Search results

Development of a disaster response plan at a national level is regarded as the best way to undertake country-level disaster management in a well-coordinated manner, involving all stakeholders in well-built networks. Where developed national disaster response plans (NDRPs) are to be subjected to evaluative assessments from time to time to establish their strengths and weaknesses in disaster response processes. Only about 20 of the world's 195 countries have NDRPs, and only three of them have undergone some form of evaluation. This paper contributes toward filling this gap by evaluating the NDRP of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Lessons from the implementation of this NDRP will help guide the development of the plans in countries where they do not yet exist.

Network and qualitative content analysis was employed to subject the Nigerian NDRP to critical evaluation using standards already established in the literature for the development of management networks and their use in disaster response. The experiences of other countries with developed NDRPs were also used to guide an effective evaluation process.

Findings of the study show that the Nigerian NDRP is deficient in many respects, particularly in the areas of weak development of networks, absence of roles-differentiation for various stakeholders, lack of specified achievable and hence monitorable targets, objectives and outcomes and absence of detailed response plans for specific disaster types. The plan needs to therefore be subjected to a detailed multidisciplinary and multi-stakeholder review to get it strengthened.

This is the first attempt to conduct an evaluative assessment of Nigeria's NDRP and the 4th in the world. The study's findings can help not only to strengthen Nigeria's NDRP, but also to develop similar plans in other countries around the world.

Cyber threats present constantly evolving and unique challenges to national security professionals at all levels of government. Public and private sector entities also face a constant stream of cyberattacks through varied methods by actors with myriad motivations. These threats are not expected to diminish in the near future. As a result, homeland security and national security professionals at all levels of government must understand the unique motivations and capabilities of malicious cyber actors in order to better protect against and respond to cyberattacks. This chapter outlines the most common cyberattacks; explains the motivations behind these attacks; and describes the federal, state, and local efforts to address these threats.

Recognizing the 9/11 attacks as a turning point in the history of American emergency management and response philosophies, this chapter examines the evolution to a standardized National Incident Management System (NIMS). This involved the movement from individual jurisdictional and agency autonomy to adoption of a multilayered system where all efforts are intended to support a response beginning and ending at the local level. This chapter discusses the overarching NIMS doctrine and its incumbent on-scene Incident Command System (ICS) for coordinating on-scene operations. The specific focus is the application to the NIMS and the ICS to law enforcement.

This study aims to demonstrate how governmental authorities can take interorganizational network responses to address unexpected situations developed by the breakdown of critical infrastructure, such as communication failure in a hyperconnected society.

This study uses social network analysis to investigate the performance of interorganizational response networks regarding the 2018 KT network blackout, a failure of telecommunication facility, compared to the planned network.

The national fire agency was the most prominent actor in the actual interorganizational network, while the actor was not significant in the planned network in addressing unexpected needs. Moreover, top government authorities were involved in the actual response network because of the national attention on the breakdown of the infrastructure as a focusing event.

Unexpected conditions in the actual response to a technological disaster, such as a critical infrastructure (CI) breakdown, require the involvement of emerging or non-significant actors in accordance with the findings related to other types of disasters. Particularly, communication failure in a hyperconnected society may involve prominent government authorities in the actual interorganizational response because of the event's broad and severe impact on the functions of society.

Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC) is the federal department responsible for housing over 190,000 Canadian federal public servants. During Y2K preparations, it became apparent that a single source or form of integrated, emergency response information at the infrastructure level did not exist. A process had to be created and developed that would serve as a single vehicle and source for building‐based emergency response. These preparations for Y2K saw the creation of the Infrastructure Continuity Unit (ICU) and a system for the creation, validation, and maintenance of Infrastructure Continuity Plans (ICPs). An ICP is an event‐management document that contains a series of procedures and protocols to be used during a building‐based incident or disruption of services. The ICU is supported nationally by a network of Regional Coordinators who oversee the gathering of information needed to create ICPs for their own parts of the country. This paper demonstrates how this system, along with the ICU’s recent certification by the Canadian General Standards Board (CGSB) to the ISO 9000 standard, have contributed to the ICU’s success. This paper takes the reader through an in‐depth exploration of the ICU’s processes, methodologies and procedures and demonstrates why, in a post‐September 11th world, the ICU has begun to attract international attention.

Although the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 explicitly recognizes the need for psychosocial support and mental health services, the focus of this and many disaster risk reduction and management (DRRM) plans lies in the response, recovery, and rehabilitation phases. Less attention has been given to how mental health aspects affect the predisaster phase. This chapter explores the less understood concept of “resistance” in the perspectives model of disaster mental health, which is related to DRRM themes of “prevention and mitigation” and “preparedness” interventions. Four strategies are identified by which DRRM interventions can contribute to psychosocial support and mental health: increasing stress resistance, fostering cohesion and social support, fostering positive cognition, and building self-efficacy and hardiness. We review the cases of the Philippines, Indonesia, Myanmar, and Thailand and report existing socio-political DRRM initiatives for prevention, mitigation, and preparedness that can potentially enhance resistance as a predisaster intervention. Beyond medical services or clinical mental health interventions for select populations, DRRM interventions can benefit the general public. Despite natural intersections, there remains a need for deliberate and targeted initiatives that explore how vertical pyschosocial care programs can be created to straddle both DRRM and health sectors in practice.

Kenya is vulnerable to multiple natural hazards that lead to disasters resulting in human, economic, environmental and other losses. The promulgation and ratification of several disaster management (DM) policies, acts, conventions and the establishment of the National Disaster Management Policy Framework has placed Kenya at the international forefront. We critically analyse various Kenyan policy institutions and processes for disaster risk management (DRM), applying a mixed-methods approach. Content analysis was applied to qualitatively analyse Kenya’s DM policy and legislation documents, using Nvivo 11 Pro. Descriptive and econometric analyses were performed on empirical data from DRM key informants in Kenya using SPSS version 25.0. Only 11% of interviewees were aware of the National Disaster Policy Framework; 50% had read up to two national DM-related documents. National institutions exert highest influence in the policy formulation (78%), compared to local and international institutions (67% and 56%, respectively). Participation of local and national institutions in national DRM policy formulation was high (mean scores of 2.44/4 and 1.67/4, respectively). A weak correlation was observed between years of experience (r = 0.115, p = 0.768), and a positive but insignificant one between experience and participation in DRM policy formulation. Based on the aforementioned, we suggest that Kenya’s disaster risk reduction (DRR) implementation benefits from the high human capacity and high level of participation. However, the performance of frontline staff needs to be improved, especially regarding their knowledge of existing national DRM frameworks.