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The purpose of this paper is to examine how, why and to what effect pounamu (New Zealand greenstone) came to be owned and managed by Ngai Tahu as part of a Treaty of Waitangi settlement.

The value of pounamu to the Maori iwi Ngai Tahu, and the strategic importance and legislative mechanism of its vesting in Ngai Tahu are described. The current legal arrangements for pounamu are compared with those for other minerals and natural resources affected by Treaty of Waitangi settlements. The legally controversial issues of mandate, entitlement and enforcement that have arisen since the vesting are traversed.

The return of pounamu was critical in settling Ngai Tahu's Treaty claims. Other natural resources have also been subject to Treaty claims, and some have been restored in whole or in part to Maori control. Pounamu is now owned and controlled by Ngai Tahu. Customary uses of pounamu are allowed, as potentially is mining that is supported by research. Current research aims to determine extraction rates for sustainable use, based on a definition of the resource as pounamu that is available for surface discovery and collection. The process of vesting pounamu in the legal entity established to represent Ngai Tahu was controversial, and complex disputes about customary rights and pounamu source(s) have dominated criminal proceedings undertaken to protect Ngai Tahu interests in pounamu.

The story of pounamu provides an interesting example of a developing feature of resource management law and practice in New Zealand: resources that are owned and/or managed under a set of legal arrangements designed within the terms of settlement for a claim under the Treaty of Waitangi.

Officers in post-cold war military operations frequently encounter situations that are not easily handled through central control and chain of command, but demand a more flexible leadership style and the ability to yield some control to subordinates. This study aims to investigate what it takes to train military leaders to master such Maneuver Warfare skills in a culture that still, unconsciously, fosters a chain of command structure.

Using a quasi-experimental pre-post design, the authors studied 30 teams of naval cadets (n = 228) in three separate Leadership Development Programs, each of 12 months full time duration. In the three otherwise identical programs, the authors varied one of the major exercises (sailing) both in duration and degree of structure and challenge. Parameters of team interaction were measured using the Systematizing the Person-Group Relation method and summarized in a construct labeled synergy.

One of the cohorts showed a significant positive effect. This cohort sailed a barque for ten weeks, crossing the Atlantic during winter storms. Apart from the clear mission of sailing the ship safely back to its home haven, they received no further instructions or training. Although the duration and the challenge likely count for part of the result, the authors argue that the lack of initial structure combined with a shared mission were more important.

Because of the cost and time involved in each program, it was not possible to independently vary duration, structure and mission. As a result, conclusions as to the reason for the greater positive effect seen in one of the programs cannot be definitively determined.

The study contributes to the understanding of the effect of unstructured situations on building Maneuver Warfare skills.