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The purpose of this paper is to study the relationship between institutional holdings and analyst coverage in the context of the heterogeneous nature of institutional investors.

Similar to prior studies (e.g. Ke and Ramalingegowda; Ramalingegowda and Yu), this paper obtains institutional investors' trading classifications (transient, dedicated, and quasi‐indexing) from Brian Bushee directly. To examine the hypotheses, the paper uses a two‐step instrumental variable approach demonstrated in O'Brien and Bhushan to mitigate the simultaneity relationship between the change in analyst coverage and the change in the number of heterogeneous institutional investors.

The findings suggest that such relations are different among transient, dedicated, and quasi‐indexing institutional investors. Specifically, there are three major results. First, a change to the number of analyst coverage has the lowest impact on the change in the number of dedicated institutional investors. Second, a change in the number of transient institutional investors has a higher impact on change in analyst coverage than those for change in the number of dedicated and quasi‐indexing institutional investors. Third, changes to analysts' buy or sell recommendations have the least impact on the change in the number of dedicated institutions, relative to transient and quasi‐indexing institutions.

The findings suggest that institutional investors are not homogeneous. Research studies on institutional investors need to disentangle the differences among different types of institutions.

The paper provides a comprehensive study on different institutional investors and analyst coverage. The findings show the complex nature of the interaction between institutional investors and analyst coverage.

We argue that uninformed subscribers to an initial public offering (IPO) of common stocks are exposed to greater ex ante risk of trading against informed traders in the secondary market because the advent of public trading conveys hitherto private information and thereby mitigates adverse selection. The going‐public firm underprices the new issue to compensate uninformed subscribers for this added secondary market adverse selection risk. We test this market liquidity‐based explanation by investigating the ex‐post consequences of ownership structure choice on the initial pricing and the secondary market liquidity of a sample of initial public offerings on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Consistent with our argument, we find that initial underpricing varies directly with the ex post trading costs in the secondary market. Further, initial underpricing is related positively to the concentration of institutional shareholdings and negatively to the proportional equity ownership retained by the founding shareholders. Finally, the secondary market illiquidity of new issues is positively related to institutional ownership concentration and negatively to ownership retention and underwriter reputation. Thus, the evidence based on our NYSE sample supports the view that the entrepreneurs' choice of ownership structure affects both the initial pricing and the subsequent market liquidity of new issues.

Purpose – Study the impact of the heterogeneity of institutional investors, evident in their investment horizon, on firm credit ratings.

Methodology/approach – Use a large sample of U.S. firms over the period from 1985 to 2006 (20,670 U.S. firm-year observations) to empirically investigate the relationship between institutional investment horizon and firm credit ratings. Test whether institutional investors with long-term investment horizon are associated with important monitoring and informational roles and thus higher credit ratings.

Findings – Stable shareholdings and relationship investing of institutional investors contribute to their monitoring and informational roles and result in higher firm credit ratings. Namely, ownership stakes of long-term institutional investors are associated with higher firm credit ratings than those of short-term institutional investors. In addition, the predominance and number of institutional investors with a long-term investment horizon affect firm's agency costs and information quality.

Social implications – Institutional monitoring incentives seem to be susceptible to the heterogeneity of institutional investors. The results point to the benefits of the long-term investment horizon of institutional investors (beyond their shareholdings) that seem to be associated with more efficient monitoring and thus reduced managerial myopia and opportunism.

Originality/value of the chapter – This is the first work to provide evidence on the extent to which the heterogeneity of institutional investors, evident in their investment horizon, alters firm's credit ratings.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of conversion to REIT status by former listed property companies in the United Kingdom on the level of institutional ownership during the period of 2007–2016.

This paper uses an event study framework to track the change in institutional ownership three years before and after a REIT conversion event. This event study approach circumvents the sample selection bias issue associated with the conversion event wherein the decision to convert to REIT is likely to be endogenous.

Panel regression analysis reveals that changing to REIT status led to a 12.8 and 15.2% increase in institutional ownership and number of institutional investors, respectively. The first order of priority in institutional investors' investment in REIT shares is their preference for liquidity. Further analysis shows that institutional investors changed their preferences towards characteristics associated with systematic risk, firm age and liquidity after the conversion event by becoming less averse to firm-specific risk, placing more emphasis on firm age and less emphasis on systematic risk and liquidity.

Overall, conversion to REIT status helps increase former property companies' investor base, which is in line with the regulator's aim to open up the property market to a wide range of investors through the introduction of a REIT regime. Findings from this paper also have policy implications for countries that are considering a REIT regime for their capital market and existing REIT regimes without a formal conversion mechanism.

This paper offers, for the first time, evidence on 1) how conversion to REITs influences firms' institutional ownership and 2) the determinants of converted REITs' institutional ownership.

