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1 – 10 of 560Ata Allah Taleizadeh and Mahtab Sherafati
This paper aims to present various three-level service contracts among the following three participants: a manufacturer, an agent and a customer. The interaction between the…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to present various three-level service contracts among the following three participants: a manufacturer, an agent and a customer. The interaction between the aforementioned participants will be modeled using the game theory approach. Under non-cooperative and cooperative games, the optimal sale price, warranty period and warranty price for the manufacturer and the optimal maintenance cost (repair cost) and marketing expenditure for the agent are obtained by maximizing their profits. The satisfaction of the customer is also maximized by being able to choose one of the suggested options from the manufacturer and the agent, based on the risk parameter.
Design/methodology/approach
Three-echelon supply chains with marketing and warranty services are studied. Game-theoretic approaches (non-cooperative and cooperative) are presented. The non-cooperative approaches are static (NE) and dynamic (Stakelberg) models. The cooperative approach is related to bargaining models (Nash bargaining games). The authors develop a sensitivity analysis of some parameters and their effect.
Findings
Based on the mentioned drawbacks (i.e. lack of a model containing warranty, marketing and pricing), despite their importance, a developed model is proposed in this research to cover one of the research gaps. In addition, main contributions of this paper that differentiate it from the existing papers are regarding inventory, lost sale and lost goodwill, which are significant in the comparison environment. Another advantage of this study is related to the solution approach, the game theory. Twofold of the games theoretical, i.e. cooperative (in three forms) and non-cooperative are considered, because of their importance. Three types of non-cooperative games are presented as follows: Nash equilibrium – each echelon decides respectively and simultaneously; manufacturer-Stackelberg – the manufacturer has more power than the agent and the agent has more power than the customer; and customer-Stackelberg – customer is leader of the agent and the agent is the leader of manufacturer. The involved cooperative game in this paper is the bargaining problem that the participants can determine how to share the additional profits.
Originality/value
In this paper, various three-level service contracts will be presented among the following three participants: a manufacturer, an agent and a customer. The interaction between the aforementioned participants will be modeled using the game theory approach. Under non-cooperative and cooperative games, the optimal sale price, warranty period and warranty price for the manufacturer and the optimal maintenance cost (repair cost) and marketing expenditure for the agent are obtained by maximizing their profits. The satisfaction of the customer is also maximized by being able to choose one of the suggested options from the manufacturer and the agent, based on the risk parameter. Several numerical examples are used to illustrate the models presented in this paper. Finally, the authors develop a sensitivity analysis of some parameters and their effects on the objective functions.
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In times of increasing shipping risks and uncertainty, the purpose of this paper is to analyze fiercely competitive shipping markets in the Asia-Pacific region and help the…
Abstract
Purpose
In times of increasing shipping risks and uncertainty, the purpose of this paper is to analyze fiercely competitive shipping markets in the Asia-Pacific region and help the carriers develop the optimal pricing schemes, shipping networks (e.g. routes and shipping frequency), and future investment plans.
Design/methodology/approach
This paper develops viable maritime logistics strategies based on the non-cooperative game theory which determines the optimal vessel size/type, shipping route, and shipping frequency, while taking into account multiple cost components and unpredictable shipping market dynamics.
Findings
This study revealed that the container carrier’s optimal shipping strategy was insensitive to changes in freight rates, fuel prices, and loading/unloading fees at the destination ports. However, it tends to be more sensitive to an increase in the shipping volume than the aforementioned parameters. In other words, aggressive pricing schemes and drastic cost-cutting measures alone cannot enhance carrier competitiveness in today’s shipping markets characterized by overcapacity and weak demand.
Originality/value
This paper is one of a few attempts to identify a host of factors influencing the container carrier’s competitiveness using the game theory and develop an optimal shipping strategy in the presence of conflicting interests of multiple stakeholders (e.g. carriers, shippers, and port authorities). To validate the rigor and usefulness of the proposed game-theoretic model, the authors also experiment it with an actual case study of container carriers serving the Northeast Asian shipping market.
