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From the quantum game perspective, this paper aims to study a green product optimal pricing problem of the dual-channel supply chain under the cooperation of the retailer and manufacturer to reduce carbon emissions.

The decentralized and centralized decision-making optimal prices and profits are obtained by establishing the classical and quantum game models. Then the classical game and quantum game are compared.

When the quantum entanglement is greater than 0, the selling prices of the quantum model are higher than the classical model. Through theoretical research and numerical analysis results, centralized decision-making is more economical and efficient than decentralized decision-making. Publicity and education on carbon emission reduction for consumers will help consumers accept carbon emission reduction products with slightly higher prices. When the emission reduction increases too fast, the cost of emission reduction will form a significant burden and affect the profits of manufacturers and supply chain systems.

From the perspective of the quantum game, the author explores the optimal prices of green product and compares them with the classical game.

The aim of this paper is to investigate whether a Nash equilibrium of a two-country trading economy is symmetry-breaking or not.

The approach to tackle this topic is a theoretical treatment by the general equilibrium trade theory and game theory.

If each government's domestic policy serving private production is diminishing to the private production scale, the Nash equilibrium is not symmetry-breaking.

In the existing study of Chatterjee (2017), a similar result is derived by focusing on the properties of each country's GDP function. The authors, however, consider an economy where each country's PPF is strictly concave and show that the Nash equilibrium uniquely exists and this equilibrium is symmetry.

This paper is a dedication to Professor Ngo Van Long who introduced the idea of Kant–Nash equilibrium. The author extends this analysis to the study of adult and child labor markets.

This is a game theoretic analysis of the market for adult and child workers when some firms behave in the neoclassical Nashian way and some firms follow a Kantian social norm.

The presence of Kantian firms in the output market in addition to Nashian lowers industry output and labor demand. This raises the possibility that Kantian behavior in the output market could lower wages sufficiently and increase the incidence of child labor. If firms engage in Kantian behavior in the labor market by not hiring child workers, adult wage rises but could lower child wage as children if they work can only work for Nashian firms. When labor demand is sufficiently high, more Kantians could raise adult wage above subsistence and eliminate child labor supply.

This is the first paper to apply Kant–Nash equilibrium to the labor market. The result that Kantian behavior could have an unintended negative spillover effect in other markets is new. The paper keeps alive the ideas of Professor Long, which hopefully will stimulate further work and build on his ideas.

The purpose of this paper is to study the Hölder calmness of solutions to equilibrium problems and apply it to economics.

The authors obtain the Hölder calmness by using an effective approach. More precisely, under the key assumption of strong convexity, sufficient conditions for the Hölder continuity of solution maps to equilibrium problems are established.

A new result in stability analysis for equilibrium problems and applications in economics is archived.

The authors confirm that the paper has not been published previously, is not under consideration for publication elsewhere and is not being simultaneously submitted elsewhere.

The current paper is a brief review of the emerging field of quantum-like modelling in game theory. This paper aims to explore several quantum games, which are superior compared to their classical counterparts, which means either they give rise to superior Nash equilibria or they make the game fairer. For example, quantum Prisoners Dilemma generates Pareto superior outcomes as compared to defection outcome in the famous classical case. Again, a quantum-like version of cards game can make the game fairer, increasing the chance of winning of players who are disadvantaged in the classical case. This paper explores all the virtues of simple quantum games, also highlighting some findings of the authors as regards Prisoners Dilemma game.

As this is a general review paper, the authors have not demonstrated any specific mathematical method, rather explored the well-known quantum probability framework, used for designing quantum games. They have a short appendix which explores basic structure of Hilbert space representation of human decision-making.

Along with the review of the extant literature, the authors have also highlighted some new findings for quantum Prisoners Dilemma game. Specifically, they have shown in the earlier studies (which are referred to here) that a pure quantum entanglement set up is not needed for designing better games, even a weaker condition, which is classical entanglement is sufficient for producing Pareto improved outcomes.

Theoretical research, with findings and implications for future game designs, it has been argued that it is not always needed to have true quantum entanglement for superior Nash Equilibria.

The main purpose here is to raise awareness mainly in the social science community about the possible applications of quantum-like game theory paradigm. The findings related to Prisoners Dilemma game are, however, original.

The current paper aims to present a formal model illustrating how payoff imbalances among the members of a team of decision makers (DMs) who must undertake a project condition the final outcome obtained. This result builds on the fact that payoffs imbalances would lead to different performance levels among the employees and managers who compose a team. The analysis is applied to a strategic environment, where a project requiring coordination among the DMs within the team must be developed.

The intuition behind the strategic framework on which the results are based is twofold. The authors build on the literature on social comparisons and assume that employees and managers acquire information on the payoffs received by other members of the team while being affected by the resulting comparisons, and they follow the economic literature on firm boundaries determined via incomplete contracts. In this case, employees and managers may underperform if they feel aggrieved by the outcome of the contract giving place to deadweight losses when developing the project.

The authors illustrate how a team-based performance reward structure may lead to a coordinated equilibrium even when team managers and employees receive different payoffs and exhibit shading incentives based on the payoff differentials between them. The authors will also illustrate how identical shading intensities by both groups of DMs imply that shading by the managers imposes a lower cost on the profit structure of the firm because it leads to a lower decrease in the cooperation incentives of the other members of the team. Finally, the authors show how differences in shading intensity between both types of DMs trigger a strategic defect mechanism within the team that determines the outcome of the project.

