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Empirically observed violations of traditional expected utility theory have prompted several new theories, putting the future of decision analysis at the crossroads. This essay describes the current status of the literature through selected examples of decision making scenarios. It concludes that if all relevant consequences of all alternatives are included in the analysis, then expected utility theory would prove to be valid. Practitioners who use techniques or software based on expected utility theory need only to make sure that they have considered all relevant consequences, and need not worry about the new non‐expected utility theories.

We present the results of a questionnaire study with Belgian undergraduate students as respondents. We consider the relationship between people’s direct ethical preferences, their preferences behind a veil of ignorance, and their purely individual risk preferences over income distributions. The results reveal that, although there are important similarities between the three types of preferences, the first and third types form two extremes, while the second type lies in between the other two. Consistency of response patterns with the expected utility (EU) and rank-dependent expected utility (RDEU) models – natural analogues of the social welfare functions most frequently used in the literature on inequality and social welfare – is tested as well. For all three types of preferences the results reveal that, in the considered context, the RDEU model does not add explanatory power to the EU model. However, preferences appear to be relatively well described by some of the basic concepts from non-expected utility theory not usually considered in the income distribution literature.

This paper aims to give a brief review on behavioral economics and behavioral finance and discusses some of the previous research on agents' utility functions, applicable risk measures, diversification strategies and portfolio optimization.

The authors also cover related disciplines such as trading rules, contagion and various econometric aspects.

While scholars could first develop theoretical models in behavioral economics and behavioral finance, they subsequently may develop corresponding statistical and econometric models, this finally includes simulation studies to examine whether the estimators or statistics have good power and size. This all helps us to better understand financial and economic decision-making from a descriptive standpoint.

The research paper is original.

This paper argues that since the utility function representation of the individual is derived from standard rationality theory, the view that rationality is bounded implies that individuality should be seen to be bounded as well. The meaning of this idea is developed in terms of two ways in which individuality is bounded, with one bound associated with bounded rationality in Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory and another bound associated with bounded rationality in Simon’s thinking. The two bounds on individuality are argued to be employed in agent-based modeling and social identity theory. How bounded individuality might be formally modeled is illustrated in an account of Kirman’s Marseille fish market analysis.

An outcome bias occurs when performance is evaluated based upon the outcome of the decision rather than upon the quality of the decision itself. The purpose of this paper is to test experimentally whether advisors eliminating the uncertainty in the quality of decisions as a potential driver of the outcome bias can eliminate this bias in judgements. Additionally, the paper analyses whether such advisors can attenuate the emotional experience after decisions’ outcomes by supporting the cognitive understanding of these outcomes.

The paper employs a between-subject experimental setting where decision makers are asked to make investment decisions. The two variables manipulated were advice (receiving advice vs deciding without an advice) and state (loss vs neutral vs gain state). Participants were randomly assigned to each group. One group completed all tasks while receiving advice before making a final decision. Another group completed all tasks without any advice. After completing each investment task, participants were randomly assigned to one of three possible states that determine their payoff.

The results reveal that advisors eliminating the uncertainty in the quality of decision can eliminate the outcome bias in the judgements of decision quality, especially after bad outcomes. Nevertheless, after controlling for the perceived quality of the decisions, advised individuals show a greater emotional sensitivity to bad outcomes than non-advised decision makers. These observations suggest that advisors eliminating the uncertainty in the decision quality can improve the understanding that good decisions can lead to bad outcomes just by chance, but they are not able to prevent affective reactions after bad outcomes; on the contrary, they may even reinforce them.

The observation that, after bad outcomes, advised decision makers are less willing to decide the same way than non-advised decision makers is consistent with empirical findings on the risk-taking behaviour of self-directed and mutual fund investors. Self-directed investors are less likely to revise their decision and sell an investment at a loss than mutual fund investors (Chang et al., 2016). While investors might sell funds because they are unable to observe the decision process of the manager and use the outcome to judge the manager’s skills, this study shows that such learning from decision outcomes is not necessary for observing the risk-taking behaviour of the investors. Even if the decision process of the advisor is observable (as in this study), the decision makers’ willingness to decide the same way is influenced by the losses – an effect that goes beyond the assessed quality of advice as the results of this study show.

The results of this study have important implications for advisors aiming to maintain a positive relationship with their clients. Convincing clients that an advice is optimal supports their understanding that a good advice can have bad outcomes. However, this understanding may not prevent affective reactions after bad outcomes. On the contrary, the affective response after bad outcomes is even stronger with the advice than without it. Hence, advisors should address not only issues related to the quality of the provided advice, but also emotional aspects, which could be related to what clients expect from following the advice.

This study is one of the few that account for the possibility that the outcome bias may arise because there is uncertainty regarding the optimal choice. In particular, this paper uses a much more powerful criterion to define an optimal choice than the expected value criterion used in previous studies. The criterion represents a minimal requirement for rational behaviour in expected utility theory and many non-expected utility theories.

