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As agent‐based systems are increasingly used to model real‐life applications such as the internet, electronic markets or disaster management scenarios, it is important to study the computational complexity of such usually combinatorial systems with respect to some desirable properties. The purpose of this paper is to consider two computational models: graphical games encoding the interactions between rational and selfish agents; and weighted directed acyclic graphs (DAG) for evaluating derivatives of numerical functions. The author studies the complexity of a certain number of search problems in both models.

The author's approach is essentially theoretical, studying the problem of verifying game‐theoretic properties for graphical games representing interactions between self‐motivated and rational agents, as well as the problem of searching for an optimal elimination ordering in a weighted DAG for evaluating derivatives of functions represented by computer programs.

A certain class of games has been identified for which Nash or Bayesian Nash equilibria can be verified in polynomial time; then, it has been shown that verifying a dominant strategy equilibrium is non‐deterministic polynomial (NP)‐complete even for normal form games. Finally, it has been shown that the optimal vertex elimination ordering for weighted DAGs is NP‐complete.

This paper presents a general framework for graphical games. The presented results are novel and illustrate how modeling real‐life scenarios involving intelligent agents can lead to computationally hard problems while showing interesting cases that are tractable.

The purpose of this study is to analyze comparatively the properties of open-loop and closed-loop equilibria in a dynamic oligopoly model with price dynamics and reflexive behavior of market agents.

To consider dynamic competitive markets, the authors focus on a differential game theory in oligopolistic structures, using analytical models to illustrate how advertising effort, good differentiation and price stickiness interact simultaneously in the open-loop and the closed-loop Nash equilibria. The comparative assessment of these equilibria obtains some significant results.

An optimization model that enriches the continuous time is presented. Under the open-loop and the closed-loop, Nash equilibrium showed an increase in the total output, advertising in price stickiness and promotional efficiency, while there was a decrease in product differentiation and advertising promotional efficiency. However, the open-loop equilibrium levels are larger than the closed-loop equilibrium. Under the closed-loop information, the long-run equilibrium was faster than the opened-loop in a dynamic oligopoly. The graphical illustration was used to present the behavior of the model parameters.

This study helps managers to choose an appropriate price and advertising adjustment to maximize profit. The obtained results may help firms to make the smart decision and may provide managers the valuable tool for making decisions in the competitive market environments.

This is a first attempt to analyze a dynamic oligopoly in the differentiated market environment. It considers a joint action of the output and advertising in shaping the closed-loop and the open-loop equilibria with N competitors in a dynamic competitive setting.

This paper aims to analyse the phenomenon of race to the bottom in a federation and provides answer to the question why developing countries are more prone to race to the bottom competition than developed countries.

The paper considers a two-stage game where, in the first stage, two regional governments in a federation choose tax rate on mobile capital employed in its own region by maximising its regional per capita income, and in the second stage, a representative firm chooses capital and labour employment in the two regions by maximising total profit. As capital is mobile across regions, tax policy chosen by any region affects other region. From strategic interaction between the regional governments, the authors derive Nash equilibrium tax rates. Comparing Nash equilibrium with Pareto optimum outcome, race to the bottom is characterised.

The paper finds that federations with poorer endowment of capital are more prone to the race to the bottom outcome. The result is robust to the introduction of different types of asymmetries between the regions and a centrally executed revenue equalisation scheme. Whilst it hints at the fact that capital accumulation can naturally solve the race to the bottom problem, it identifies the presence of an equalisation scheme and equity concern at the regions to weaken the impact of capital accumulation in achieving such an outcome.

The role of capital endowment in the race to the bottom literature in fiscal federalism has previously been ignored. This has serious implications for developing countries like China and India where states compete with each other for attracting private capital in their own jurisdictions.

The paper aims to build the connections between game theory and the resource allocation problem with general uncertainty. It proposes modeling the distributed resource allocation problem by Bayesian game. During this paper, three basic kinds of uncertainties are discussed. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to build the connections between game theory and the resource allocation problem with general uncertainty.

In this paper, the Bayesian game is proposed for modeling the resource allocation problem with uncertainty. The basic game theoretical model contains three parts: agents, utility function, and decision-making process. Therefore, the probabilistic weighted Shapley value (WSV) is applied to design the utility function of the agents. For achieving the Bayesian Nash equilibrium point, the rational learning method is introduced for optimizing the decision-making process of the agents.