Using initial public offering (IPO) involuntary delisting data, this chapter examines whether and how motivated institutional investors affect the survivability of IPO firms. The empirical evidence shows that the likelihood of future delisting is much lower for IPOs with more motivated institutional investors. This impact is more pronounced for firms with higher information asymmetry. The motivated institutional investors also facilitate better post-IPO operating performance. The results are consistent with the prediction of the limited attention theory.

This paper examines the effect of institutional investors on the trading volume reaction to management forecasts of annual earnings. Based on a sample of forecasting firms between 1990 and 1992, institutional investors are examined as heterogeneous types, rather than as a single group as done in prior research. The findings contribute to the growing literature on institutional investor types in two ways: (1) institutional categories differ in their trading patterns, and (2) if the categories are classified into active and inactive types, then greater trading by active institution‐types signals greater investor‐level information asymmetries and greater trading by inactive institution‐types signals lower investor‐level information asymmetries. Overall, the results suggest that increased firm voluntary disclosures, as encouraged by the SEC and the AICPA, may be differentially informative to different types of investors.

The purpose of this paper is to test the hypothesis that relative to a cash acquisition, a stock acquisition would increase the bidder’s investor base and lower Merton’s (1987) shadow cost, which in turn contributes positively to the bidder announcement return.

Using the number of registered shareholders and measures of institutional ownership as the proxies for investor base and investor recognition, this paper compares their changes and the changes in shadow cost between bidders using different methods of payment. The authors examine the relation between the shadow cost reduction and bidder announcement return in a multivariate framework.

This paper finds that given the target type, bidders using stocks experience significantly larger increases in their investor bases and investor recognition than bidders using cash. Additionally, only bidders using stocks experience significant decreases in their shadow costs. In a multivariate framework, the change in the shadow cost has a negative and significant effect on the bidder announcement return in the sample of stock acquisitions and the subsample of bidders using stocks to acquire private targets. These findings support the authors’ hypothesis and suggest that the less established bidders acquiring private targets in particular benefit from the shadow cost reduction.

This paper provides the direct evidence that investor recognition matters in mergers and acquisitions. The findings also provide a complementary explanation for the documented positive bidder returns when bidders use stocks to acquire private targets.

This paper aims to provide new evidence that corporate site visits give institutional investors better opportunities to obtain information and exert monitoring powers, which reduce listed firms’ earnings management.

This paper explores how private communications affect firms’ earnings management by using a sample of institutional investors’ visits to the corporate sites of Chinese listed firms between 2010 and 2018. This study uses the performance-matched Jones model (Kothari et al., 2005) to measure accrual-based earnings management and Roychowdhury’s (2006) method to measure real earnings management. The authors also perform several robustness checks including an alternative measure of accounting accruals, a two-stage instrumental regression and the Heckman two-step approach.

Using a sample of institutional investors’ site visits to Chinese listed firms during the 2010–2018 period, this study finds that institutional investors’ site visits reduce listed firms’ earnings manipulation activities (both accrual-based and real). This association is robust to several checks, including an alternative measure of accounting accruals, a two-stage instrumental regression and the Heckman two-step approach. This study further documents that other private communication approaches such as private in-house meetings and conference calls moderate the effect of site visits.

As the Shenzhen Stock Exchange is one of the few stock markets to mandate that listed firms record and disclose their private communication information, this study also has implications for researchers and policymakers who work in other stock markets.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first comprehensive study of the impact of private communications on earnings management. This study extends the earnings management literature by examining institutional investors’ information acquisition process and revealing a negative association between their site visits and listed firms’ earnings management. Moreover, this study examines the effects not only on traditional accounting accruals but also on real earnings management. In addition to studies that emphasize the effect of corporate site visits on individuals and market reactions, this study examines the effect of site visits on firms’ financial misbehavior. This study shows that institutional investors’ corporate site visits provide external monitoring that mitigates listed firms’ earnings management behavior.

The purpose of this paper is to examine industry herding among the institutional investors and to find whether their herding behaviour is intentional or unintentional.

The study uses Lakonishok et al. (1992) model to examine the presence of industry herding behaviour among institutional investors. To determine whether the herding observed is intentional or unintentional, herding measure is regressed with volatility, volume, beta and return. The period of the study is from 1 April 2005-31 March 2015.

The findings of the study showed that though institutional investors have herding tendency towards most of the industries, in the overall period industry herding was not significant. The herding found in some industrial sectors was linked to economic performance of those sectors in India during the period of study and hence the herding was unintentional in nature.

This is the first attempt to study industry herding among institutional investors and their intent in Indian market ever since the country opened its market to foreign investors in a big way. Present study is limited to the use of only bulk/block data instead of the entire trading data for the period.

This study is the first attempt to investigate industry herding behaviour of institutional investors in the market using their bulk and block trading data. The herding observed in well performing industries has been shown to be unintentional and hence rational. The results indicate that the entry of big institutional investors, including foreign institutions into the Indian market has not destabilised the market by irrational herding.