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In the 40 years of reform and opening-up toward a more rational micro-economic structure, the proportion of output of state-owned enterprises shows a declining trend. Over the past decade, on one hand, the operational efficiency of state-owned enterprises has tended to be low as compared to other ownership enterprises; on the other hand, the asset–liability ratio of state-owned enterprises has risen against the trend, and still remains high under the recent national policy of “deleveraging.” The paper aims to discuss this issue.

This indicates that the inefficiency of state-owned enterprises that once hindered China’s economic development has not yet been fundamentally solved, and the task of deepening state-owned enterprises reform is still arduous.

In the process of establishing China’s modern economic system, there will be some “new state-owned enterprises” growing into world-class ones. This requires more effort in enhancing the capacity for independent innovation, improving the level of organizational control, expanding international market opportunities and fulfilling enterprise social responsibilities with high standards.

It is more appropriate for China to have a micro-economic structure in which public ownership predominates and diverse forms of ownership enjoy common prosperity and development.

The primary objectives of this paper are to: develop a multi‐attribute pattern of the corporate governance model in Thai state‐owned enterprises; assess the relative importance of different corporate governance practices; and provide detailed information of each corporate governance practice.

Qualitative and quantitative approaches were used. A case study was conducted to gather information on specific corporate governance behaviors in Thai state‐owned enterprises. Then a questionnaire was developed and tested in 38 Thai state‐owned enterprises. Factor analysis was conducted to examine a common framework of corporate governance practices.

This research demonstrated the multi‐attribute nature of the corporate governance model in Thai state‐owned enterprises. According to this model, the most important corporate governance practice is strategic human resource management, followed by information technology, board of directors, risk management, internal control, and internal audit sequentially. Additionally, this study brings out insights into corporate governance practices that represent the specific characteristics of Thai state‐owned enterprises.

This study is limited by the fact that the sample represents only Thai state‐owned enterprises. Further studies should be conducted to better understand the complexity of the multi‐attribute nature of the corporate governance model in state‐owned enterprises in developing countries.

Policy makers can utilize the multi‐attribute nature of the corporate governance model as a guideline for the further development of corporate governance practices in other state‐owned enterprises.

This study demonstrated the multi‐attribute nature of the corporate governance model in state‐owned enterprises in developing countries such as Thailand. This research confirms the broad principles of corporate governance as well as providing detailed information on corporate governance practices from a new perspective.

There is no general theory of public enterprise, and the miscellany of separate theorizations on the subject has created a conceptual quagmire. Examines the rather confusing state of the research on public enterprise performance and behaviour. Contrary to conventional wisdom, it seems that in certain circumstances (as in the case of Singapore) public enterprise can be quite efficient, as well as an effective form of national competition.

There is no general theory of public enterprise (PE), and the miscellany of separate theorizations on the subject has created a conceptual quagmire. Advances some hypotheses gleaned from the literature on the PE concerning confusion in the PE′s objective function, investment tendencies and cost of capital, “fairness” as international competitors, influence of the societal environment, and other major theoretical issues. Hypotheses are modified to accommodate the Singapore experience with PEs. Singapore represents a rare phenomenon – a case of a successful PE system.

The past two decades have witnessed significant changes in China as it has moved from a centrally planned economy to a more market‐oriented one. As a socialist nation, state owned enterprises (SOEs) continue to comprise a dominant part of economic activity in China. While many SOEs are inefficient and incur losses, economic reforms since the late 1970s have brought about irrevocable changes in the manner in which Chinese SOEs conduct their business. The important agenda for the Chinese government now is how to “vitalize” state sectors and ensure that SOEs are able to strive for their own survival. SOEs therefore are exploring ways to improve the productivity of their current operation and to enhance innovativeness in their business development, including seeking financial and technological resources overseas. The varying levels of market‐orientation in SOEs present diverse outcomes for the SOEs. This study attempts to evaluate the extent to which the SOEs have adopted market‐based organizational learning (Sinkula, Baker, and Noordewier 1997), market orientation (Deshpande and Farley 1998), entrepreneurial orientation (Smart and Conant 1994), and learning and innovativeness (Hurley and Hult 1998).

This paper illustrates the socio-political nature of accountings, referring to the partial privatisation of the monopoly telecommunications organisation in a lower-middle-income country.

Actor-network theory and an ANTi-history approach are used to trace circumstances and occurrences. Empirical materials include official documents, print media and retrospective interviews with organisation employees ten years on from the privatisation.