The paper provides empirical insights about how the game theoretical model deals with the resource allocation problem uncertainty. A probabilistic WSV function was proposed to design the utility function of agents. Moreover, the rational learning was used to optimize the decision-making process of agents for achieving Bayesian Nash equilibrium point. By comparing with the models with full information, the simulation results illustrated the effectiveness of the Bayesian game theoretical methods for the resource allocation problem under uncertainty.

This paper designs a Bayesian theoretical model for the resource allocation problem under uncertainty. The relationships between the Bayesian game and the resource allocation problem are discussed.

The aim of the current study is to use a city case study from Costa Rica to evaluate the Nash equilibrium point and Anna Karenina Principle in relation to community-based tourism (CBT), collaborative destination marketing (CDM) and strategic destination branding (SDB) – all of which require similar facilitators and suffer from similar inhibitors.

The study combines a case study approach with in-depth interviewing of local business stakeholders as the aim is to reveal a specific event in a specific setting.

In-depth interviews with local tourism product and service suppliers provided evidence that numerous deficiencies stem from the lack of collaborative destination marketing and branding in Costa Rica. This undermines the Nash equilibrium, namely successful CBT marketing and branding.

The results support the theory that the success (i.e. Nash equilibrium) or the failure situation (i.e. Anna Karenina Principle) in CBT – similar to CDM and SDB – depend on similar critical factors, including a shared vision, all-inclusive stakeholder involvement and participation; and cooperation and collaboration.

Results indicated an urgent need for governments, donor organizations, universities and NGOs to partner to collectively develop campaigns and educational and training programs for human and social capital development.

This study integrates sustainable tourism, tourism development, poverty alleviation, community-based tourism (CBT), collaborative destination marketing, strategic destination branding (SDB), Nash equilibrium and Anna Karenina Principle to explain the successful application of community-based tourism, which has not been previously reported.

The study aims to investigate the effect of cultural alignment and value congruency between children and founder on intergenerational succession and on the observation of family optimal outcomes.

A game-theoretical approach is used to develop a sequential game modeling the strategic interactions behind successor selection. The authors test its main predictions by conducting an experiment with 75 subjects.

A theoretical prediction that misalignment between children and founder leads to outcomes without intergenerational succession, or to outcomes with intergenerational succession that are not family optimal. These predictions are buttressed by our experiment, which also found evidence that the family optimal outcome is focal when there are multiple equilibria.

No light is thrown on the sources of cultural (mis)alignment, but only on some of its consequences. Further studies of a different nature are needed to better understand the former.

Cultural diffusion and value congruency within the family should be timely fostered to promote harmony during the succession process and raise the chances of successful succession.

The cultural alignment and value congruency between incumbent and successors is treated as shaping the incentives that both types of agents face in the successor-selection process. Further, experimental techniques have not been used to test the results obtained in games exploring issues in family firm succession. This paper aims to begin filling this gap.

This paper aims to show that evolutionary game theory not only provides a general and unified theory of political philosophy and strategic management theories but also a positive theory of interactive behavior.

This study suggests a way of the evolutionary game-theoretical model.

The model presented in this paper demonstrates coopetition is derived from balance points in multi-actor games. As the political–philosophical address of those strategic games will of all becomes convention in this balance point at which common knowledge occurs global optimum.

This study explores the connections between several streams in philosophy and strategic management. What does a particular philosophy contribute to strategic management with respect to game theory? When addressing this question in historical or exploratory terms, or in a combination of both, the end result is similar: particular philosophical issues, properly explained, are discussed in relation to important questions in strategic management.

What are the psychological and behavioral underpinnings of strategic decisions of this kind? What type of cognitive frames and managerial mental models, such as the game-theoretical model, might enable or hinder the integration of real-world problems in strategic decision-making?

What explains the evolution of such mental models, as well as the development of philosophical ideas, in informing the origins? How does the evolution of social and political contexts influence change in the cognitive and behavioral underpinnings of strategic decision-making?

This study highlights the overt power of strategic management ideas – competition, cooperation and coopetition – which have historically been built on the foundations of organizational theory, while also underlying the potential of philosophies, collective wisdom and Condorcet’s jury theorem and Rousseau’s (1998) correctness theory in games of evaluation. This study investigates whether the many produce better decisions than the wise few.

Adopting efficient marketing strategies is a challenging task in a competitive market place involving complex marketing planning, techniques and mechanisms to identify the best course of action under these circumstances and finding optimal solutions or stable outcomes. Decisions and strategies of competitors in the market influence the selection of the appropriate marketing strategy. The main purpose of this paper is to develop a mathematical methodology based on the game theory approach for planning optimal marketing-mix strategies in dynamic competitive markets, taking into account strategic foresight and interaction effects.

