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This paper examines collaborative planning, forecasting, and replenishment (CPFR), a Web‐based tool to coordinate the various supply chain management activities including production and purchase planning, demand forecasting, and inventory replenishment between supply chain trading partners. This paper identifies what CPFR is, explains the CPFR process, cites benefits that have been achieved, identifies obstacles to implementation, and discusses the future of CPFR.

This chapter explains the structure of two contracts commonly involved in university licensing: the license granting a company (or companies) outside the university rights to make, sell, or lease products or processes based on a university invention, and the nondisclosure agreement (NDA) that plays a role in the license negotiation process. In the context of the Bayh–Dole Act, the chapter explains that license contracts often contain a complex combination of payment terms intended to provide sufficient incentives for licensees to undertake the (often risky) development of embryonic research. The authors relate the intent of the Bayh–Dole Act to the concerns of university licensing professionals who often negotiate licensing agreements. The chapter then examines the same incentive issues (and the universal contract issues of money, risk, control, standards, and endgame) in the context of NDAs, used by potential licensing partners to protect their respective interests while sharing information about a licensable technology. The chapter concludes with an assignment that provides students with an opportunity to evaluate a license, not from the university's perspective but from that of a client interested in licensing an invention owned by the university.

There is a tension between the literatures on incomplete contracting and transactions cost economics regarding the importance of ex post governance and the extent to which formal theories of incomplete contracting capture salient aspects of exchange relations. In this paper, we empirically examine how firms structure joint R&D agreements to illuminate how contracts can be incomplete and how governance can matter. We employ a dataset of 96 contracts to construct a taxonomy of the types of mechanisms firms use in organizing collaborative R&D, and indicate how groups of mechanisms line up with various types of contracting hazards. The results suggest that the allocation of property rights over innovations at the time of contracting between R&D partners is an important aspect of contract design. But they also suggest that weak property rights admit scope for other dimensions of contract. In particular, the research indicates that while knowledge spillovers may give rise to appropriability hazards, efforts to contain or channel knowledge spillovers may enable joint venture members to strategically block other members’ follow-on commercialization or research. Firms design joint R&D governance mechanisms to balance spillover hazards and strategic blocking.

In recent years, a growing number of libraries have canceled or unbundled their “Big Deal” journal subscriptions – those subscriptions that include a full package of digital journal titles for one discounted cost. This started as an affordability problem but has slowly morphed into a challenge from libraries demanding a new pricing structure that accommodates and spurs the growing open access movement.

The change has caused a variety of challenges for technical services units including the increased need for user data, increasingly complicated workflows as they manage partial subscriptions, new interactions with consortia, and ongoing campus conversations. Whether the library is seeking to simply unbundle due to budget constraints, or push for new models such as “read and publish”, there is a tremendous impact on the work of technical services units.

This chapter will explore the rationale and growth of the Big Deal, how it is breaking, four case studies on breaking Big Deals, a brief discussion of new transformative agreements, new challenges for consortia, and implications for technical services units moving forward.

The questions of loan availability and pricing were considered from the perspectives of financial economic theory and practice as well as a survey of lenders capable of financing a one-year bridge loan to determine the market's willingness to make such a loan and what rate of interest would be charged. Utilizing the sources above, in conjunction with professional knowledge and industry contacts, 101 lenders were selected as representative of the universe of lenders who had the capacity to make directly or otherwise to arrange, a $192 million bridge loan. The survey of lenders involved interviews with 67 of the 86 selected lenders from 59 firms. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

Loan availability and pricing were considered from perspectives of financial economic theory and practice plus a survey to determine market's willingness to make a loan at what price. Utilizing professional knowledge and industry contacts, 101 lenders were selected as representative of those which had the capacity to make a $192 million bridge loan. When lenders were evaluated against criteria of size, product type, geographic territory, and willingness/capability to provide nonstandard loans, list selected for telephone interviews was narrowed, then subsequently expanded with referrals that led to identification of new potential lenders to be contacted.

Nine lenders offered conceptualized deal structures to provide the required financing. Though the price may be expensive, especially relative to what borrowers may wish to pay, financing is available. Developers’ and deal-makers’ protestations that “it's impossible,” should be discounted and rejected. Because the subject property is characterized by high-risk, it is logical conclusion that the lenders expressing a desire to provide the bridge loan would expect to earn a high return, meaning that the interest rate would approach, if not exceed, 20 percent.

Because the nature of the research required that the specific identities of the building and the parties were not revealed, some lenders might decline to consider this financing opportunity. And, real world negotiation of financing terms could result in higher rates than quoted and/or disinclination of lenders to proceed. Because of very specialized circumstances surrounding this proprietary research, conducted subject to nondisclosure agreement, publication had to be deferred until those constraints no longer applied. Though the data are more than a decade old, this consideration does not compromise the relevance, validity, or generalizability of the findings.

