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Adopting efficient marketing strategies is a challenging task in a competitive market place involving complex marketing planning, techniques and mechanisms to identify the best course of action under these circumstances and finding optimal solutions or stable outcomes. Decisions and strategies of competitors in the market influence the selection of the appropriate marketing strategy. The main purpose of this paper is to develop a mathematical methodology based on the game theory approach for planning optimal marketing-mix strategies in dynamic competitive markets, taking into account strategic foresight and interaction effects.

The game theory approach, as a decision-making tool in conflict situations, is suggested for planning and adopting optimal marketing strategy. The main intellectual attraction of the game theory is essentially a question of how to act in gaming situations against highly rational opponents A kind of static, finite and non-cooperative game analytics approach has been developed for this issue, and the proposed model has been implemented to design optimal marketing strategies for two top brands of the automotive parts market in Iran.

The findings of this study show that the optimal marketing-mix strategy for brand A is pricing and for brand B is the product strategy.

Game theory and the Nash equilibrium model can provide a practical approach to find and adopt the right strategy, know competitors' movements and strategies and get more profit.

The integration of the game theory approach into the marketing mix framework has been adopted as a generalized model for marketing strategy planning and analysis as well as to resolve some shortcomings of the marketing mix framework. The Nash equilibrium model has been used to analyze the results. The incorporation of game theory into marketing models has the potential to enrich the scope of marketing modeling.

The purpose of this paper is to use the game theory combined with Monte Carlo simulation modelling to support the analysis of different retail marketing strategies, in particular, using payoff matrices for modelling the likely outcomes from different retail marketing strategies.

Theoretical research was utilised to develop a practical approach for applying game theory to retail marketing strategies via payoff matrices combined with Monte Carlo simulation modelling.

Game theory combined with Monte Carlo simulation modelling can provide a formal approach to understanding consumer decision making in a retail environment, which can support the development of retail marketing strategies.

Game theory combined with Monte Carlo simulation modelling can support the modelling of the interaction between retail marketing actions and consumer responses in a practical formal probabilistic manner, which can inform marketing strategies used by retail companies in a practical manner.

Game theory combined with Monte Carlo simulation modelling can provide a formalised mechanism for examining how consumers may respond to different retail marketing strategies.

The originality of this research is the practical application of game theory to retail marketing, in particular the use of payoff matrices combined with Monte Carlo simulation modelling to examine likely consumer behaviour in response to different retail marketing approaches.

The problem of ethnic conflicts and unrest is at the forefront in a diverse world today. This paper aims to identify ways of resolving social conflicts and establishing a balanced way of taking into account the diverse interests of a multinational society.

Modeling of dynamical ethnic processes in the Republic of Kazakhstan was based on the Parson's sociological scheme and the Nash equilibrium theory. The model consists of differential equations describing the development of four ethnic subsystems: political system, economic system, societal community and Institute of the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan. This model allows investigating how the interests of various ethnic groups change over time and identifying the states of equilibrium in which the interests of all groups are satisfied.

The results of computer simulation showed that one of the solutions to the problem of social stability is establishing social equilibrium. For this, the Institute of the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan (APK Institute) must take changes that occur within ethnic groups into account. The proposed model can reveal states of equilibrium with respect to positive and negative dynamic processes that exist between different ethnic groups.

The proposed model can be used to predict changes in social behavior and find balance between ethnic subsystems in the research on ethnic processes in multinational countries to early detect conflicts of interest and crisis situations. Future studies will benefit from expanding the range of subsystems that can affect alterations in the ethnic community.

To explore and identify the strategic approaches firms may follow in their pursuit of value transparency (VT) in inter‐organisational relations in supply networks.

Through the use of game theory an understanding of the difficulties of co‐operation and information transfer is developed. Game theory and marginal analysis facilitate an advanced application of VT.

While the article acknowledges the limitations of prescriptive precision in strategy matters, it is not proposed that firms would follow any single part of the outlined strategies. However, through rational analysis of the strategic options presented it may be possible to foresee potential negative outcomes, and through structuring undesirable scenarios managers may be able to reduce the risk of their occurrence.

A model is proposed that aids firms in the selection of supply partners for VT and VT modes. Recognising that certain conditions will be more likely to support a more rapid and extensive adoption of VT, the paper identifies the role that aspects of organisations' economic environments may play.

The article acknowledges the limitations of modelling and game theory‐based approaches but suggests that through considering the interests and benefits of the other party, practical insights may be developed and the likely outcomes of various scenarios considered.

According to officially published statistics, there began in the UK during 1979 some 2,080 stoppages of work due to industrial disputes, involving 4.584 million workers and resulting in 29.474 million working days lost (Department of Employment Gazette, 1980, p. 874). The purpose of this article is to summarise some of the main developments which have occurred over recent years in the economic analysis of strike activity and to illustrate some of the insights provided by economic theories of the collective bargaining process and its breakdown. We begin with a brief survey of the literature which provides a discussion of its major findings and of the limitations of existing studies. In subsequent sections, some basic theoretical concepts are introduced and after a brief discussion of some important elements of bargaining theory these are used in the construction of an alternative model of the breakdown of the collective bargaining process and the occurrence of strikes. In the penultimate section, this alternative model is tested against UK data and in the final section the main findings are summarised.

