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To highlight the failure of the tsunami early warning system and the challenges of successfully responding to, and managing a transnational catastrophe of this nature. The paper also highlights unique challenges in the management of this catastrophe and suggests potential strategies for good disaster response and management in this response and beyond.

Primary data collection was by telephone interviews with experts in the South and South‐East Asian region, supplemented by a comprehensive literature review of scholarly journals, reports from relief agencies and United Nations situation reports and bulletins amongst others. The scope of the paper is limited to the issue of a warning not been passed onto appropriate authorities in the region, the unique challenges of the relief response and the rehabilitation and reconstruction of the affected communities.

From the study, there is a need for further investigation into the catastrophic warning failure; as reasons proffered by the early warning officials for their inability to pass on a warning to authorities in the affected area appear weak at this stage. The study also found unique geographical, political, economic and social challenges facing the international relief and reconstruction effort. Specifically some of the challenges include the management of the media and information, logistics and coordination, needs and damage assessment, donations and safety and security issues amongst others. In summary, the author found that there is also a need for foreign assistance agencies to be seen to be fair, to build trust and ownership of relief and reconstruction efforts amongst the local populace, as well as use local people as much as possible.

The study was conducted only 21 days (three weeks) after the tsunami catastrophe of 26 December 2004, hence it is a snapshot of events in the days immediately after the catastrophe. The relief action is an on‐going event and there may be changes as new information emerges from the field.

A world wide network of integrated submarine earthquake and tsunami monitoring and early warning system should be set up. Critical warning information in any potential disaster should be shared as inclusively as possible. Relief workers must be seen to be politically and religiously neutral, especially in the civil conflicts of Banda Aceh Indonesia. Finally relief and aid should be given on the basis of sound humanitarian principles such as need, not just on wider economic criteria.

The study highlights specific potential challenges which relief organisations must deal with in responding effectively to the disaster, and in assisting to reconstruct the region. The paper proffers specific strategies for effective management of the international assistance effort. Finally, the study adds to the literature on developing countries and is valuable for governments, emergency and relief workers, policy makers in both developed and developing countries.

This paper focuses on the adaptations societies make to climate-related disasters. How they learnt from them in the past should indicate how they will respond in the more climate-stressed future. National typhoon disaster politics arise when citizens demand disaster protection from their state.

The paper analyzes one episode of typhoon politics in each of three Asian countries before 1945: the Philippines (1928), India (1942) and Japan (1934). These three countries show high variance in state capacity and level of democracy. Discourse data are found in contemporary newspaper accounts.

In each case, the typhoon disaster politics were shaped by the “distance” (geographical, institutional, class and cultural) between citizen-victims and the state. Where that distance was great (rural Philippines, Bengal-India), the state tended to minimise victimhood. Where it was small (urban Japan), adaptation was serious and rapid.

The findings should stimulate public discussion of the way in which past social relations and power dynamics surrounding climate-related disasters might influence the present. As the political character of climate change adaptation grows clearer, so does the need for debate to be well-informed.

Most historical work on climate-related disasters has focused either on the natural phenomena, or on their societal impact. The present paper's focus on adaptation is part of a small but growing scholarly effort to bend the debate towards the evolution of adaptive capacity.

The purpose of this study is to analyse the crisis network response of European countries and the role played by defence organizations (DOs) during the early response phase of the pandemic, here set to encompass 75 days.

Published materials – reports, news and communications – provided by authorities and DOs were used. Some of the authors actively participated in national pandemic response networks. An exploratory approach and qualitative content analysis were applied. The data were collected in national languages from 13 European countries, and they were coded and analysed using the actors, resources and activities (ARA) framework.

This study identified three main categories of activity structures in which the DOs interacted with civilian members of response networks, health-related services, logistics services and public support services. These networks among actors were found within formal response systems and emergent networks. The DOs engaged as actors that provided a range of services when civil authorities could not cope with the huge demand for specific services and when resources were scarce in the initial response phase.

This study contributes by filling an important research gap with regard to the civil-military relations associated with the use of DO resources in the civil response to the pandemic crisis in Europe, which is described as an untraditional response. The ARA network approach provides a framework for arranging ARA and extends the wider civil-military network to expand the formal networks of the early crisis response. The study lays knowledge about the co-operation between civilian and military actors in different contexts and provides a broader understanding of the roles that DOs played in the response operations.

The purpose of this paper is to explore human issues within subordinate and leader interaction and guide police leaders in how they can achieve success. Although focussed on uniformed services, leaders from all areas will find the arguments presented here useful.

The paper draws on a number of catastrophic case studies, including the collision of two war ships, two Jumbo Jets, the defeat of the Spanish Armarda and the failure of Hitler’s military to respond effectively to the D-Day landings. It will examine work by Rittel and Webber (1973) and Grint (2005), who propose different styles of leadership for different problems.

The paper will find that humans are inherently obedient and reluctant obedient, reluctant to challenge authority and introduces the concept of blind obedience into police leadership. A distinction will be drawn between commanding in critical situations, which are rare, and leading in routine situations; the paper will conclude that to lead the police service through the turbulent times ahead, police leaders must be on guard against blind obedience and create an environment where subordinates have a voice and will be heard. The paper also finds that “micro-management” from a remote location is ineffective and that staff must be afforded time and space to undertake tasks and that strategic leaders must allow their subordinates, at the tactical and operational levels, freedom to act with the overall strategy; the paper recommends leaders adopt a mission command approach.

The paper will contribute to understanding how subordinates and leaders interact and will be of value to all who lead, particularly in structured organisations like the police, where rank plays a factor in establishing a strict hierarchy. It introduces the concept of blind obedience into police leadership and warns that police leaders, and indeed leaders in all hierarchal organisations, must be on constant guard against it.

Since the democratic transition in 1986, the Philippines has made considerable progress in re-establishing the legal/constitutional basis of civilian supremacy. Legislative control over the military's budget and appointment as well as the use of paramilitary units were re-instituted. Congress also assigned civilian court jurisdiction over human rights cases involving state security forces. An independent human rights commission was given power to investigate allegations of abuses. Constitutional limits were written into the President's ability to mobilize and deploy the military during emergency situations. Notwithstanding, the present structure of the Philippine security forces remains problematic. Of the three services, the army is primarily focused on counterinsurgency (COIN) operations, with the police and paramilitary providing support. The army relies on large formations for its COIN operations and less on Special Forces, which owing to historical interventionist and coup-plotting proclivities, has been numerically emasculated.

Using a case study method, the chapter probes how local civilian authorities in Leon, Iloilo (a town in central Philippines) are able to monitor, supervise or control security sector activities within their area of jurisdiction. A considerable gap exists between each force's understanding of its functions and what they actually do in relation to other state security forces. The army performs mostly non-combat tasks in line with COIN as well as non-traditional tasks. The police are involved mostly in law enforcement and provide augmentation force to army-led COIN operations, but greatly handicapped in detection and investigation matters. The paramilitary is utilized primarily for COIN as territorial defense forces but not for other emergency tasks as envisioned in the law. A tighter relationship exists on the ground between the army unit and the paramilitary, whereas a gap is evident between the army and the police regarding the geographic scope of response to rebel threat. The local government played no significant role in the peace initiative brokered in the 1990s nor has the town peace and order council been the framework of choice in seeking more constructive engagements between the civilian authorities and security forces.