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Premananda Sethi, Tarak Nath Sahu and Sudarshan Maity
This study aims to examine the influence of corporate governance variables on firm performance and also to find out whether the corporate governance mechanism is capable of…
Abstract
Purpose
This study aims to examine the influence of corporate governance variables on firm performance and also to find out whether the corporate governance mechanism is capable of mitigating the vertical agency crisis. Here the researcher uses corporate governance mechanisms such as board meeting frequency, board independence, percentage of non-executive directors, percentage of woman directors on board and the board size to measure the firm performance and, at the same time, tries to mitigate the agency crisis, which is measured through return on asset and asset turnover ratio.
Design/methodology/approach
The present study considers period from 2009 to 2020 with data corresponding to a panel of 271 non-financial firms listed in 500 NSE index, India. The study introduces a panel regression model to analyze the data collected from the sample firms.
Findings
The study detects a positive as well as a statistically significant relationship between board size and vertical agency cost. The study also observes a negative relationship between board independence and agency cost. Further, the study finds a positive relationship between corporate governance variables and firm performance, though it is non-significant.
Originality/value
As the study progresses, the study detects a negative relationship between non-executive directors and agency costs. This study tries to give policy prescription to the corporate policymaker regarding various measures to be taken by the firm for the improvement of firm performance and reduction of owner and manager conflict inside the company. The study fills the literature gap by revealing a significant relationship between corporate governance, vertical agency crisis and firm performance.
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Krishna Prasad, K. Sankaran and Nandan Prabhu
The purpose of this paper is to examine the empirical relationship between gray directors (non-executive non-independent directors) and executive compensation among companies…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to examine the empirical relationship between gray directors (non-executive non-independent directors) and executive compensation among companies listed in India’s National Stock Exchange (NSE). The paper also examines the possible interplay of relationships between controlling shareholder duality (controlling shareholder being the CEO), ownership category and executive compensation.
Design/methodology/approach
A sample of 438 firms listed in the NSE of India was studied using data spanning five financial years, 2012–2013 to 2016–2017.
Findings
Empirical evidence suggests that there is a positive association between the proportion of gray directors on the board and executive compensation. The sensitivity of executive compensation to gray directors is found to be higher among family controlled firms. This research has also found that CEOs who belong to controlling shareholder groups received higher pay than professional CEOs. The authors conjecture that these results suggest cronyism and may contribute to lower levels of corporate governance practices in the country.
Research limitations/implications
The hybrid board structure, which India has adopted with the desire to bring the best of Anglo Saxon and Japanese board philosophies, has paradoxically led to self-serving boards. Exploration of alternative thinking to bring about changes in the regulatory framework is, therefore, necessary.
Originality/value
Serious problems are identified with the philosophy behind board composition mandated by Listing Requirements for Indian firms with empirical evidence showing how the existing rules generate cronyism and unfairness to minority shareholders.
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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role of independent non-executive directors (INEDs) in Malaysian public listed companies (PLCs), other than the control role…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the role of independent non-executive directors (INEDs) in Malaysian public listed companies (PLCs), other than the control role prescribed by agency theory and reformatory documents such as the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance.
Design/methodology/approach
A qualitative research design, consisting of face-to-face interviews with 27 company directors of Malaysian-owned PLCs, was instigated.
Findings
The interviews revealed that INEDs do more than just monitor their executive counterparts. Apart from the control role, INEDs of Malaysian companies provide a conduit for mitigating uncertainties in the environment and perform invaluable services to the host companies.
Research limitations/implications
This research utilized interviews. Generalizations may be an issue when interviews are used as the method of inquiry. Also, the sample is not random as access to many of the interviewed directors depended on recommendations. In addition, respondents were consciously selected in order to obtain various board positions that include independent and non-independent directors.
Originality/value
There are limited studies using qualitative research design in investigating INEDs’ performing other roles apart from the control role of the board in developing countries. Many of previous studies and literature in this area of corporate governance were predominantly based upon experiences of western economies.
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Abstract
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The author examines the role of board structure and institutional investors in dealing with the agency issues for the Indian firms by taking the data of NSE-500 nonfinancial firms…
Abstract
Purpose
The author examines the role of board structure and institutional investors in dealing with the agency issues for the Indian firms by taking the data of NSE-500 nonfinancial firms for the period 2010–2019.
