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In countries with large or potentially large oil and gas deposits, the resource and its extraction tend to become vital cornerstones of the economy. However, uncertainties involved in finding commercial quantities of oil and gas and the intensive capital required for undertaking exploration and production result in significant business risks. The petroleum fiscal systems in many developing countries are now opting for production‐sharing contracts (PSC) as a new model of agreement for the exploration and production of oil and gas resources. This paper extends the principal‐agent theory to foster understanding of partnership between the host government and its foreign contractor in the realm of PSC. The theory highlights the importance of moral hazard and adverse‐selection problems. To avoid these uncertainties and asymmetric information, the principal (national oil company) needs to design an incentive contract that induces the agent (international oil company (IOC)) to undertake actions that will maximise the principal's welfare. Under a PSC, the state has to offer contract terms that are attractive enough for the IOC to enter into an agreement. At the same time, the terms must allow the state to receive maximum economic returns from the venture.

A public‐private partnership can be seen as an appropriate institutional means of dealing with particular sources of market failure by creating a perception of equity and mutual accountability in transactions between public and private organisations through co‐operative behaviour. The relative merit of the idea of public‐private partnership is oriented mainly around a mutual benefit. As the roles of government in public‐private partnerships are not only to provide services, but also to monitor the marketplace, a well‐defined regulation framework is essential. A sound regulatory framework will increase benefits to the government by ensuring that essential partnerships operate efficiently and optimise the resources available to them in line with broader policy objectives, ranging from social policy to environmental protection. In turn, it provides assurance to the private sector that the regulatory system includes protection from expropriation, arbitration of commercial disputes, respect for contract agreements, and legitimate recovery of costs and profit proportional to the risks undertaken.