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We present a continuous time series on first cabin passenger fares for ocean travel from New York to the British Isles covering nearly a century of time. We discuss the conceptual and empirical difficulties of constructing such a time series, and examine the reasons for differences between the behavior of advertised fares and those based on passenger revenues. We find that while there are conceptual differences between these two measurements, as well as differences in the average values, the two generally moved in parallel, which means that the advertised fare series can serve as a reasonable proxy for movement of the revenue-based fares. We also find that advertised fares declined over time, roughly paralleling the drop in freight rates for US bulk exports, until around 1890, but thereafter increased while freight rates continued to decline. We propose several hypotheses for this divergent behavior and suggest lines of future research.

Early twentieth century transatlantic migration was both a massive transoceanic population transfer and a complex travel business. The successful growth of this multinational commerce was based not on fare reductions, but on risk management strategies. Shipping lines provided costly carrying capacity sufficient to accommodate severely fluctuating demand for transatlantic migration, and did so in a manner which improved the reliability and quality of travel for migrants.

This chapter examines the unique regulatory environment that trans-border air carriers work within. Using a U.S. perspective the concept of the bilateral air agreement is outlined and discussed. These agreements form the basis for how two countries decide to share their airspaces among their air carriers. The trend has been toward more liberal approaches. To explain this trend the concepts of the Freedoms of the Air and Open Skies are discussed. Other liberalization programs are also discussed; specifically, co-terminalization and cabotage. Finally, the air cargo transfer operations at Ted Stevens Anchorage International Airport are used as an example to highlight a rare example of unilateral liberalization on the part of the United States.

Here we consider the various ways in which airlines integrate their business activities. The thin markets, long distances, poor infrastructure, and challenging terrain over which many airlines based in developing countries operate can make it difficult to reap the economies of scale, scope, and density that carriers in more developed nations enjoy. There also remain institutional barriers to cross border trade in airline services. As a response to this, airlines from developing regions “cooperate” in a number of ways. This may involve multinational ownership, code sharing, or joint ventures. The rationale for these actions, together with discussion of the outcomes of some of them, is considered here.

Drawing primarily on examples from the United States, this chapter explains how cities often misprice street parking, and the consequences that flow from that mispricing. The chapter then discusses progress toward charging market prices for street parking. In particular I examine equity- and fairness-based objections to market prices and find that most of these objections do not withstand scrutiny

I present street parking as an example of price controls, and use a sample of American cities to show that many street parking regimes exhibit the four hallmark consequences of price ceilings: shortages, misallocation, search costs, and shadow markets.

Most parking in American cities is free or underpriced (relative to nearby off-street parking), which creates the conditions for cruising and the justification for minimum parking requirements. Contrary to perceptions, off-street parking in US downtowns is usually available – most garages have at least 20 percent vacancy. Lastly, on-street parking charges are often lower than round-trip transit fares, even though drivers are on average more affluent than transit riders.

The chapter demonstrates the logical inconsistency of keeping street parking free, as well as the practical problems that arise by doing so. It also addresses the common concerns that dense areas have insufficient parking, and that accurately priced street parking would burden low-income people.

By using the price control framework, the chapter provides a novel way to think about parking pricing, one that emphasizes the distortions created by governments’ refusal to price their valuable street space. The chapter also provides new evidence about the relative prices of on- and off-street parking, and the burdens of parking charges relative to charges for transit.

In much of the literature written in Sustainability and Environmental Justice, the focus is on the effects of government mismanagement or corporate social irresponsibility, or CSR ignored for the goal of greater profits. Certainly we have seen natural resources ripped from communities and nations for the benefit of corporate profits (Sarkar, 2013). The idea that a participatory government will lead to greater efforts for sustainability must be viewed in the light of its times and economy (Gonzalez-Perez, 2013). What happens when the man-made disaster precedes or clashes with natural disaster? The Great Recession of 2008 was stunning in the rapidity with which it spread around the globe. The recession illustrated a global acceptance of financial wisdom that had been presented as fact and yet could easily be undermined by people who understood the barriers, boundaries, and restrictions in place as well as where the financial assumptions could be deceived by introduction of new terms and definitions as in the case of credit default swaps.

In this chapter, we focus on the influence of the recession on one of the most powerful financial capitals of the world, New York City. We discuss the general effect of the recession on New York City as a whole and then take a narrower look at each of the five boroughs, Manhattan, Queens, Staten Island, Brooklyn, and the Bronx. We examine the disparate economic states of each borough and how the recession has impacted each of them. Furthermore, we discuss the implications of the general perception of Manhattan’s resilience to the recession and how is has impacted the other boroughs, such as the housing crisis in Staten Island and Queens following Hurricane Sandy, unemployment rates in the Bronx, and the rebuilding of a sustainable job market in Brooklyn.

We reviewed relevant literature, including academic research, reports issued by the State of New York, census data, articles printed in popular press outlets, and business resources to provide a thorough look at the influence of the Great Recession on New York City and each of its five boroughs. We found extensive support for the disparity amongst the five boroughs, despite the perception that New York City is thriving in the wake of the Great Recession and Hurricane Sandy. We detail the unique economic and environmental factors of each borough and explain how it influenced the impact of the Great Recession and subsequent natural disaster.

Manhattan was well insulated from the initial impact of the Great Recession, with tourism in the city remaining high through 2008 and financial firms on Wall Street experiencing record high profits well into 2009. Despite the downfall of Lehmann Brothers and Merrill Lynch, the financial bailouts and Federal Reserve credit available to Wall Street firms prevented Manhattan’s financial sector from experiencing the dramatic unemployment rates that the rest of New York and the United States were facing (DeFreitas, 2009).

The Great Recession hit disadvantaged areas, like the Bronx, harder than other areas of New York, while Hurricane Sandy halted the economic recovery in areas like Queens and Staten Island. While unemployment remains low in New York City as a whole, the recovery from the Great Recession has been uneven, further widening the gap between New York City’s boroughs, with the lower income areas at a greater disadvantage and the higher income areas souring. While Manhattan has recovered significantly, with Wall Street profits reaching record levels in 2009, other boroughs haven’t experienced the same economic upturn and are still facing significant challenges (Parrott, 2010). While the city has gained nearly 375,000 jobs, nearly twice the number of jobs that were lost during the Great Recession (Crain’s New York Business, 2013), the significant variance in wages and high costs of living has not greatly reduced the number of working poor across New York City and has not resulted in an evenly spread boost in wealth.

At the end of our chapter, we discuss “lessons learned” and, in particular, the importance of preparation for both fiscal and natural disasters. Local policy makers must ensure that the needs of its constituents are being met and will be met in the future if such hardship were to strike. Government leaders need to have a forward-looking plan, rather than simply handling immediate needs.

The originality of our content stems from a deeper look into the nuances of the economy of New York City. Statistics paint a picture of a thriving City, despite the Great Recession. However, understanding the distinct differences amongst the five boroughs illustrates that these citywide averages do not paint an accurate picture of life for New Yorkers off of Wall Street. The extent to which the high-income areas in Manhattan have recovered suggests that the economy of New York City as a whole is thriving, whereas the reality is that the middle-class has not recovered and the previously disadvantaged are now even more so. It is important to look at each of the five boroughs of New York City individually when creating policy to both recover from and prevent events such as the Great Recession and the destruction of Hurricane Sandy. Our chapter illustrates stark differences within New York City in the face of both financial and natural crises.