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On December 17, 2003 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) approved an overhaul of the New York Stock Exchange’s (NYSE’s) system of corporate governance. After questions arose concerning the NYSE’s ability to discharge its self‐regulatory functions following the resignation of former Chairman and CEO Richard Grasso, Interim Chairman John Reed proposed new governance architecture including a newly independent Board of Directors and a separate Board of Executives designed to represent the NYSE’s various constituencies. The new architecture reflects an effort to strike a balance between an independent board of directors and the desire for input from the industry, i.e., self‐regulation. This new structure should not be seen as the SEC’s determination of the future of self‐regulation, but simply as the most recent step in refining and improving the self‐regulatory process at the NYSE and other marketplaces as well.

The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) is at the center of an increasing chorus of market professionals who complain that investors are at the mercy of a system that caters to exchange specialists. While structural change may be necessary to address the NYSE’s governance issues, talk about wholesale structural change in the trading of NYSE‐listed securities is misguided. As this paper discusses, the real issue is the lack of competition among the marketplaces that trade NYSE‐listed shares. The article is intended to contribute to the market structure debate by exploring the market structure of the NYSE, the competitive environment for exchange‐listed securities, the limitations associated with the current structure, and what changes might be pursued. In particular, the author calls attention to the “trade‐through” rule, implemented through the Intermarket Trading System (ITS), which benefits the NYSE by discouraging orders from being routed to alternative marketplaces

To examine whether the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in its recent rule changes has provided the appropriate separation between its supervisory authority and the management of the Exchange.

Describes the regulatory and governance structure proposed by the NYSE in connection with its public offering; discusses policy objections the security industry has made to the proposal, reviews responses by the NYSE and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to those objections; and discusses what steps might be on the horizon to better rationalize the regulatory and business side of the new for‐profit NYSE.

The NYSE's proposal should provide for regulatory consolidation with the NASD. The proposal heightens the conflict between a for‐profit exchange and its regulatory function. The proposal governance structure ignores the fact that NYSE LLC is the Exchange and has plenary authority over NYSE regulation. The proposal does not provide fair representation for members. The proposal does not provide appropriate treatment of market data.

Provides a comprehensive view of recent changes to the NYSE's regulatory and governance structure and issues raised by the securities industry in response to those changes.

This paper examines the Random Walk Hypothesis (RWH) for aggregate New Zealand share market returns, as well as the CRSP NYSE‐AMEX (USA) index during the 1980‐2001 period. Using several indices, we rely on the variance‐ratio test and find evidence to support the rejection of the RWH with some evidence of a momentum effect. However, we find evidence to suggest the behaviour of share prices to be time‐dependent in New Zealand. For example, we find the indices tested were closer to random after the 1987 share market crash. Further analysis showed even stronger results for periods subsequent to the passage of the Companies Act 1993 and the Financial Reporting Act 1993. We also find evidence that indices based on large capitalisation stocks are more likely to follow a random walk compared to those based on smaller stocks. For the USA index, we find stronger evidence of random behaviour in our sample period compared to the earlier period examined by Lo and Mackinlay (1988)

The purpose of this paper is to explain the amendments to the listing standards of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the NASDAQ Stock Market (Nasdaq), which were approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission (the SEC) on January 11, 2013 to implement the SEC's final rules on the independence of compensation committees and their selection of advisors pursuant to Rule 952 of the Dodd‐Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd Frank).

After a summary of notable provisions, the paper explains effective dates and respective Nasdaq and NYSE listing standards pertaining to compensation committee compensation; director independence standards, advisors, and charters; certain exemptions for foreign issuers; exemptions for certain types of companies and partnerships; and recommended next steps for companies that are subject to the amended listing standards.

Over the past few years, the independence of compensation committees and their advisors has been a hot button corporate governance issue. Dodd‐Frank prohibits national securities exchanges from listing any equity security of an issuer that is not in compliance with the exchanges' compensation committee independence and advisor requirements.

The listing standards generally become effective on July 1, 2013; however, listed companies have until the earlier of: their first annual meeting after January 15, 2014; or October 31, 2014, to comply with certain requirements including the independence structure of their compensation committees.

The paper provides practical advice from experienced financial services lawyers.