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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the state of the art in static and dynamic games (or inter‐firm relationships). This research area has changed significantly over the…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the state of the art in static and dynamic games (or inter‐firm relationships). This research area has changed significantly over the last 25 years through the development of phenomena such as the supply chain and the progressive overcoming of monopolistic and oligopolistic frameworks. By exploring the state of the art in inter‐firm relationships, this paper aims to identify the most suitable research methods to be used by future research in this domain and to highlight the major areas under investigation.
Design/methodology/approach
This research adopts both qualitative and quantitative approaches. The qualitative approach describes the technical differences between static and dynamic methods and gives evidence of their appropriateness when applied to a game. Quantitative analysis transforms some of the information extracted from the qualitative analysis into categorical variables in order to obtain an indication of the major issues still to be addressed.
Findings
The resulting findings identify the extent of the use of static and dynamic modelling in previous research and how their use has changed over time, what resolution methods need to be applied when investigating inter‐firm relationship, what features influence this decision and what research areas still remain unexplored.
Originality/value
The existing literature on the modelling of static and dynamic games lacks an exhaustive review. Several contributions investigate the literature on inter‐firms relationships and review numerous issues, but focus only on static or dynamic modelling. This paper fills this gap by reviewing a number of theoretical papers.
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To describe how the well‐known Shapley Value concept from cooperative game theory can be used as an approach to solve the transshipment problem.
Abstract
Purpose
To describe how the well‐known Shapley Value concept from cooperative game theory can be used as an approach to solve the transshipment problem.
Design/methodology/approach
This paper provides a numerical example for a three‐person game in a non‐cooperative environment, a selected cooperative environment, and a fully cooperative environment. The well‐known Shapely Value concept from cooperative game theory is used as an approach to solve the transshipment problem and show “how” the pooling coalitions should be formed. The appurtenance of the Shapley Value is verified to ensure that a stable solution exists.
Findings
The primary focus of this paper is to describe how the well‐known Shapley Value concept from cooperative game theory can be used as an approach to solve the transshipment problem and show “how” the pooling coalitions should be formed.
Research limitations/implications
While pooling coalitions are presented, this paper does not discuss revenue sharing.
Practical implications
This paper helps students understand “how to” make the right decisions about where they want to position themselves with respect to supply chain strategies.
Originality/value
The principal contribution of this approach is for establishing a pooling coalition in order to provide a more stable and cooperative solution. This paper also presents application to recent supply chain management business scenarios found in industry.
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In forecasting unknown quantities, risk and finance decision makers often rely on one or more biased experts, statistical specialists representing parties with an interest in the…
Abstract
Purpose
In forecasting unknown quantities, risk and finance decision makers often rely on one or more biased experts, statistical specialists representing parties with an interest in the decision maker's final forecast. This problem arises in a variety of contexts, and the decision maker may represent a corporate enterprise, rating agency, government regulator, etc. The purpose of the paper is to assist decision makers, experts, and others to have a better understanding of the dynamics of the problem, and to adopt strategies and practices that enhance efficiency.
Design/methodology/approach
The problem is formulated as a two‐person, non‐cooperative Bayesian game with the decision maker and one expert as players, and perfect Bayesian equilibrium solutions are identified. Then the analysis is extended to variations of the game in which the expert's loss function is not common knowledge, and in which there are multiple experts.
Findings
In the struggle for information between the decision maker and the experts, the experts generally benefit from greater uncertainty about the parameters of the model. Thus, in attempting to elicit as much information as possible from the experts, the decision maker must strive to minimize all sources of uncertainty.
Research limitations/implications
As in most Bayesian games, the analysis requires that a variety of process assumptions and model parameters be common knowledge. These conditions may be difficult to satisfy in real‐world applications.
Practical implications
The principal finding of the study is that there is truly a struggle for information between the decision maker and the experts. This generally encourages the experts to inject as much uncertainty as possible into the process. To counter this effect, the decision maker might: provide incentives for the experts to increase their sampling information; try to mitigate specific uncertainties regarding the model parameters; and try to increase the number of experts.
Originality/value
This is the first paper to apply the framework of signaling games to the problem of eliciting information from biased experts. It is of value to decision makers, experts, and economic researchers.