The novel environment of team cooperation and defection through shading introduced in this paper is designed to deal with the strategic decisions taken by DMs when undertaking a project within a group. In particular, the intensity of shading applied by the DMs will be endogenously determined by the relative payoffs received, which allows to account for different scenarios, where relative payoff differentials among DMs determine the outcome of the project.

Japan's decision to release nuclear wastewater into the Pacific Ocean in 2023 has sparked strong opposition at home and abroad. In this study, Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) method is adopted to analyze the conflict problem, and reasonable equilibrium solutions are given to solve the conflict event.

In this study, GMCR is adopted to solve the conflict problem. First, identify the key decision-makers (DMs) on the issue of nuclear effluent and the relevant options they might adopt. Second, the options of each DM are arranged and combined to form a set of feasible states. Thirdly, the graph model is constructed according to the change of DM's options, and the relative preference of each DM is determined. Finally, the conflict problem is solved according to the definition of GMCR equilibrium.

Discharging nuclear wastewater into the ocean is not the right choice to solve the problem. Developing more space to store nuclear wastewater is more conducive to the protection of the ocean environment.

It is undesirable for the Japanese government to unilaterally discharge nuclear wastewater into the ocean. Objectively assessing the radioactivity of nuclear wastewater and the cooperation of relevant stakeholders can better solve this conflict.

The problem arising from Japan's releasing plan is complicated because of a lack of information and the existence of multiple stakeholders, while GMCR can help us with a better view of the current circumstance in the conflict.

This empirical research examined the factors and conditions that contribute to the success of international strategic learning alliances. The study aimed to provide organisations with evidence-based insights and recommendations that can help them to create more effective and sustainable partnerships and to leverage collaborative learning to drive innovation and growth. The examination is performed using game theory as a mathematical framework to analyse the interaction of the decision-makers, where one alliance's decision is contingent on the decision made by others in the partnership. There are 20 possible games out of 120 outcomes that can be grouped into four different types; each type has been divided into several categories.

The research methodology included secondary and primary data collection using empirical data, the Delphi technique for obtaining qualitative data, a research questionnaire for collecting quantitative data and computer simulation (1,000 cases, network resources and cooperative game theory). The key variables collected and measured when analysing a strategic alliance were identified, grouped and mapped into the developed model.

Most respondents ranked reputation and mutual benefits in Type 1 games relatively high, averaging 4.1 and 3.85 of a possible 5. That is significantly higher than net transfer benefits, ranked at 0.61. The a priori model demonstrate that Type 1 games are the most used in cooperative games and in-game distribution, 40% of all four types of games. This is also confirmed by the random landscape model, approximately 50%. The results of the empirical data in a combination of payoff characteristics for Type 1 games show that joint and reputation benefits are critical for the success of cooperation.

Research on cross-border learning alliances has several implications. Managerial implications can help managers to understand the challenges and benefits of engaging in these activities. They can use this knowledge to develop strategies to improve the effectiveness of their cross-border learning alliances. Practical implications, the development of game theory and cross-border models can be applied in effective decision-making in a variety of complex contexts. Learning alliances have important policy implications, particularly in trade, investment and innovation. Policymakers must consider the potential benefits and risks of these collaborations and develop policies that encourage and support them while mitigating potential negative impacts.

International learning alliances have become a popular strategy for firms seeking to gain access to new knowledge, capabilities and markets in foreign countries. The originality of this research lies in its ability to contribute to the understanding of the dynamics and outcomes of these complex relationships in a novel and meaningful way.

This study aims to create actionable guidelines for pricing decision-making by employing game a theory matrix to forecast the correlation between the average daily rate and the latest ambiance of hotels.

Utilizing a vector error correction model, the research employs game theory to assess the influence of the average daily rate on the hotel's newest atmosphere during both peak season (April–September) and valley season (October–March).

Findings indicate that during the peak season, when the average daily rate rises in resorts and falls in suburban areas, the hotel’s newest atmosphere is at its best in both types of accommodations. During the off-peak season, the hotel’s newest atmosphere is achieved when both resorts and suburban accommodations increase their average daily rates.

There are two study constraints. One is the assumption that hotel guests in both parties prefer not to change hotels, but in fact they would. Two is a limited sample of two resort and suburban markets.

This suggests that the hotel’s newest atmosphere can draw both leisure and business travelers to suburban areas during the low season and more leisure travelers to resorts during the high season.

The study’s findings have implications for revenue related to the hotel’s newest atmosphere and cleanliness for both suburban and resort hotels, particularly when promoting tourism collaboratively.

The study provides valuable insights for hotel managers in analyzing pricing strategies using matrices.

Following Zingales (1994) and Gilson (2006), this paper assumes that controlling shareholders have incentives to secretly transfer parts of corporate earnings to themselves, and the government to reduce these corporate self-dealing activities. We study if there exist certain levels of government monitoring intensities which are optimal for all parties involved; controlling shareholders, public investors and the government. Our model shows that there exists Nash equilibrium in corporate self-dealing and governmental monitoring levels. At this equilibrium, the optimal corporate investment level is greater than the counterpart in the absence of self-dealings and government monitoring. Our model further shows that the main determinants for the equilibrium level are monitoring efficiency, severity of self-dealings penalty, and marginal return on investment. Interestingly, however, we can not conclude that either controlling shareholders’ equity ownership ratios or corporate tax rates determines the optimal investment level.