal routes out of the debt doldrums. However, this option must be exploited with great caution as there is ample evidence that these poor countries increase their external borrowing capacities with improvements in economic outlook.

This paper fills a research gap that identifies specific components of government deficit budgets that may be contributing to the growth rate of external debts among HIPCs.

This study aims to undertake an institutional analysis of capital flight and examine the drivers of capital flight from Burundi.

Given the episodes of political instability and poor governance which have characterized Burundi’s landscape in the past decades, coupled with macroeconomic instability which has been prevailing, political, economic and institutional factors are used to explain the trend and magnitude of capital flight which were recorded. An econometric analysis using robust least squares is also used to examine the determinants of capital flight from Burundi.

The estimation results seem to be sensitive to capital flight measurement used, but in general, they suggest that external debt, political instability and wars, as well as exports, are the main drivers of capital flight from Burundi.

The findings of this study imply that to discourage capital flight, the government of Burundi should promote peace and political stability. In addition, more responsibility, more transparency and accountability are required from the government of Burundi in managing resources from external debt. Moreover, some actions are needed to fight trade misinvoicing, which was seen to be a major channel of capital flight from Burundi. It is however to be acknowledged that our econometric analysis results might not be robust because of data limitations related to data availability on capital flight for only the period 1985-2013.

This study contributes to the existing capital flight literature in two ways. First, by undertaking the first ever country-specific study focusing on Burundi, and second, by undertaking an institutional analysis of capital flight to understand the political, economic and institutional issues behind capital flight from Burundi. The focus in this study is on Burundi because of the burden that capital flight imposes on the country already impoverished.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a critical appraisal of the theme of zulm (injustice/exploitation) in light of the Islamic finance literature and the general attitude and approach of the Islamic finance industry and its advocates.

Based on an expanding theoretical and empirical knowledge base about Islamic finance and banking movement, and the emerging understanding about the role of profit and corporate behavior, a critical analysis of the role of riba, interest and profit in widespread injustice and exploitation is presented.

On the basis of the behavior of the Islamic finance industry, it seems that the industry's current practices are either neutral to the issue of injustice/exploitation or mirrors the tendencies of the conventional finance. Furthermore, when comparing the exploitative role of interest and profit, the latter seems to be more consequential than generally understood and acknowledged.

Islamic economics/finance literature should have more empirical research in identifying and understanding the nature of exploitation in the contemporary world and in how the current practices or tendencies are minimizing or abetting the challenge of exploitation.

The larger goal of the Islamic finance and banking movement should be to be in harmony with the maqasid of Islam to minimize zulm (injustice/exploitation) in the society.

The larger goal of the Islamic finance and banking movement should be to be in harmony with the maqasid of Islam to minimize zulm (injustice/exploitation) in the society.

While the literature of Islamic economics and finance is rather robust, this might be the first work that critically examines the riba‐interest reductionism, especially to focus on its implication for attention of the industry being away from exploitation in general and the relationship between profit and exploitation in particular.