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David Kim Hin Ho, Eddie C.M. Hui, Tai Wing Ho and Satyanarain Rengarajan
This paper aims to examine the behavior of “rational” residential developers, under game theory, for their pricing strategy in a competitive environment.
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to examine the behavior of “rational” residential developers, under game theory, for their pricing strategy in a competitive environment.
Design/methodology/approach
Results show that residential developers cooperate implicitly for long-term benefit, leading to a slow-down in sales. Developers are motivated to deviate from cooperating at the beginning and at the end of successive periods in a sub-market. Relatively high profits, earnable in the first few periods, provide an allowance to undercut prices and improve sales. For the last few periods, the punishment for any deviation from cooperating is insignificant or zero. Note that the first-mover advantage in a new market is evident. On the effect of uncertainty on the developer’s residential prices, results show that as uncertainty increases, prices decrease while price variability increases.
Research limitations/implications
This study highlights the merits of a uniquely simplified experimental research design for the strategic behavioral pricing of the private residential development market using a game theoretic approach.
Practical implications
This study enhances the understanding of the residential development strategy of developers in the residential development market.
Originality/value
There is limited research on pricing strategy for the private residential development market in Asia.
Details
Keywords
- Behavioural pricing
- Development and redevelopment
- Price uncertainty
- Experimental research design
- First-mover advantage
- Game theoretic approach
- Private residential development market
- Investor-developer
- Behavioral pricing
- Pricing strategies
- Game theoretic approach
- Experimental research design
- Equilibrium price
- First-mover advantage and price uncertainty
Ela Ozkan-Canbolat, Gulberk Ozkan and Aydin Beraha
This paper aims to show that evolutionary game theory not only provides a general and unified theory of political philosophy and strategic management theories but also a positive…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to show that evolutionary game theory not only provides a general and unified theory of political philosophy and strategic management theories but also a positive theory of interactive behavior.
Design/methodology/approach
This study suggests a way of the evolutionary game-theoretical model.
Findings
The model presented in this paper demonstrates coopetition is derived from balance points in multi-actor games. As the political–philosophical address of those strategic games will of all becomes convention in this balance point at which common knowledge occurs global optimum.
Research limitations/implications
This study explores the connections between several streams in philosophy and strategic management. What does a particular philosophy contribute to strategic management with respect to game theory? When addressing this question in historical or exploratory terms, or in a combination of both, the end result is similar: particular philosophical issues, properly explained, are discussed in relation to important questions in strategic management.
Practical implications
What are the psychological and behavioral underpinnings of strategic decisions of this kind? What type of cognitive frames and managerial mental models, such as the game-theoretical model, might enable or hinder the integration of real-world problems in strategic decision-making?
Social implications
What explains the evolution of such mental models, as well as the development of philosophical ideas, in informing the origins? How does the evolution of social and political contexts influence change in the cognitive and behavioral underpinnings of strategic decision-making?
Originality/value
This study highlights the overt power of strategic management ideas – competition, cooperation and coopetition – which have historically been built on the foundations of organizational theory, while also underlying the potential of philosophies, collective wisdom and Condorcet’s jury theorem and Rousseau’s (1998) correctness theory in games of evaluation. This study investigates whether the many produce better decisions than the wise few.
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Ata Allah Taleizadeh, Mahsa Noori-Daryan and Shib Sankar Sana
This paper aims to deal with optimal pricing and production tactics for a bi-echelon green supply chain, including a producer and a vendor in presence of three various scenarios…
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to deal with optimal pricing and production tactics for a bi-echelon green supply chain, including a producer and a vendor in presence of three various scenarios. Demand depends on a price, refund and quality where the producer controls quality and the vendor proposes a refund policy to purchasers to encourage them to order more.
Design/methodology/approach
In the first scenario, the members seek to optimize their optimum decision variables under a centralized decision-making method while in the second scenario, a decentralized system is assumed where the members make a decision about variables and profits under a non-cooperative game. In the third scenario, a cost-sharing agreement is concluded between the members to provide a high-quality item to the purchasers.