The fact that stocks going ex‐dividend decline in price by less than the dividend amount is theoretically attributed to the differential taxation of dividend and capital gains or the differential taxation of investor groups. NYSE, Amex and Toronto Stock Exchange listed stocks, and stocks interlisted on these three exchanges, are examined to infer the tax jurisdiction of the marginal investor. The stock price changes relative to the dividends are consistent with a tax clientele effect. Further, the stock price changes are plausible given the tax rates. Ex‐dividend day behavior is different for non‐interlisted stocks on all three exchanges, suggesting each exchange has a different tax clientele. Canadian firms interlisted on US exchanges exhibit ex‐dividend day behavior consistent with the appropriate US exchange’s non‐interlisted stocks, suggesting that the marginal investors in these stocks are American.

It is the purpose of this paper to analyze drivers of organizational change as well as their inhibitors with a particular focus on the influence of management and the environment.

The question will be addressed with the help of the case study of the New York Stock Exchange's (NYSE) move towards electronic trading. A system dynamical analysis of underlying forces and feedback will help elucidate the strength of mechanisms that drive or impede change.

The stepwise analysis of the model in accordance with different model boundaries reveals that neither the environment nor endogenous pressures from stakeholders and management alone are able to replicate the reference behavior; all three model elements are necessary to simulate the process of the NYSE's radical move. Additionally, with only minor changes in the underlying assumptions, the model is able to show the contrasting behaviors predicted by different streams of literature.

The paper's contribution is limited by the number of but one exemplary case it provides.

The paper contributes to one of the most prominent topics in the organizational change literature and adds a valuable example of representative drivers of change. It opens the black box of organizational change by its focus on the relationship of structure and behavior as well as on the process of change.

This paper aims to provide evidence that market efficiency varies greatly across individual stock, and across market exchanges.

Three approaches, partial adjustment model, Dimson beta model and variance ratio test, are used on a large sample of US stocks.

This paper finds prices are closer to random walk benchmarks (i.e. more efficient) for stocks with better liquidity provision, frequent trading, greater return volatility, higher prices, larger market capitalizations and smaller trade sizes. These findings suggest that liquidity stimulates arbitrage activity, which, in turn, enhances market efficiency. Market efficiency also varies with information environment. The results show that stocks with greater information-based trading exhibit higher level of efficiency. Finally, market structure influences market efficiency. New York Stock Exchange stocks achieve higher level of efficiency than NASDAQ stocks do. The empirical results are robust and not driven by differences in stock attributes between the two markets.

Overall, these results indicate that liquidity provision, stock attributes and market structure exert a significant impact on the realization of market efficiency.

In addition, this paper is also relevant to both stock exchanges facing increased competition and to market regulators.

Prior studies offer little evidence on the speed at which new information is impounded into the price. There is also limited evidence regarding how liquidity provision and market structure affect market efficiency. Using a transformation of the speed of price adjustment and other measurements as proxies for individual stock efficiency, this study may shed further lights on our understanding of market efficiency.

We utilize cross-sectional regression analysis to identify key variables affecting the initial three-year holding period returns of foreign equities traded as American Depository Receipts (ADRs) on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Our results suggest that U.S. market index movements and foreign exchange rates are the main determinants of the initial three-year holding period returns for 285 ADRs listed from January 1990 through December 2002. The determinants vary once the sample is broken into subsets comparing ADRs issued before 1998 to those issued afterwards, ADRs issued as IPOs versus SEOs, and Asia Pacific ADRs versus European and Latin American ADRs. We also find that U.S. interest rate movements and type of ADR issue (IPO versus SEO) provide little explanatory power for ADR returns overall.

The purpose of this paper is to examine an entrepreneur’s attempt to gain legitimacy and change institutions in a multiple institutions setting.

The authors conducted a qualitative case study to track an entrepreneur’s efforts to create a new financial instrument and get it accepted and traded on the New York Stock Exchange.

The authors introduce the concept of institutional judo, analogous to the martial art where a fighter uses his opponent’s forces against him. While institutional theory has focussed on how institutional pressures force actors to conform, the term judo refers to an actor using institutional pressures to their advantage in changing those very institutions.

This qualitative research involves a single case study, but is most suited to revealing extensions of theory and subtle processes.

The approach allowed the authors to provide a nuanced look at the actual change efforts by an entrepreneur to gain legitimacy.

This study provides a nuanced look at actual attempts to change institutions.

Institutional judo offers a new change mechanism within institutional theory.