Design/methodology/approach
The author applies dynamic panel data methodology to deal with endogeneity concerns prevalent in corporate finance variables.
Findings
The agency view is consistent with the board size in the context of India. The author observed that the board size has a harmful effect on agency cost. A larger board size may create a coordination problem, or CEO may find it easy to thrust his or her decisions on board. The author also noticed that firms should have sizeable institutional ownership, particularly pressure-insensitive investors, in equity as they can reduce agency-related issues.
Originality/value
This study focuses on one of the largest emerging economies, i.e. India.
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Nicholas Asare, Patricia Muah, George Frimpong and Ibrahim Ahmed Anyass
This study aims to examine the effects of board structures (BS) on the financial performance and stability of banks in Africa.
Abstract
Purpose
This study aims to examine the effects of board structures (BS) on the financial performance and stability of banks in Africa.
Design/methodology/approach
Using annual data of 366 banks from 26 African countries from 2007 to 2015, the study estimates growths in financial performance using net interest margin and risk-adjusted return on assets; bank stability using z-scores; and BS using board size, board independence and board gender diversity. The system generalized method of moments and ordinary least squares panel-corrected standard error estimation strategies are used to estimate panel regressions.
Findings
The study concludes that board independence has a negative and significant relationship with financial stability but has diverse relationships with financial performance. Board size and board gender diversity have insignificant relationships with financial performance and stability.
Research limitations/implications
The study has relevant implications for practitioners, policymakers and the academic community. The findings provide evidence of the extent to which BS have been instituted to influence the financial profitability and stability of banks in Africa.
Originality/value
This study offers robust evidence on the role of BS in the performance and stability of banks; using a multidimensional conceptualization of the performance and stability of banks in 26 countries in Africa.
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Syed Tauseef Ali, Zhen Yang, Zahid Sarwar and Farman Ali
In view of organizational inertia, with the occurrence of a major event, though resource rigidity minimizes, however simultaneously, it increases process rigidity, which creates…
Abstract
Purpose
In view of organizational inertia, with the occurrence of a major event, though resource rigidity minimizes, however simultaneously, it increases process rigidity, which creates difficulties in motivating managers and dealing with the agency problem. Therefore, keeping in mind the high demand created by the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor and Naya Pakistan Housing Scheme in the cement sector of Pakistan, the purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of corporate governance (CG) on the cost of equity (COE) in the cement sector, to deal with the problems surging during and after the completion of these projects and highlight further opportunities for the cement sector of Pakistan.
Design/methodology/approach
CG is a qualitative concept therefore, eight proxies have been used to measure it along with the two control variables. This study uses balance panel data of six years from 2012 to 2017, collected from 18 companies of the cement sector of Pakistan. Descriptive statistics have been used to describe the data, correlation matrix to see the nature of the relationship, and Pooled OLS as the estimation technique, while to analyze the data a statistical package 13 has been used. To measure the COE, the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) has been used.
Findings
Regression results suggest that block ownership, insider ownership and the board size are insignificant, while CEO tenure is negatively and significantly associated with the COE. Non-executive directors, independence and CEO duality are insignificant; however, diversity is positively and significantly associated with the COE. Moreover, the mean value of the COE is 8.22 percent for the cement sector, while the coefficient of determination of the model under study is 74 percent.
Research limitations/implications
This paper is based on the data from the cement sector of Pakistan only. Therefore, this is the reason that these results cannot be generalized on the whole economy of Pakistan.
Practical implications
This study helps in finding out the COE value specific to the cement sector, which will help this sector to evaluate the capital budgeting decision more precisely and accurately than before. Moreover, the association of diversity as positive, while independence as negative with the COE highlights a room for improvement in the implementation of CG codes by SECP. This study also helps to mitigate the impact of inertia, the after-effects of high demand, and managing the agency problem in the cement sector.
Originality/value
This is the first study using CG data collected just after the revised promulgation of CG codes in 2012, along with a wide range of eight proxies measuring CG and its impact on the COE in the cement sector.
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