Findings
The performance of the proposed model is investigated by illustrating a numerical example. A sensitivity analysis of some key parameters has been done to study the effect of the changes on the optimal values of the decision variables and profits. From sensitivity analysis, the real features are observed and mentioned in this section.
Originality/value
This research examines the behavior of partners in a green supply chain facing with a group of purchasers whose demand is the function of a price, greenery degree and refund rate. This proposed mathematical model is developed and analyzed which has an implication in supply chain model.
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Issam Tlemsani, Robin Matthews and Mohamed Ashmel Mohamed Hashim
This empirical research examined the factors and conditions that contribute to the success of international strategic learning alliances. The study aimed to provide organisations…
Abstract
Purpose
This empirical research examined the factors and conditions that contribute to the success of international strategic learning alliances. The study aimed to provide organisations with evidence-based insights and recommendations that can help them to create more effective and sustainable partnerships and to leverage collaborative learning to drive innovation and growth. The examination is performed using game theory as a mathematical framework to analyse the interaction of the decision-makers, where one alliance's decision is contingent on the decision made by others in the partnership. There are 20 possible games out of 120 outcomes that can be grouped into four different types; each type has been divided into several categories.
Design/methodology/approach
The research methodology included secondary and primary data collection using empirical data, the Delphi technique for obtaining qualitative data, a research questionnaire for collecting quantitative data and computer simulation (1,000 cases, network resources and cooperative game theory). The key variables collected and measured when analysing a strategic alliance were identified, grouped and mapped into the developed model.
Findings
Most respondents ranked reputation and mutual benefits in Type 1 games relatively high, averaging 4.1 and 3.85 of a possible 5. That is significantly higher than net transfer benefits, ranked at 0.61. The a priori model demonstrate that Type 1 games are the most used in cooperative games and in-game distribution, 40% of all four types of games. This is also confirmed by the random landscape model, approximately 50%. The results of the empirical data in a combination of payoff characteristics for Type 1 games show that joint and reputation benefits are critical for the success of cooperation.
Practical implications
Research on cross-border learning alliances has several implications. Managerial implications can help managers to understand the challenges and benefits of engaging in these activities. They can use this knowledge to develop strategies to improve the effectiveness of their cross-border learning alliances. Practical implications, the development of game theory and cross-border models can be applied in effective decision-making in a variety of complex contexts. Learning alliances have important policy implications, particularly in trade, investment and innovation. Policymakers must consider the potential benefits and risks of these collaborations and develop policies that encourage and support them while mitigating potential negative impacts.
Originality/value
International learning alliances have become a popular strategy for firms seeking to gain access to new knowledge, capabilities and markets in foreign countries. The originality of this research lies in its ability to contribute to the understanding of the dynamics and outcomes of these complex relationships in a novel and meaningful way.
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Luke Muggy and Jessica L. Heier Stamm
The purpose of this paper is to summarize ways in which game theory has been or could be utilized within the humanitarian sector and to identify future research opportunities in…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to summarize ways in which game theory has been or could be utilized within the humanitarian sector and to identify future research opportunities in this field. Game theory is a tool for modeling systems in which multiple decision makers act according to their own objectives and where individual choices affect system outcomes. Humanitarian logistics systems are often characterized by the presence of many such decision makers.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors synthesize literature from operations research, humanitarian logistics, and the political and management sciences that describes either game theory models or settings in which game theory has the potential to contribute practical insights. Papers are categorized based on the types of decision makers highlighted and the facets of humanitarian operations described.
Findings
The review of literature indicates that applications of game theory to humanitarian supply chain systems are limited to date but that many components of humanitarian operations can benefit from such study.
Research limitations/implications
The literature on game theory in humanitarian supply chains is still emerging. The findings imply opportunities for researchers to advance both theoretical and practical understanding in this area.
Practical implications
Current research provides some managerial insights to humanitarian practitioners, but future practice-driven research could increase the impact of game theory models in the humanitarian sector.
Originality/value
This work reviews past research contributions in the area of game theory and humanitarian operations and recommends areas for future research.
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