The dominant theory of individual decision making under uncertainty is the von Neumann and Morgenstern's expected utility model (EUM). Although, this model has gained its popularity from its ability to explain a wide range of attitudes toward risk, empirical evidence over the last three decades has documented paradoxical behavior that is inconsistent with the EUM model. The present study examines in an experimental setting individuals' inconsistent behavior in choosing between two pairs of lotteries known as the Allais paradox. This study extends previous literature on money gamble situations by conducting a series of experiments to test expected utility behavior on auditing student subjects in pure money and audit settings. Two variants of audit settings are examined: overall audit plan case and audit procedure evaluation of internal control case.

The formal model of economics of crime developed by Becker is based on the assumption that a miscreant knows with certainty the benefit that accrues to a criminal activity. The purpose of this paper is to relax this assumption and establish a link between technical efficiency and commission of fishery crimes in a developing country where fishing techniques are rudimentary making catch volumes uncertain.

The paper extends the neoclassical model of crime developed by Becker to account for catch uncertainties. The extended model predicts that, in addition to the risk and severity of punishment, less skilful fishermen are more likely to violate effort‐limiting fishing regulations. Primary data were obtained through a survey of 258 artisanal fishermen from the Central and Western Regions of Ghana to test the predictions of the model.

The prediction that less skillful fishers are more likely to violate effort‐limiting fishing regulations is confirmed by the data. Other factors that determined the rate of violation of the fishing regulation include the risk of detection, severity of punishment, rate of time preference, age of the fisher, perceived legitimacy of the regulation and respect for religious norms.

If returns to illegal activities are uncertain, policies that improve the efficiency of potential violators may decrease the rate or extent of violation. Moreover, minimizing overfishing will improve livelihood and reduce poverty among fishers.

The paper makes a novel attempt at linking efficiency (or skills) to violation of regulations.

Agricultural insurance has become increasingly important to farmers' livelihood and production in rural China. Yet despite the enormous governmental subsidizing efforts, the insurance participation rate remains below expectations. This study revisits the linkage between farmers' risk attitudes and crop insurance utilization by providing a cross-cutting perspective such that the role of risk aversion is re-scrutinized in Chinese “kindred” village economies.

The authors administrated a lottery-based multiple price list (MPL) experiment by recruiting rice farmers from 12 villages in Sichuan province in southwestern China. Using the experimental data, farmers' risk attitudes are assessed and coefficients of risk aversion are estimated within the rank-dependent expected utility (RDEU) framework by maximizing a structured likelihood function.

This study provides substantiating evidence that rice farmers in southwestern China exhibit relatively high risk aversion. The authors also provide suggestive evidence of the positive relationship between farmers' risk aversion and crop insurance utilization. In addition, findings reveal that kinship network has a negative effect on crop insurance utilization, such that farmers who are connected in higher degree of kinship network have lower likelihood of crop insurance utilization, which suggests that kinship network may be substitute for formal crop insurance. Result also demonstrates that the incentive effect of risk aversion on farmers' crop insurance participation manifests differently depending on the degree of kinship network in rural China.

This study provides a cross-cutting perspective by scrutinizing the effects of farmers' risk attitudes and kinship network on crop insurance participation in rural China, which has received relatively little attention in the literature. Conclusions on the effects of risk aversion on crop insurance participation have been mixed in previous studies. In addition, to the best of our knowledge, little has been done to explicitly examine the influence of social proximity and networks on farmers' insurance uptake. This study attempts to fill both gaps. This study provides new insights which might shed lights on the understanding of farmers' crop insurance participation in rural China.

An aspect of prospect theory posits that decision‐makers, when making decisions in the face of risk, make their decisions with respect to a pre‐existing reference point or ‘frame’ (the statusquo bias). We utilize data from the Australian version of the TV game show, Deal or No Deal, to explore whether risk aversion varies with a change in reference point in a context where stakes are real and high.We achieve this by exploiting a special and unique Australian feature of the Deal or No Deal lottery‐choice setting, namely, the existence of the Chance or the SuperCase rounds (supplementary rounds). These rounds reverse the decision‐frame that was obtained in earlier (normal) rounds. We fit and estimate a complete dynamic decision‐making model to our dataset and find that the risk aversion estimate of contestants who participated in both the normal and the supplementary rounds indeed differs depending on the nature of the round, a result consistent with the operation of the existence of a framing effect.

This paper investigates whether individuals’ risk-taking behavior is affected by background risk by analyzing individuals’ choices over a series of lotteries in a laboratory setting in the presence and absence of independent, uncorrelated background risks. Overall, our results were mixed. We found some support for the notion that individuals were more risk averse when faced with the introduction of an unfair or mean-preserving background risk than when no background risk was present, but this finding depends on how individuals incorporate endowments and background gains and losses into their utility functions and how error variance is modeled.