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Rather than organize as traditional firms, many of today’s companies organize as platforms that sit at the nexus of multiple exchange and production relationships. This chapter considers a most basic question of organization in platform contexts: the choice of boundaries. Herein, I investigate how classical economic theories of firm boundaries apply to platform-based organization and empirically study how executives made boundary choices in response to changing market and technical challenges in the early mobile computing industry (the predecessor to today’s smartphones). Rather than a strict or unavoidable tradeoff between “openness-versus-control,” most successful platform owners chose their boundaries in a way to simultaneously open-up to outside developers while maintaining coordination across the entire system.

According to TCE, different forms of economic organization – markets, hierarchies, hybrid forms of various kinds, etc. – are characterized by different “syndromes of attributes,” or coherent sets of features (Williamson, 1991). Because each form of organization implements a distinctive set of governance features, each is efficient for a different type of transaction, implying trade-offs among the forms. The two key categories of features are the allocation of decision-making authority among and within firms and the intensity of the incentives facing firms and members of them. By concentrating decision-making authority, hierarchies have the benefit of facilitating “cooperative adaptation”; that is, coordinated change among two or more parties. Adaptation to new economic circumstances is, after all, the main function of an economic system (Hayek, 1945). Hierarchies are said to facilitate cooperative adaptation better than markets because unlike for markets, courts will not intervene in internal disputes and fiat is available as a last resort. This leaves more scope for the management hierarchy to use its authority to promote cooperative adaptation to unanticipated circumstances (Williamson, 1975, 1991). On the other hand, hierarchies feature weaker incentive intensity, that is, weaker links between individual or unit performance and individual or unit reward. This is because market-like levels of incentive intensity would inhibit cooperative adaptation by stimulating “autonomous adaptation” instead. Autonomous adaptation refers to adaptation by individual firms or organizational members that occurs without regard to its effects on other parties. Williamson (1985) also argues that market-like incentives lack credibility within hierarchies due to the ultimate availability of fiat. Thus, for TCE, the most fundamental trade-off between various forms of internal organization is between cooperative adaptation and incentive intensity.

Do digital technologies of early 21st century capitalism promote or reduce consumer sovereignty? This chapter addresses this question by examining John Kenneth Galbraith’s critique of consumer sovereignty during the post-war period of industrial society and looks at the insights he provides to understand the impact of platform capitalism on consumer sovereignty today. This chapter has the following sections: (1) I review the main postulates of Galbraith’s theory; (2) I highlight the main differences between traditional advertising and online behavioral advertising; (3) I explain how online behavioral advertisement strengthens Galbraith’s dependence effect and revised sequence theories; (4) I then discuss normative challenges raised by digital platform corporations to individual sovereignty; and (5) finally, I argue that platform capitalism is a mature form of Galbraith’s “new industrial state.”

Using corporate value statements of the top Fortune 300 firms for the year 2012, we examine relationships among the stated values of these companies, their industries, and their Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) performance measures. We classify stated values into 21 broad categories. We find that corporate values exhibit strong industry affiliations. Correspondence analysis and regression models indicate that 19 out of 21 values are related to at least one performance measure and while some values are associated with improved performance (e.g., ethics), others (e.g., safety) have a negative impact. Further, while some values have the anticipated impact on performance (e.g., the shareholder value is positively associated with financial performance), some show no relationship (e.g., the environment value is not associated with environmental performance). Finally, our findings also suggest possible CSR washing in some cases. Overall, the study finds corporate values do affect their performance.

There is a renewed interest among economists and policymakers in striking a perfect balance between the market, state, and the community for equitable and sustained development. Inclusive development is the need of the hour and healthcare cooperatives provide the perfect means to deliver that. The cooperatives can and should have an important role to play in this scenario. However, there is an important need to provide an enabling environment for the genesis and growth of Healthcare Cooperatives in India and to learn from the best models and practices across the world. The chapter discusses the effectiveness of healthcare cooperatives.