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The Neoclassical approach to analysing personal choice is compared with an approach contained in a Biblical Christian mode of analysis. This paper compares the Neoclassical and Christian positions via analysis of characteristics of the Neoclassical rational choice model. The main characteristic examined is a basic assumption of the rational choice model that human choice is explained as the optimisation of utility via rational self‐interest. The two positions are compared in terms of how they treat self‐interest and rationality, the degree to which basic assumptions about human behaviour are specified, the importance they attach to the realism of assumptions underlying their models, and the explanatory and predictive purposes for which the models are used. The conclusion of the comparison is that the Biblical Christian perspective encompasses the variables regarded as important in Neoclassical explanation, but presents them in the context of a more embracing worldview perspective than the Neoclassical. This Christian belief perspective is applicable to human behaviour in both “economic” and “non‐economic” domains.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the provisions of both the neoclassical economics and new institutional economics theses and assesses the implications of their methodologies for property market analysis.

This research is based on secondary literature review and desk-based study.

It is argued that new institutional economics, grounded on firmer foundations of human behaviour, offers an analytical approach to the study of the property market which emphasizes the institutionally contingent nature of real estate exchange, thus placing real estate within its socio-economic context.

In-depth examination and juxtaposition of the provisions, assumptions, philosophical orientations and limitations of these main traditions of economic thought towards the achievement of a representative study of the workings of the property market.

The paper aims to show that economic theory has become “desocialised” and separated from social theory through the adoption of individualistic methods and neglect of social relations and structures. It also seeks to assess the upshot of these trends, as well as the prospects for reversing them.

A historical overview traces how the social content of economic theory has diminished, considering the reasons why. This leads on to a wider evaluation of what desocialisation entails and whether economics could be done differently.

Desocialisation stems from the desire for boundaries between academic disciplines, which drove economics towards individualism and other social sciences towards structural methods. Such an artificial divide between economic theory and social theory is argued to be detrimental to all the disciplines concerned.

Restrictions imposed by desocialised theory have practical consequences for how we understand and model the economy. Some reforms that would loosen the restrictions so as to promote a resocialised economics are suggested.

The idea of desocialisation is defined and interpreted, drawing attention to the changing nature of economics, its isolation from other social sciences, and the possibilities for alternative modes of economic theorising.

Explains the exogenous and endogenous types of relationships between ethics and economics in neoclassical and non‐neoclassical framework. Studies market consequentialism, deontological preferences and polity‐market (ecology) interactions in recent developments in economic theory and political philosophy. A review of literature is covered. From these studies, bordering ethics and economics, is evolved the contrasting methodology and world view of an endogenous theory underlying the interface between ethics and economics. The underlying principle of ethical endogeneity of this new paradigm is treated with an institution‐economy interface by addressing the issue of sustainability. A simple mathematical formulation is done to show how ethics can be methodologically endogenized in a scientific framework for theory, policy development and institutionalism. Examines Canada′s Green Plan in light of the exogenous and endogenous ethical relationships. The critique is developed and ethico‐economic policy‐theory alternatives are proposed.

This article attempts to provide an institutionalist analysis and diagnosis of the current crisis of orthodox economics. We shall, first, characterise the predominant opinion in economics—the neoclassical synthesis. Next, we examine the anomalies which are currently vexing orthodox opinion and their power to provoke a period of crisis and extraordinary science. In the final section, we diagnose the source of the anomalies of the neoclassical synthesis.

After a clarification of definitions important in methodological discussions, a brief history of early methodological thought in economics and political economy is presented. The development of “orthodox” methodology is traced, and the fundamental assumptions underlying neoclassical economic methodology are enumerated. Philosophical positions – both critical of and sympathetic to the orthodox assumptions – are presented. In addition, the advantages and disadvantages of various heterodox positions are surveyed. Throughout the paper, methodological justifications for the emphasis on primarily deductive, complex mathematical models in contemporary economics as practiced in the USA – especially in light of the relevance and importance of primarily verbal, interpretive methodologies in the realm of applied and policy‐oriented economics – are examined.

The paper examines the dependence of the positivist and welfarist preference satisfaction paradigm of neoclassical economics upon an implicit functionalist philosophy of mind. Functionalism is the doctrine that mental states are strictly materialistic and understandable in cause‐effect terms. An important aspect of functionalism is the multiple realizability thesis, namely, that mental states can be realized in any type of hardware, whether human brain or computer.

The approach used involves investigating the fact‐value distinction after Robbins in terms of the positivist meta‐ethical view known as emotivism, and then explaining emotivism as inherently functionalist. Functionalist thinking itself is explained in terms of contemporary philosophy of mind.

An important finding is that the preference satisfaction paradigm can be shown to be as suitable to artificial intelligence systems as to human beings. A consequence of this is that normative concerns are increasingly difficult to address in connection with the neoclassical thinking about economic agents.

The paper does not investigate more recent research programs in economics (such as behavioural economics) that depart from basic neoclassical assumptions.

A practical implication of the paper is that it shifts attention to previously un‐emphasized aspects of neoclassical thinking.

The paper's value to explain the relation of economics to ethics in neoclassical economics in connection with functionalist philosophy of mind.

Looks at the impact John Maynard Keynes and the movement (Keynesian) he started had on the theory and practice of economics in the 1930s and onwards. Identifies respective problems about capitalism and discusses them in depth. States that the monetary and fiscal policies recommended by Keynes have helped the West escape severe social consequences in the aftermath of the Great Depression. Goes on to show how economists after Keynes carried his work forward and upward in the 1940s and 1950s. Closes by stating there is a further, third revolution in economic thinking on the rise.

Compares the philosophical backgrounds of the disciplines of economics and accounting in view of complexity theory. The relationship which has existed between the two is examined as well as the problems of such inter‐disciplinary studies. Decision making, target costing and the need for future collaboration are discussed in light of the theory.

The rediscovery and analytical reconstitution are present tendencies in much of social science, especially economics and sociology. The emergence and expansion of the so‐called new institutional economics exemplify these tendencies as do attempts at revival and rehabilitation of the old institutional economics. Analogous tendencies have been manifested in sociology by the further development of economic sociology, especially by various reformulations of its classical premise of institutional structuration and embeddedness of economic behavior. Nevertheless, much of mainstream economics tends to neglect or play down certain salient divergences between the latter's neoclassical or orthodox institutionalism, and heterodox or critical institutionalism advanced by the old institutional economics as well as by economic sociology. Identifies and elaborates such divergences between these seemingly homologous varieties of institutionalism. Since institutionalist varieties and tendencies in both economics and sociology are considered, represents a contribution to an interdisciplinary treatment of social institutions, a treatment originally proposed by the old institutional economics of Veblen et al., the German historical school as well as by Weberian‐Durkheimian classical economic sociology.