Decisions to initiate conflict often have an irrevocable character. They tend to transform the status quo in ways that it is often foreseen only with difficulty beforehand, and this change is then mostly impossible to undo. The sentence attributed to Colin Powell talking to President Bush about the Iraq War, “You break it, you own it,” illustrates the issue quite well. Closely linked to irrevocability is the issue of conflict costs. The uncertainty about conflicts and wars is due not only to the identity of the eventual winner but also to the costs inflicted upon the parties including the victorious ones. Often, prospective losers such as Napoleon and Hitler were initial winners who were in the end defeated by an accumulation of war costs they could not master.11There is some evidence that Napoleon, and then Hitler, were driven by increasing needs to absorb more and more territories. Clearly, Napoleon sold Louisiana to Jefferson to replenish his war chest and Hitler pillaged the central banks of conquered countries to support German military expenses. It is mostly the sunk costs associated with war that account for the irrevocability problem. Unfortunately, the literature on the formal analysis of war has not dealt with this matter, representing instead conflict as involving fixed costs or fixed cost expectancies at the onset. Additional cost estimates that should be taken by a decision-maker due to possible failures or irreversibility of actions are not considered. This is nowhere more evident than in the so-called bargaining model of conflict and war, whose numerous sometimes hidden assumptions have to be discussed and analyzed. The goal of this paper is to show that irrevocable decisions add to the cost of making them. Belligerent parties often have a tendency to minimize these especially, and this is an interesting twist of the analysis of irrevocable decision-making, if estimations of the gains of war are made on the basis of risk neutral expected utility calculations. The latter consideration leads me then to formulate alternative theories of war and conflict under the assumption of rationality.

The paper aims at modelling a game‐theoretical framework that covers the basic mechanisms of lease contract negotiations while making allowance for relevant behavioural aspects.

Based on a review of literature about negotiation processes the work initially models, analyses, and solves lease contract negotiations as basic non‐cooperative game situations. It develops a game‐theoretical model based on the simple bi‐matrix normal form and the Rubinstein bargaining game while successively approximating real estate practice by integrating behavioural concepts.

On a conceptual level the work demonstrates that a game‐theoretical modelling of lease contract negotiations allows for a systematic structuring of the conflict situation between landlords and tenants. Different market situations that affect the perception of utility of the negotiating parties, as well as the consequences of mutual concessions and the creation of additional negotiation subjects that enhance the perceived contract utility can be taken into account by integrating simple mental models. On a practical level the paper shows that brokers' influence on the behavior of the negotiating partners can contribute to the efficiency of negotiation processes and the perceived contract utility. It identifies mutual concessions and the creation of incentives and additional negotiation subjects as possibilities to improve the attractiveness of a lease contract and to reach more beneficial contract provisions.

The paper offers a systematic examination of bargaining processes between landlords and potential tenants which can help professionals to understand lease contract negotiations as conflict situations and reach more profitable and satisfying results.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the impact of supply capacity constraint, water delivery loss and fairness concern on the operational decisions/efficiency of the IBWT supply chain under the random precipitation.

Two game-theoretic decision models for the IBWT supply chain coordination considering water delivery loss without/with fairness concern under the supply capacity constraint and random precipitation are developed, analyzed and compared. On this basis, the corresponding numerical analyses are conducted and compared to derive the corresponding management insights and policy implications.

The research results indicate that the two-part tariff contract could effectively coordinate the IBWT supply chain and achieve operational performance improvement; the binding supply capacity constraint makes the water capacity to be allocated among IBWT distributors in accordance with fair shortage allocation rule and reduces the profit (or utility) of the IBWT supply chain and its members; the existence of fairness concern reduces the utility of the IBWT supply chain and its members; a lower precipitation utilization factor in the case with non-binding capacity constraint is beneficial for improving the profit/utility of the IBWT supply chain while a higher precipitation utilization factor in the case with binding capacity constraint is beneficial for improving the profit/utility of the IBWT supply chain; and reducing the water delivery loss rate, the mainline transfer cost, the branch-line transfer cost, the holding cost and the shortage cost and setting a higher retail price are beneficial for improving the profit/utility of the IBWT supply chain.

Two innovative coordination decision models under random precipitation are developed, analyzed and compared through game-theoretic approaches to investigate the impact of supply capacity constraint, water delivery loss and fairness concern on the operational decisions/efficiency of the IBWT supply chain, which have enhanced the optimization decision theory for the operations management of IBWT projects and provided a better decision support for the IBWT stakeholders to make better operations strategies.

General theories have been criticized for their inability to explore the mechanics of more specific domain knowledge and understand how, when and where general theory applies to and extends domain knowledge in supply chain management (SCM). Middle-range theorizing (MRT) is a potential solution to this limitation. This paper aims to assist researchers in understanding the relationship between MRT and general theorizing (GT) and connecting MRT research findings to general theory.

This research provides a structured literature review of 518 articles, from eight journals in logistics, SCM and operations management. Theoretically based articles are analyzed by primary domain and SCM context.

There are frameworks for conducting MRT; however, the literature does not sufficiently assist researchers in understanding how middle-range (MR) theory should relate to general theory. Findings include a better understanding of underserved areas in SCM, guideline frameworks for understanding when to apply MRT, when to apply GT and how MRT knowledge can be connected to SCM domain knowledge.

This study provides a timely and appropriate compilation of theory research in SCM, including significant implications for both theory and practice, by helping to articulate the evolving philosophy of science in SCM.