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The purpose of this paper is to assess the determinants of state fragility in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) using hitherto unexplored variables in the literature.

The previously missing dimension of nation building is integrated and the hypothesis of state fragility being a function of rent seeking and/or lobbying by de facto power holders is tested.

The resulting interesting finding is that political interference, rent seeking and lobbying increase the probability of state fragility by mitigating the effectiveness of governance capacity. This relationship (after controlling for a range of economic, institutional and demographic factors) is consistent with a plethora of models and specifications. The validity of the hypothesis is confirmed in a scenario of extreme state fragility. Moreover, the interaction between political interferences and revolutions mitigates the probability of state fragility while the interaction between natural resources and political interferences breeds the probability of extreme state fragility.

There are two main policy implications. First, political interference, rent seeking and lobbying are likely to increase the fragility of SSA nations. Second, there is a “Sub-Saharan African specificity” in “nation building” and prevention of conflicts. Blanket fragility-oriented policies will be misplaced unless they are contingent on the degree of fragility, since “fragile” and “extreme fragile” countries respond differently to economic, institutional and demographic characteristics of state fragility.

The study is timely given the political strife, violence and conflicts issues currently affecting African development.

This paper aims to assess the role of foreign aid in reducing the hypothetically negative impact of terrorism on trade using a panel of 78 developing countries with data for the period 1984-2008.

The empirical evidence is based on interactive generalised method of moment estimations with forward orthogonal deviations. Bilateral, multilateral and total aid dynamics are used, whereas terrorism entails domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorism dynamics.

The following findings have been established. First, while bilateral aid has no significant effect on trade, multilateral aid and total aid have positive impacts. Second total terrorism, domestic terrorism and transnational terrorism increase trade with increasing order of magnitude. Third, corresponding negative marginal effects on the interaction between foreign aid (bilateral and total) and terrorism display thresholds that are within range. Fourth, there is scant evidence of positive net effects. Overall, the findings broadly indicate that foreign aid is a necessary but not a sufficient policy tool for completely dampening the effects of terrorism on trade.

There is a growing policy interest in the relationship between terrorism and international development outcomes.

The author aims to analyze the effect of statistical capacity on government effectiveness/efficiency using cross-sectional from a sample of 48 African countries for the period 2003-2008.

The estimation technique used is a two-stage least squares instrumental variable methodology and ordinary least square.

The results show that statistical capacity positively affects government effectiveness/efficiency. It follows that countries with higher statistical capacity levels enjoy institutions of better quality than countries with low levels of statistical capacity.

As a policy implication, if Africa does not have effective governments, it is partly because it has a very weak statistical capacity. In such an environment, access to information for effective governance is compromised.

This paper contributes to existing literature on the determinants of institution by focusing on the distribution of the dependent variable (government effectiveness). The author stressed the importance of information and statistics capabilities.

Crimes and conflicts are seriously undermining African development. The purpose of this paper is to assess the best governance tools in the fight against the scourges.

The authors assess a sample of 38 African countries. Owing to the cross-sectional structure of the data set, the authors adopt a heteroscedasticity consistent ordinary least squares estimation technique. For further robustness purposes, the authors employ Ramsey’s regression equation specification error test.

The following findings are established. First, democracy, autocracy and voice and accountability have no significant negative correlations with crime. Second, the increasing relevance of government quality in the fight is as follows: regulation quality, government effectiveness, political stability, rule of law and corruption-control. Third, corruption-control is the most effective mechanism in fighting crime (conflicts).

The findings are significantly strong when controlling for age dependency, number of police (and security) officers, per capita economic prosperity, educational level and population density. Justifications for the edge of corruption-control (as the most effective governance tool) and policy implications are discussed.

The study is timely given the political instability, wars and conflicts currently marring African development.