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The purpose of this study is to develop the Counterintelligence Strategy as a conceptual document in the field of state security of Ukraine, identifying current security threats to Ukraine, which global landscape has been significantly transformed since the adoption of the Law of Ukraine “On Counterintelligence”, is substantiated. It is proved that the provisions of such Strategy should determine the current and projected counterintelligence environment via a set of the following elements. The nature of real and potential threats in the process of implementing state foreign and domestic policy course determined by Ukraine. Sources of such threats (individual states and their intelligence agencies, terrorist organizations, transnational organized crime, etc.). Features of the identified encroachment objects of foreign intelligence agencies, terrorist and other criminal organizations, including transnational ones. Long time strategy treats like COVID-19 pandemic.

During the past decades of the XXI century, intelligence has become a crucial tool in the system of determining and implementing the foreign policy in international relations. Modern realities confirm that this political and legal phenomenon directly affects the formation of the foreign policy course of any state, the development of its geopolitical strategy and defense doctrine. Possessing a powerful apparatus for obtaining primary information, fulfillment of government orders for monitoring, evaluation, analysis, forecasting and modeling of possible scenarios of global- or regional-scale events and processes, special services take an active part in perspective and current foreign and domestic policy implementation.

Thus, based on the state security paradigm, which cannot be defined in the absence of threats and ensured by their complete elimination, since negative factors for state security objects will always exist, the ensuring of its development requires first of all creation of the conditions under which threats will not be able to limit its development. That is why it is necessary not only to minimize the impact of such factors on vulnerable objects, but also to create a certain “immunity” to their impact, i.e. the ability of the state security system to function effectively in spite of the negative impact. Thus, maintaining the ability to function in terms of the existing threats is the most important area of practical activity for the state security protection, as well as ensuring the legitimate interests of the state.

During the paper decades of the XXI century, intelligence has become a crucial tool in the system of determining and implementing the foreign policy in international relations. Modern realities confirm that this political and legal phenomenon directly affects the formation of the foreign policy course of any state, the development of its geopolitical strategy and defense doctrine. Possessing a powerful apparatus for obtaining primary information, fulfillment of government orders for monitoring, evaluation, analysis, forecasting and modeling of possible scenarios of global- or regional-scale events and processes, special services take an active part in perspective and current foreign and domestic policy implementation.

The conclusion of the Cold War rivalry between the United States and former Soviet Union in the late 1980s and early 1990s created new areas of opportunity and concern for U.S. national security policy. No longer menaced by the threat of nuclear war from Soviet military might, the United States emerged from the Cold War as the world's preeminent military power. Successful developments such as this often produce elation in the pronouncements of U.S. officials as a recent Clinton administration declaration demonstrates:

The purpose of this paper is to concentrate on the place of cyber security risk in the framework of global commitments adopted in 2015 to reduce disaster risks in an all-hazards approach. It explores the correlations between traditional risks associated with critical infrastructures – as understood by the Sendai framework – cyber security risks and the cascading effects characteristic of today’s complex and interrelated shocks and stresses. It takes a step further, expanding the focus of traditionally understood technological risks to explore cyber security risks, at the heart of our societies’ digital transformations,and showcase opportunities from the European context.

By reviewing existing literature on cyber security, disaster resilience and cascading disasters, this paper highlights current challenges and good practices undertaken by various governments.

Understanding disaster risks is a precondition to improving the mitigation of impacts of existing risks and preventing new risks. Effective risk reduction relies on a solid understanding of losses resulting from events to inform future actions, and on the assessment of risks relying on a robust evidence base and state-of-the-art scientific capacity to model and simulate potential hazards. In this context, embedding cyber security risks, and the complexity of cascading impacts in improving the understanding of disaster risks, calls for appropriate methods and tools allowing for a multi-risk and holistic focus to the assessment of risks and the planning of risk management capacities that follow.

Globally and in Europe, focus on interconnected risk and their impacts is steadily increasing. Risk assessments are still conservative; incorporation of cyber resilience into national and local level DRR plans is yet not visible.

Existing research is restricted to cyber security and disaster resilience, as separated subjects. This paper, for the first time, brings together the interconnection between the two topic options to address them.

There is a current argument that “national security” and “national defense” are no longer synonymous terms-that there is a new and broader definition for the activities that contribute to “the common defense.“ A whole of government approach is suggested as a means for integrating and coordinating national security policies and programs. To support this approach, recommendations have been made for an integrated national security budget. Focusing on the executive budget process, three approaches to an integrated national security budget are examined: organization-based, program-based and function-based. Though there are questions about the importance of budget structure and the effectiveness of program budgeting, a whole of government integrated unified national security budget could facilitate the fiscal trade-offs required between alternative means of pursuing national security objectives in the executive budget.