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This article has been withdrawn as it was published elsewhere and accidentally duplicated. The original article can be seen here: 10.1108/eb055070. When citing the article, please cite: Nicholas Kinnie, (1986), “Patterns of Industrial Relations Management”, Employee Relations, Vol. 8 Iss: 2, pp. 17 - 21.

Changes are taking place in collective bargaining arrangements and management structures for industrial relations. The Warwick Survey, confirming the findings of previous research, shows that the apparent moves towards the decentralisation of industrial relations are in practice more complex than they first appear. The survey results are consistent with earlier studies into the extensive activities of head office managers in the affairs of establishments in what are ostensibly decentralised companies. However, they provide little support for existing research into how employees perceive these changes since the emphasis is on the contrast of view between managers at different levels in the organisation. This points to the need for the development of theory in this area.

Uses the concept of institutional separation to examine changes in the management of industrial relations in an organization studied on two occasions ten years apart. Argues that the concept provides insights into the management of industrial relations, but needs to be modified to take account of the form of institutional separation and the employees and issues under consideration.

Few subjects in the employment field have generated as much controversy as the current debate over the existence of the ‘flexible firm’. The initial ideas put forward by the Institute of Manpower Studies (Atkinson and Meager, 1986) which gained a great deal of attention, have recently been the subject of close scrutiny. (Pollert 1988a, 1988b)

Senior managers in multi‐plant companies are faced by a dilemma: how can they control Industrial Relations centrally, but at the same time allow scope for flexibility? One way of solving this problem is to permit negotiations to take place in the plants, but to regulate this bargaining in some way from a central Personnel department. Why do companies feel obliged to intervene in the affairs of plants in this way? How is this intervention carried out in practice? Is it, for example, through agreements common to all plants, or through loosely worded guidelines from company level?

Collective bargaining remains the principal institution used by employers for managing their industrial relations. About three‐quarters of all employees have their pay and conditions settled by agreements negotiated collectively with their employer. However, bargaining arrangements take a wide variety of forms; some agreements are made at industry level, while others are made at group, division or plant level.

Senior managers of industrial relations in large multi‐plant companies are faced by both centrifugal and centripetal forces and ask: “How can we achieve the benefits of decentralisation while at the same time maintaining centralised control?” In response to these countervailing pressures, senior managers create the appearance of autonomy for plant managers but in reality exercise centralised authority over major industrial relations decisions. To achieve this, managers at head office promote an ideology of decentralisation while actually practising central control. Local managers' autonomy on major industrial relations issues is largely a myth, perpetuated by formally decentralised management and bargaining structures, and techniques designed to enhance the independence of each plant. Central managers' authority is exercised by making all major decisions at head office and by co‐ordinating plant industrial relations through a variety of measures. Two factors are examined to explain this inconsistency between the levels of decision making over important issues and the level at which collective agreements are made—first, the changes in bargaining structure, and in particular the move towards single‐employer bargaining, and, second, developments in organisational structures and control techniques, especially those associated with divisionalised organisations.

Discusses how downsizing has been associated with the move towards lean working in organisations and with having negative consequences for employees. Considers the extent to which downsizing is lean and mean drawing on an extensive review of the available literature. Concludes that downsizing is rarely lean since it usually takes the form of quantitative changes in employment rather than qualitative changes in the process of managing. Evidence also suggests that downsizing usually has an adverse effect on both employees who leave and those who remain with the organisation. Yet this meanness is not inevitable since it depends partly on the extent to which human resources issues are considered.

Research into the issues faced by managers who introduce IT into their organisations: how does technological change affect human resources policies? What human resources issues need to be dealt with before the benefits of technological change can be fully exploited?

A national survey shows that personnel specialists are still failing to exploit fully the benefits of information technology (IT) in their own work. In seeking to explain this, looks at the IT skills and knowledge of personnel specialists and their attitudes towards the use of IT. While these provide part of the explanation for the under‐utilization of IT, argues that more important inhibitions derive from the professional values of personnel specialists and their political power within organizations.