Proponents of privatisation used retrospectively constructed historical accounts to problematise the natural monopoly of telecommunications and the government organisation administering it. A restructuring programme followed. Proponents addressed controversies pertaining to the programme thus garnering widespread support for complex and controversial changes. Proponents produced and reproduced accounting artefacts as evidence in these processes of history reconstruction, consequent changes and restoring stability to telecommunications in its reconfigured commercial domain. The proponents used selective, controversial accounting evidence to problematise the government organisation's existence, then to mobilise various actors to reduce and close the controversies previously aroused and reinstate stability in a partially privatised telecommunications company. Although no longer having a monopoly this company still dominates. Dissenters did the same but with little success.

The findings demonstrate the importance of tracing the socio-political process of arriving at the dominant outcome about the past. This assists in making sense of present circumstances and re-imagining the future.

The study demonstrates that, during controversial circumstances, taken-for-granted history, as well as what is thought to have not existed in the past, support the dominant network in gaining advantage over their opponents and black-boxing their perspectives of how things should be.

This article aims to consider success in terms of the financial returns and risks of new public management (NPM) in state‐owned enterprises (SOEs).

Financial returns of New Zealand SOEs were examined through a review of their annual reports over a five‐year period. Dimensions of risk were examined through interviews conducted in two phases over a two‐year period with senior executives from 12 of the (then) 17 SOEs operating in New Zealand.

Findings indicate the potential for SOEs to operate as profitable government investments, with clear support for positive financial returns under NPM. However, variations noted within individual SOEs also indicate that profitable and commercial operations may not be possible in all cases. An examination of the risks associated with SOEs' operations reveals a number of dimensions of risk, encompassing financial, political (including regulatory), reputational, and public accountability aspects.

There is a need for an enhanced awareness on the part of internal and external stakeholders (such as the government and general public) of the risks SOEs face in pursuing higher levels of profitability. Also required, is a more acute understanding on the part of internal and external stakeholders (e.g. government and the public) of the need for SOEs to manage the range of risks identified, given the potentially delicate balance between risk and return.

While previous studies have considered the financial returns of SOEs, or the risks faced by the public sector in terms of accountability, few have addressed the two issues collectively in a single context.

Five years after the deregulation of New Zealand′s telecommunications and broad‐casting markets, the country′s two state‐owned broadcasters had achieved widely differing levels of internationalization and financial performance. Television New Zealand, the more active international marketer, was continuing to develop and expand its international business, while Radio New Zealand, which had adopted a more passive, reactive stance, earned negligible returns from its offshore interests and de‐internationalized. Shows that internationalization is best viewed as an experiential process, with international marketing investment decision making directly influenced by managerial characteristics, particularly levels of international business experience, orientation and commitment, and that environmental factors are also important influences on managers′ aspirations and expectations, the policies and strategies adopted and the levels of company internationalization and performance achieved.

This paper aims to argue that in the short history of New Zealand banking, political experimentation, based at first upon socialist ideology of the 1940s led to the nationalisation of The Bank of New Zealand (BNZ), followed by a period of neo‐liberalism in the 1980s and early 1990s in which the bank was privatised. It further argues that the establishment of Kiwibank Ltd in New Zealand at the dawn of the twenty‐first century was a return to the political ideology of the 1940s.

The paper discusses the nationalisation and subsequent privatisation of the BNZ and draws a parallel between the perceived banking environment as it existed in New Zealand in the twentieth century and as it existed at the establishment of Kiwibank. By way of context setting it also discusses the political environment as it relates to the nationalisation of the Bank of England.

The paper finds that in New Zealand, political experimentation, not commercial pragmatism, was the underlying motivating factor for the state's involvement in banking.

The paper contributes to the pool of knowledge regarding the political motivations behind nationalisation and state ownership of banking assets. The article is of interest to economic and political historians as well as those who study New Zealand political party history. Future policy makers could do well to reflect upon the motivations for state ownership of banking assets by asking if their decisions are driven by ideology or economics.

The purpose of this study is to consider the potential for profit under new public management, through a study of New Zealand's state‐owned enterprises (SOEs).

“Examination from the outside” involved analysis of financial data from 2001 to 2005 for the SOE sector. “Inquiry from the inside” involved interviews with senior executives from 12 of the 17 SOEs operating in New Zealand.

Findings indicate the potential for SOEs as profitable government investments, with clear support for financial returns under NPM.

While this study is limited to SOEs in New Zealand, it provides valuable insight into one country's SOE sector, and offers a platform for similar studies in other countries. Strong financial returns from several SOEs highlight the potential for SOEs as valuable investments, and an important alternative to traditional sources of government funding. However, variations noted in the financial returns of individual SOEs also indicate that profitable and commercial operations may not be possible in all cases.

The value of this paper lies in the combination of quantitative and qualitative data, to provide insight not only into SOEs' financial performance, but also into the operational and strategic issues underlying that performance.