The game theory approach, as a decision-making tool in conflict situations, is suggested for planning and adopting optimal marketing strategy. The main intellectual attraction of the game theory is essentially a question of how to act in gaming situations against highly rational opponents A kind of static, finite and non-cooperative game analytics approach has been developed for this issue, and the proposed model has been implemented to design optimal marketing strategies for two top brands of the automotive parts market in Iran.

The findings of this study show that the optimal marketing-mix strategy for brand A is pricing and for brand B is the product strategy.

Game theory and the Nash equilibrium model can provide a practical approach to find and adopt the right strategy, know competitors' movements and strategies and get more profit.

The integration of the game theory approach into the marketing mix framework has been adopted as a generalized model for marketing strategy planning and analysis as well as to resolve some shortcomings of the marketing mix framework. The Nash equilibrium model has been used to analyze the results. The incorporation of game theory into marketing models has the potential to enrich the scope of marketing modeling.

The purpose of this paper is to provide an understanding of how a phenomenon or process of collective action with regard to the negotiation in value capturing can be expected to happen in a certain way, which in the end could improve our understanding of value capturing implementation processes.

Game theory is utilized to model the structure of relations between the actors involved. Game theory is a mathematical approach to study collective decision‐making situations in which the decision makers involved have conflicting preferences. Here, the authors consider the implementation of value capturing as the result of an agreement between a municipality and landowners to contribute to the costs of public infrastructure development which, in essence, is a form of collective action.

The paper is not only demonstrating the usefulness of game theoretical modelling in conceptualising relations between different stakeholders in the implementation of value capturing and suggesting the best possible strategy for every stakeholder; but also observing the limitations of the methods in analyzing the behaviour of actors involved in decision‐making processes with respect to value capturing.

Unlike most of value capturing studies which focused on either a valuation point of view (how much value can be captured?), a governance or instrumentalist point of view (which instruments can be effective for value capturing?), or a political point of view (to whom belongs the increment value that is the result of government investments or decisions?) – this paper emphasizes an alternative perspective to value capturing, namely the decision‐making or negotiation process underlying value capturing by relying on game‐theoretical approach.

This paper aims to present various three-level service contracts among the following three participants: a manufacturer, an agent and a customer. The interaction between the aforementioned participants will be modeled using the game theory approach. Under non-cooperative and cooperative games, the optimal sale price, warranty period and warranty price for the manufacturer and the optimal maintenance cost (repair cost) and marketing expenditure for the agent are obtained by maximizing their profits. The satisfaction of the customer is also maximized by being able to choose one of the suggested options from the manufacturer and the agent, based on the risk parameter.

Three-echelon supply chains with marketing and warranty services are studied. Game-theoretic approaches (non-cooperative and cooperative) are presented. The non-cooperative approaches are static (NE) and dynamic (Stakelberg) models. The cooperative approach is related to bargaining models (Nash bargaining games). The authors develop a sensitivity analysis of some parameters and their effect.

Based on the mentioned drawbacks (i.e. lack of a model containing warranty, marketing and pricing), despite their importance, a developed model is proposed in this research to cover one of the research gaps. In addition, main contributions of this paper that differentiate it from the existing papers are regarding inventory, lost sale and lost goodwill, which are significant in the comparison environment. Another advantage of this study is related to the solution approach, the game theory. Twofold of the games theoretical, i.e. cooperative (in three forms) and non-cooperative are considered, because of their importance. Three types of non-cooperative games are presented as follows: Nash equilibrium – each echelon decides respectively and simultaneously; manufacturer-Stackelberg – the manufacturer has more power than the agent and the agent has more power than the customer; and customer-Stackelberg – customer is leader of the agent and the agent is the leader of manufacturer. The involved cooperative game in this paper is the bargaining problem that the participants can determine how to share the additional profits.

In this paper, various three-level service contracts will be presented among the following three participants: a manufacturer, an agent and a customer. The interaction between the aforementioned participants will be modeled using the game theory approach. Under non-cooperative and cooperative games, the optimal sale price, warranty period and warranty price for the manufacturer and the optimal maintenance cost (repair cost) and marketing expenditure for the agent are obtained by maximizing their profits. The satisfaction of the customer is also maximized by being able to choose one of the suggested options from the manufacturer and the agent, based on the risk parameter. Several numerical examples are used to illustrate the models presented in this paper. Finally, the authors develop a sensitivity analysis of some parameters and their effects on the objective functions.