Search results

Investigates the differences in protocols between arbitral tribunals and courts, with particular emphasis on US, Greek and English law. Gives examples of each country and its way of using the law in specific circumstances, and shows the variations therein. Sums up that arbitration is much the better way to gok as it avoids delays and expenses, plus the vexation/frustration of normal litigation. Concludes that the US and Greek constitutions and common law tradition in England appear to allow involved parties to choose their own judge, who can thus be an arbitrator. Discusses e‐commerce and speculates on this for the future.

This chapter concentrates on child rights institutions’ founding or organic laws that provide independence and powers to the national or local child rights institutions. This chapter analyzes the National Commission on the Rights of the Child Act (NCRCA, 2017) of Pakistan as a case. It employs the Paris Principles of 1993 and the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child’s General Comment No. 2 as a yardstick. This chapter also compares the NCRCA with the National Commission on Human Rights Act (NCHRA, 2012). It presents results from interviews of three Child Rights Movement Pakistan (CRM) members and a member of the National Commission on the Rights of the Child (NCRC). The analysis finds that the NCRC faces serious challenges in performing its duties and functions, which were already limited within the organic law. The NCRC is an advisory body whose only role is to suggest the federal bureaucracy when and if required. The NCRC has not been provided with funds and adequate resources. Even the NCRC members were not paid their salaries for many months. The analysis finds that the NCRC’s affairs are governed through the bureaucracy¹ (senior officials) within the Ministry of Human Rights, and the Human Rights Division. Rather than direct responsibility to the Parliament, the NCRC’s independence is undermined as its legislation directs. In the future, the NCRC will face challenges in advancing and protecting children’s rights because it does not have suo-motu (on its own) powers to intervene in matters affecting children. Therefore, it is indispensable to amend the NCRCA in consideration of the GC2 and the Paris Principles to bolster the institution’s independence and functions. These changes are essential to addressing violations of children’s rights and bringing about changes in the structures that affect children.

The paper discusses how the Commission is shaping a decentralisation policy in the antitrust field. The paper details the procedural architecture ‐ “degrees of priority”, “preconditions for decentralisation” and “Community interest” ‐ which gives the Commission sole discretion to decide whether an antitrust case is dealt with by Brussels or is referred to a Member State. It reveals that the decentralisation procedure has been set up by the Commission, with the blessing of the Community courts, but with little real consultation with the Member States. The paper points out that the decision whether to decentralise turns on a new, qualitative and Commission decided Community interest test. The paper emphasises that the Community interest test runs in parallel with ‐ and has a similar function to ‐ a number of decentralisation provisions which already exist. The final section of the paper contrasts Community interest as a decentralisation test with the rival, and pre‐existing, quantitative approach to decentralisation ‐ the Community dimension test ‐ contained in the EC Merger Control Regulation (MCR). It explains that both tests have strengths and weaknesses and that the recent reform of the MCR has not fully addressed these concerns in respect to Community dimension. The paper’s main conclusion is that the Commission’s appropriation of the ability to decide which Member States are competent to deal with decentralised antitrust cases has created the possibility of a fragmented or two‐speed Europe in competition regulation.

Interest and support for a National Commission on Libraries developed in the early 1960s. The idea was supported by such diverse and important groups as the American Library Association, the US Bureau of the Budget (now the Office of Management and Budget), the Office of Science and Technology, and the US Office of Education.

The EU Commission's radical proposals to change the rule set controlling the implementation of Article 81 and 82 in antitrust matters are critically explored in this paper. This includes the Commission's reasoning behind the proposed changes, particularly the assertion that it will lead to a more effective application of community antitrust instruments, thus helping to safeguard the Single Market. The aim of the proposals is to establish a network of cooperating enforcers applying Articles 81 and 82 in an effective and uniform way, with the Commission guaranteeing this. The proposed decentralisation of antitrust applications stands in marked contrast to merger control at the EU level, with the Commission retaining exclusive jurisdiction over mergers having a community dimension. However, the Commission, in the longer term, particularly in the light of enlargement, is much more likely to rethink the architecture of EU merger control.

The National Commission on Unemployment Compensation (NCUC) represents the only full‐fledged review of unemployment insurance since the enactment of this all‐important social programme in 1935. Assuming a body of commissioners deeply versed in unemployment insurance, considering also that the commission was to have two full years and adequate funds with which to work, there was an expectation that the commission would be the most significant event in the programme's history. Now that the commission has completed its task, it is time to review the results of its work and assess its worth.

This chapter explores how the Korean electoral management bodies (EMBs) and the election administration ensure the autonomy of administrative management from political parties and the interior ministry. In particular, the analysis focuses on the role of recognition, rights independence, and professionalism in securing the election administrations in the EMBs. Recent studies have found that the contents of the independent variable, dependent variable, and other parameters influencing fair and autonomous election management system do not differ significantly. Therefore, the institutional independence of the EMBs is not intended to guarantee fairness and impartiality in Korea either. Since 1987, the authoritarian regime collapsed and democracy began to grow in Korea. Also, the role of the EMBs granted by the constitution started to be considered.

Actively recognizing the role and expanding the rights of the Korean National Election Commission (NEC) has become a decisive factor in the formation of the autonomous and neutral election management system. The scale, manpower and budget of organizations, and personnel have increased. The role of the EMBs has also expanded proportionally. The Korean NEC has enormous authority, such as investigative power and enforcement power that the EMBs of other countries do not have. After all, recognizing the role of bureaucracy and government employees will become a very important factor in ensuring the independence of the EMBs in developing countries. Furthermore, it will be a driving force to develop democracy in developing countries.

This book is a policy proposal aimed at the democratic left. It is concerned with gradual but radical reform of the socio‐economic system. An integrated policy of industrial and economic democracy, which centres around the establishment of a new sector of employee‐controlled enterprises, is presented. The proposal would retain the mix‐ed economy, but transform it into a much better “mixture”, with increased employee‐power in all sectors. While there is much of enduring value in our liberal western way of life, gross inequalities of wealth and power persist in our society.

In 1988 the Government of Israel appointed a Commission of Inquiry (of which the authors were members) to examine the state of its health‐care services. Although relating to Israel, some of the problems contributing to the crisis in the health services are shared by other industrialized nations. In 1991 the findings and recommendations of the Commission were adopted by the Government. They related to the major problem areas analysed by the Commission: poor standard of service to the public; health ministry structure and performance; funding and budgeting; poor labour relations in the public health sector; surplus of physicians; mix of public and private health care; shortage of qualified health‐care managers. The main recommendations adopted were: legislation for compulsory health insurance (due to be effective on 1 January 1995), establishing a National Health Authority, running of hospitals by autonomous corporations and reform in salary structure.