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The increased use of checks in nonlocal payments at the end of the nineteenth century presented problems for their clearing and collection. Checks were required to be paid in full (at par) only when presented directly to the drawn-upon bank at its counter. Consequently, many, primarily rural or small-town, banks began to charge remittance fees on checks not presented for collection in person. Such fees and the alleged circuitous routing of checks in the process of collection to avoid them were widely criticized defects of the pre-Federal Reserve payments system. As the new Federal Reserve established its own system for check clearing and collection, it also took as an implicit mandate the promotion of universal par clearing and collection. The result was a bitter struggle with non-par banks, the numbers of which initially shrunk dramatically but then rebounded. A 1923 Supreme Court decision ended the Fed’s active (or coercive) pursuit of universal par clearing, and non-par banking persisted thereafter for decades. Not until the Monetary Control Act of 1980 was universal par clearing and true monetary union, in which standard means of payment are accepted at par everywhere, achieved.

The assumption today is that the Federal Reserve stands behind the financial system in case of a catastrophic shock. There has been little research on how the payments system functioned during economic catastrophes prior to the establishment of the Federal Reserve System. This paper examines the 1906 San Francisco earthquake when a private sector response was required after disaster occurred. The research question addressed is how well the private sector responded when there was a large external shock to the payments system such as an earthquake. The San Francisco Clearinghouse is examined as a case study.

This chapter develops a no-arbitrage, futures equilibrium cost-of-carry model to demonstrate that the existence of cointegration between spot and futures prices in the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) crude oil market depends crucially on the time-series properties of the underlying model. In marked contrast to previous studies, the futures equilibrium model utilizes information contained in both the quality delivery option and convenience yield as a timing delivery option in the NYMEX contract. Econometric tests of the speculative efficiency hypothesis (also termed the “unbiasedness hypothesis”) are developed and common tests of this hypothesis examined. The empirical results overwhelming support the hypotheses that the NYMEX future price is an unbiased predictor of future spot prices and that no-arbitrage opportunities are available. The results also demonstrate why common tests of the speculative efficiency hypothesis and simple arbitrage models often reject one or both of these hypotheses.

Empirical evidence of the hedging pressure risk premium exists only in the futures contracts with delivery-related options. Since hedging pressure is supposed to exist for all futures contracts, the empirical evidence raises an interesting empirical question: whether the hedging pressure risk premium is in fact the risk premium associated with the delivery-related options. This chapter contains an empirical test of the non-redundancy between the two related but alternative sources of non-market risks. For the test, we employs a futures risk premia model in which the expected futures returns contain the market risk premium (proxied by the equity market risk premium) and two non-market risk premia (proxied by the hedging pressure effect and by the delivery risk premium reflected in the returns of futures options, respectively). Our main finding is that both the hedging pressure and the delivery risk premia are non-redundant and statistically significant for futures contracts with delivery-related options. This finding implies a substantial degree of segmentations between these futures markets and the underlying asset markets.