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Post-9/11 a first order terrorism narrative has been widely asserted. In this chapter, I explore the development of second order terrorism narrative or ideal-type.

The chapter begins by providing a brief synopsis of three highly mediated Australian counter-terrorism operations and of shortcomings in incident counting. It also relies on some U.S. research on counter-terrorism prosecutions in support.

In first order terrorism, crime appears as a spectacular irruption or original sin on a tabula rasa of innocence and there is a clean division between us and them, non-state and state, victim and offender. In the second order terrorism narrative there is a contrasting claim that 9/11 is blowback, in kind, for U.S.-led interventions and does not offer a clean division between how we and they behave, blurs non-state and state culpability in big crimes, and sees victims and offenders trading places over time. As we adjust our perspective from the presumptive first order to second order event-acts, terrorism and counter-terrorism, event-act and interdiction, is merged as one.

The concept may be useful in accounting for assumptions pertaining to this category of crime, including its relation with precaution and security.

What kinds of support do interstate rivals provide to domestic actors in ongoing civil wars? And how do domestic actors utilize the support they receive? This chapter answers these questions by comparing Iranian and Saudi military and non-military (mediation, foreign aid and religious soft-power promotion) support to the Houthis and to the Government of Yemen (GoY) during the Saada wars (2004–2010) and the internationalized civil war (2015–2018). It also focuses on the processes through which the GoY and the Houthis have utilized this support for their own strategic purposes. This chapter applies a structured, focused comparison methodology and relies on data from a review of both primary and secondary sources complemented by 14 interviews. This chapter finds that there were less external interventions in the conflict in Saada than in the internationalized civil war. During the latter, a broader set of intervention strategies enabled further instrumentalization by domestic actors, which in turn contributed to the protracted nature of the conflict. This chapter contributes to the literature on interstate rivalry and third-party intervention. The framework of analysis is applicable to civil wars that experience intervention by rivals, such as Syria or Libya.

Today, the global education market is one of the faster growing sectors, and it has attracted several new actors or what we call educational brokers who are now responsible for shaping national agendas. The newer actors in education are vastly different for the former players in that whereas previous actors engrossed national educational systems through the provision of technical assistance to meet international standards, best practices, and benchmarks, these newer players are for-profit entities that emphasize austerity, leanness, human resource maximization, performance targets, and competition. Therefore, in this new educational landscape, national governments are seen as “clients” who receive “expert” advice from “external consultants” that have an assortment of experiences across different sectors. Education governance is no longer a statist endowed but one that incubates in laborites of best practices resonates with existing case studies and results driven based on Big Date collected. We argue that educational brokers are responsible for the emergence of a hybrid form of education governance that use business and market techniques to reform strategies within the education sector. We conclude by suggesting that collectively educational brokers are using what we call “educational sub-prime mechanisms” – higher interest rates, reduced quality collateral, and less advantageous terms to counterweight higher credit risk – to manage educational portfolios and newer forms of educational risk.

With the advent of the fourth industrial revolution and the intelligent economy, this conceptual chapter explores the evolution of educational governance from one based on governing by numbers and evidence-based governance to one constituted around governance by data or data-based educational governance. With the rise of markets and networks in education, Big Data, machine data, high-dimension data, open data, and dark data have consequences for the governance of national educational systems. In doing so, it draws attention to the rise of the algorithmization and computerization of educational policy-making. The author uses the concept of “blitzscaling”, aided by the conceptual framing of assemblage theory, to suggest that we are witnessing the rise of a fragmented model of educational governance. I call this governance with a “big G” and governance with a “small g.” In short, I suggest that while globalization has led to the deterritorializing of the national state, data educational governance, an assemblage, is bringing about the reterritorialization of things as new material projects are being reconstituted.

This essay will consider three theories developed by international law scholars to analyze the international legal terrain and the strengths of each as well as issues it fails to address sufficiently in the dimensions of power, meaning, and social relationships: bottom-up lawmaking; transnational legal processes; and global legal pluralism. The idea of bottom-up lawmaking, already discussed, has the strength of beginning from the everyday practices by which problems are solved that lead eventually to the creation of a body of law. However, the phrase bottom-up suggests that this is a grassroots movement, while it is typically cosmopolitan elites who generate the informal rules that become established over time. Explicit attention to the power relationships underlying this process would help to clarify what “bottom-up” means. As Judith Resnick points out, the terms “soft law” and “hard law” are themselves problematic, incorporating gender ideologies and suggesting that some international laws are enforced firmly, which is rarely the case in practice (personal communication).

Purpose – Attitudinal inoculation has a long history of success in communication studies. A wealth of literature has shown it to be an effective strategy for preventing the assimilation of beliefs and attitudes in several domains, including healthcare, politics, and advertising. Despite its demonstrated efficacy, its utility as a means of preventing the adoption of beliefs and attitudes consistent with strategic messaging distributed by malicious actors has yet to be sufficiently evaluated. This chapter introduces attitudinal inoculation as a viable strategy for challenging online disinformation produced by violent extremist groups.

Methods – Through a systematic review of the literature on attitudinal inoculation and disinformation, this chapter represents an attempt to link broad themes of narrative persuasion with the field of counter-terrorism.

Findings – This chapter will offer specific guidance on the development of inoculation messages intended to mitigate the persuasive efficacy of online disinformation produced and distributed by violent extremist organizations.

Originality/Value – As one of the first attempts to demonstrate the utility of attitudinal inoculation in the field of terrorism and radicalization studies, this chapter presents a novel approach to understanding contemporary issues of political extremism.

This chapter reviews the changing contours of education governance in today’s global environment in which governments participate in different educational agreements across various levels (supranational and global) or what is identified as the rise of “educational multistakeholderism.” Methodologically it draws up discursive evidence from previous studies in the form of a content analysis to show how the expansion of international regimes (institutions) into new issue areas, such as education, creates an overlap between the elemental (core) regime and other regimes. In exploring how regime theory has been applied to comparative and international education, this chapter draws attention to how new regimes and institutions arise and coexist alongside two or more classes (civil society, nongovernmental, intergovernmental, businesses, and state) of actors and its consequences for education governance. It suggests that regime complex(es) in education, which aims to facilitate educational cooperation and are composed of assemblages from several other regimes, are responsible for governing, steering, and coordinating education governance activities through the use of agreements, treaties, global benchmarks, targets, and indicators. It concludes by suggesting that regimes and regime complex(es) in education are constituted by different types of multistakeholder governance.

This chapter examines the potential and limitations of criminal law as a policy tool for fighting against the trade in counterfeit goods in Tanzania. It uncovers major challenges involved in tackling the counterfeiting business in Tanzania using criminal law. The chapter shows that counterfeit goods have infiltrated many supply chains in Tanzania. Both law-related and non-law factors drive the counterfeit goods trade. The counterfeiting business affects consumers, traders, the economy and the general society in Tanzania. The counterfeiting business presents serious societal risks during the crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic owing to the possible infiltration of counterfeit pharmaceuticals into the medical supply chain. Criminal law is part of Tanzania's legal embodies for fighting against the counterfeit goods trade. Both law-related and non-law limitations and challenges undermine the efficacy of criminal law in tackling the trade in counterfeit goods in Tanzania. The chapter recommends policy, legal and institutional reforms that will help to augment the efficacy of the anti-counterfeiting legal regime in Tanzania.