Markets can accommodate transactions that might be perceived as improbable. Investors which approach opportunities with creativity and open mind, can make deals that would not be possible, were strict, rigid, unbending eligible deal preference parameters to be employed. Strategists establishing policies for real estate enterprises should insist on progressive, expansive thinking in turning the scope of their potential venture involvements. Real estate education and training should address more attention to financial economic theory, strategic initiative, and creative deal making, which priority topics are too seldom prioritized, with the consequence that too many in real estate think narrowly rather than expansively.

This research substantiates a fundamental theory of financial economics and refutes conventional applied wisdom. Seldom do researchers and investors have the opportunity to “get inside” the lending decision process for a large scale commercial property, especially one characterized by daunting circumstances and considerable complexity, such as studied here. A unique real world date set – not normally accessible to property scholars – enables study of the proposition that every commodity has a price, no matter how severe or difficult the circumstances, in a manner fully congruent with the new AACSB Business School Deans policy emphasis on relevance in addition to rigor.

As commercial mortgages much less studied than residential mortgages, this paper is significant addition to undeveloped segment of literature. As the majority of mortgage finance research, estimated to be in the range of 90 percent, has been limited to single family residential financing, the study of commercial mortgage financing is relatively under-researched. Further, the studies of commercial mortgage finance tend to be illustrative case studies with stylized facts rather than explorations of empiricism-based investigations. As most researchers engaged in exploring real estate topics limit themselves to public information, research that provides access to real world private transactions is especially important.

The purpose of this paper is to propose a system for regularly offered government-sponsored technology prizes. Such prizes would preserve the incentive to invent without the barriers to entry that come with the patent system. This is of particular interest to entrepreneurs as they lack the patent portfolio that incumbent firms can leverage into derivative technology.

After reviewing various efficiency concerns with the patent system, the author describes how technology prizes could work alongside the patent system. Such prizes are best when the sponsor can capture as much of the technology spillover as possible – i.e. through a government agency. This paper provides a framework for a practical prize structure while paying special attention to combating the logistical and public choice concerns of creating a prize.

This paper focuses on two methods to prevent inefficiency in government-sponsored prize: truth-bonding and information markets. Each mechanism helps combat different kinds of problems. Various complications to this system are explored and addressed.

The paper suggests that an efficient prize system is a possible policy and, if implemented, would embolden technology-focused entrepreneurship and other subsequent technological development.

While previous work has noted the benefits of technology prizes over patents, few attempts have been made to outline an incentive-compatible system for doing so. This paper is the first of its kind to propose a practical and efficient government-sponsored prize system.

The UK has in recent years seen considerable growth of facilities management (FM) outsourcing across a range of industries. This paper considers the legal problems and risks inherent in FM outsourcing. It also suggests ways to facilitate the transactional negotiating process and discusses the methods by which business and legal risks can be fairly apportioned (between the user and the provider), how to ensure good contract management and, importantly, managing risks on contract termination and exit. The paper is relevant to both users and providers in terms of best negotiating practice and risk management. From a legal perspective, both the UK (and the European Union) are more highly regulated jurisdictions for FM deals than are the US and Canadian markets, and this paper focuses on UK (and European) issues. Cross‐border legal issues are also considered.

Licensing from US universities is done within the overall legal framework of the Bayh–Dole Act of 1980 and the employment agreements of universities. This chapter explains common contracts used by universities to license technologies developed by their faculty and students within the context of these laws. In addition to the legal framework, the nature of license agreements is affected by the embryonic nature of most university inventions, which necessitates faculty and student involvement in development, and the entrepreneurial goals of the university. Universities have diverse goals in terms of revenue, licenses executed, inventions commercialized, patents filed, and number of startups formed. The somewhat obvious problem is that the goals of faculty, students, the university, and the licensee may not be aligned. Common contracts used are meant to align these goals. While some contracts include multiple terms such as upfront fees, running royalties, annual payments, and equity, Express Licenses are increasingly being used to accommodate the entrepreneurial environment. This chapter discusses these issues and also the importance of the rights to sublicense inventions.

The purpose of this paper was to study how public regulation promotes or hinders openness in the food industry, specifically how European novel food regulation has affected external ties among novel food pioneers seen through patents and their inventors.

A multiphase mixed-methods design was used to combine data as follows: Worldwide patents originating from Norwegian novel food pioneers 2004–2019, downloaded through the European Patent Office database. Application data and interviews were analysed together with substantial information on 88 patents.

Firms use patenting and novel food applications as part of a wider intellectual property rights strategy to guard against unintended spillovers and to shape external collaboration. Examinations of patents indicate a pattern of selective partnership with research and development (R&D) providers.

Food industry actors can combine property rights strategies to maintain a pattern of openness and external collaboration. R&D providers should consider the food industry's flag-planting strategies by integrating these into contractual regulations.

Little is known earlier about how novel food pioneers collaborate with suppliers, research actors, governmental actors, distributors and customers regarding new product development.

Technological innovation is not simply invention, but rather is a process that includes all the steps from the decision to conduct research to the identification of opportunities and paths for that research to contribute to society through diffusion and commercial application. While scientific discovery is central, it is a single (albeit critical) piece of a complex process involving navigation of the business, legal, regulatory, and economic issues that define the innovation landscape.