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This chapter uses a college-by-graduate degree fixed effects estimator to evaluate the returns to 19 different graduate degrees for men and women. We find substantial variation across degrees, and evidence that OLS overestimates the returns to degrees with the highest average earnings and underestimates the returns to degrees with the lowest average earnings. Second, we decompose the impacts on earnings into effects on wage rates and effects on hours. For most degrees, the earnings gains come from increased wage rates, though hours play an important role in some degrees, such as medicine, especially for women. Third, we estimate the net present value and internal rate of return for each degree, which account for the time and monetary costs of degrees. Finally, we provide descriptive evidence that satisfaction gains are large for some degrees with smaller economic returns, such as education and humanities degrees, especially for men.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc. is a challenge to conventional antitrust analysis. Conventional civil antitrust cases are decided by a preponderance of the evidence. This means that conduct challenged under the rule of reason is only condemned if the conduct resulted in more competitive harm in the actual world than a world without the alleged violation. Under conventional analysis, the intent of the parties also plays only a supporting role in determining whether the conduct was anticompetitive. A holder of a valid patent has a right to exclude others practicing the patented technology. And, the patent holder is not assumed to have market power because it expended resources in maintaining exclusionary rights. Actavis creates doubts about these propositions in circumstances beyond the “reverse” payment settlement of a patent suit that may have delayed an alleged infringer market entry. This chapter explores whether applying Actavis logic to antitrust litigation can result in condemnation of practices where there is little chance of an anticompetitive effect, where the patent holder likely has a valid and infringed patent, where there is little reason to believe that the patent holder has market power, and where only one party, or no parties, to an agreement have an anticompetitive intent. This chapter also investigates whether Actavis creates new problems with standing analysis, damages calculations, and the balancing of efficiencies against anticompetitive effects. Nevertheless, the lower courts have begun to extend the logic of Actavis. This is apparent in the condemnation of no-Authorized-generic settlements.

The purpose of this case is to allow students the opportunity to examine how the recent changes to depreciation incentives in the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (P.L. 115-97, Dec. 22, 2017) may affect the purchase of capital assets. Bonus depreciation has been extended to allow an immediate 100% deduction for eligible property, which also now includes used property. This bonus depreciation will be phased out over a nine-year period. Additionally, the progressive marginal tax rate used for business income has been eliminated and replaced by a flat 21% tax rate, representing a 14% drop in the tax rate on businesses.

Specifically, this case will examine how a change from 50% to 100% bonus depreciation affects purchasing decisions between asset classes, due to the exaggerated impact on the net present value for longer lived assets. In keeping with the evolution of accounting in academia, students will be asked both to solve a realistic problem and to communicate their investment decisions effectively. To prepare students for the assignment, the informational building blocks are presented in modules following Bloom’s taxonomy – culminating in the application of the concepts in a decision-making scenario. The learning method applied in this case has been tested in the classroom, with quantifiable results showing a positive learning outcome. Pre- and post-case assessment questions were administered with significant improvement in students reported understanding across all six measures. Based on these results, this case achieves the dual goals of teaching students how to apply the concept of bonus depreciation to maximize value and how to communicate this information effectively.

In the 1990s, individuals aged 18–64 were eligible for disability insurance, if their work capacity was reduced by at least 25 percent (50 percent before 1993). In the beginning of the period, before 1991, disability insurance could also be granted for labor market reasons (i.e., if unemployed had been compensated long enough to exhaust their benefits – obtained benefits for 300 days). This possibility was gradually phased out after 1991. In 1995, the enforcement of the rules was tightened. When evaluating applications for disability pensions, local insurance offices now had to request a medical certificate and a work-related test of the applicant's degree of work capacity. Local offices also had to consult the applicant's employer, physician, or other qualified personnel, and even pay personal visits to the applicant. The possibilities for rehabilitating the applicant should also be investigated. From 1997, work incapacity should be evaluated in relation to all possible employment opportunities. Potential income changes resulting from changes in employment should not affect the evaluation⁴ (National Social Insurance Board, 2005).

The theory of discounting is based on the assumption that people's observed behavior in markets for savings and investment reveals their subjective preferences regarding trade-offs between present and future economic benefits. A person who borrows money at the annual interest rate r, for example, shows a willingness to pay (1+r)t dollars t years in the future to obtain one dollar in the present. On the other side of this transaction, the lender demands (1+r)t future dollars in exchange for each dollar loaned out today. In the logic of this situation, both borrowers and lenders behave as if one dollar of future currency has a “present value” of just

The Kaldor–Hicks (KH) criterion has long been the standard for benefit–cost analyses, but it has also been widely criticized as ignoring equity and, arguably, moral sentiments in general. We suggest the use of an aggregate measure (KHM) instead of KH, where M stands for moral sentiments. KHM simply adds to the traditional KH criterion the requirement that all goods for which there is a willingness to pay or accept count as economic goods. This addition, however, runs up against objections to counting moral sentiments in general and non-paternalistic altruism in particular. We show these concerns are unwarranted and suggest that the KHM criterion is superior to KH because it provides better information.