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Aims to analyse the labour market outcome when there are two unions in the industry, representing heterogeneous workers – imperfect substitutes in production.

Competition between union policies are viewed in terms of both employment and wage strategies. Results for substitutes and complements are inspected. Attention is given to the strategic behaviour of the unions, towards one another and/or the employer side. Cooperation is modelled using the Nash‐maximand approach.

Gathers some notes and enlargements to the standard collective bargaining problem in which unions maximise utility. Extends the framework to model union competition behaviour for jobs and/or employment that reproduces the standard market product analysis of imperfect competition. Focuses on heterogeneous labour.

The analysis concentrates on the case of union duopoly, but can easily be enlarged to the n‐union setting – which is left for further investigation.

A simple analytical example with Stone‐Geary union utility functions and a linear labour demand system is forwarded.

The author develops a bilateral Nash bargaining model under value uncertainty and private/asymmetric information, combining ideas from axiomatic and strategic bargaining theory. The solution to the model leads organically to a two-tier stochastic frontier (2TSF) setup with intra-error dependence. The author presents two different statistical specifications to estimate the model, one that accounts for regressor endogeneity using copulas, the other able to identify separately the bargaining power from the private information effects at the individual level. An empirical application using a matched employer–employee data set (MEEDS) from Zambia and a second using another one from Ghana showcase the applied potential of the approach.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of fairness concerns of the retailer on the pricing policies of the supply chain partners, their individual profits, and the overall performance of a dual-channel supply chain composed of one manufacturer and one retailer. First, the authors model the dual-channel supply chain under retailer’s fairness concern. Second, the authors derive the optimal pricing policies of the channel members. Third, the authors analyze the effects of retailer’s fairness and bargaining power on the pricing strategies and profit functions of the dual-channel supply chain system.

The authors adopt the manufacturer-led Stackelberg game theoretic framework, where the dominant manufacturer’s pricing decisions are based on the retailer’s pricing decision. The paper considers Nash bargaining solution as the fairness reference point to formulate the utility function of the fair-retailer. The paper uses this approach because it endogenously accounts for the competitive power and cooperative contribution of the channel members when they interact.

The authors find that the retailer’s fairness concerns are not always beneficial for its better performance. If the retailer is moderately sensitive towards its fairness, it will positively influence its performance. However, if the fairness concern becomes too high then it will negatively impact the retailer’s performance because it results in customers’ migration towards direct online channel for buying the products. In addition, if the retailer’s fairness concerns are mild, the manufacturer’s prices will decrease in retailer’s bargaining power, which is opposite otherwise.

The authors use Nash bargaining solution model as the fairness reference in the context of dual-channel supply chain, which is comparatively a recent approach and has been used independently from dual-channel supply chain system.

A Nash bargaining game data envelopment analysis (NBG-DEA) model is proposed to measure the efficiency of dynamic multi-period network structures. This paper aims to propose NBG-DEA model to measure the performance of decision-making units with complicated network structures.

As the proposed NBG-DEA model is a non-linear mathematical programming, finding its global optimum solution is hard. Therefore, meta-heuristic algorithms are used to solve non-linear optimization problems. Fortunately, the NBG-DEA model optimizes the well-formed problem, so that it can be solved by different non-linear methods including meta-heuristic algorithms. Hence, a meta-heuristic algorithm, called particle swarm optimization (PSO) is proposed to solve the NBG-DEA model in this paper. The case study is Industrial Management Institute (IMI), which is a leading organization in providing consulting management, publication and educational services in Iran. The sub-processes of IMI are considered as players where their pay-off is defined as the efficiency of sub-processes. The network structure of IMI is studied during multiple periods.

The proposed NBG-DEA model is applied to measure the efficiency scores in the IMI case study. The solution found by the PSO algorithm, which is implemented in MATLAB software, is compared with that generated by a classic non-linear method called gradient descent implemented in LINGO software.

The experiments proved that suitable and feasible solutions could be found by solving the NBG-DEA model and shows that PSO algorithm solves this model in reasonable central process unit time.

Recent US federal court rulings have provided new guidance on the use of economic models of bargaining in estimating reasonable royalty damages in patent cases. After reviewing relevant case law and providing an overview of the bargaining range approach, we describe one analytic method (the Rubinstein Bargaining Model) for developing a quantitative starting point with which to divide a bargaining range and explain how it can be tied, at least in part, to the facts and circumstances of the parties around the time of the Hypothetical Negotiation. We also describe how this approach can be used in conjunction with an analysis of other quantitative and qualitative factors related to the bargaining power of the parties, to help estimate reasonable royalty damages.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the labor market outcome when there are two unions in the industry, representing heterogeneous workers – substitutes or complements in production – and using wage strategies, in the presence of minimum wage regulation.

Three strategic environments are considered: symmetric Bertrand‐Nash duopoly, Stackelberg duopoly, and efficient cooperation between the two unions.

Usually, minimum wage legislation (floor) would decrease employment; it is shown that in Stackelberg environment, minimum wage legislation may induce an increase in total employment. Wage‐pushing strategies by a leader may also arise; and if workers are substitutes, entry deterrence strategies by the leader may be observed.

This paper analyses the impact of minimum wages in duopoly scenarios in an extensive way.

The purpose of this paper is to study the impact of bargaining powers of firms in supply chain coordination. It studies selected aspects of bargaining powers, namely, impatience, breakdown probability and outside options, and uses a bargaining-theoretic approach to analyze surplus allocation in a coordinated supply chain.

This paper proposes one-supplier one-buyer infinite horizon supply chain coordination game, where suppliers and buyers negotiate for the allocation of supply chain surplus arising out of supply chain coordination. Various aspects of the bargaining power of the negotiating parties are modeled and the paper studies impact of power levels on the results of the bargaining game.

A significance of impatience on the bargaining process and the surplus split has been established. This paper also demonstrates a rather counter-intuitive aspect of bargaining that the impatience (as perceived by the other party) can improve the bargaining position and therefore share of profits.

This paper has limited its analysis to three key components of bargaining power. Future works can study other aspects of bargaining power, namely information asymmetry, learning curve, inside options, etc. Further, the paper has considered an infinite horizon model – this assumption can be relaxed in future research.

Equations to derive optimal split of the surplus have been derived and can be leveraged to design an autonomous bargaining agent to discover equilibrium profit splits in a cloud or e-commerce setting. Further, insights from this paper can be leveraged by managers to understand their relative bargaining power and drive to obtain the best profit split.

This paper establishes that impatience (in terms of counter-offer probability) has a significant impact on the bargaining position and on the split of the surplus that the firm can get for themselves. It establishes the advantage of higher levels of impatience, provided the other party recognizes the impatience and factors it in their decision-making process.

According to officially published statistics, there began in the UK during 1979 some 2,080 stoppages of work due to industrial disputes, involving 4.584 million workers and resulting in 29.474 million working days lost (Department of Employment Gazette, 1980, p. 874). The purpose of this article is to summarise some of the main developments which have occurred over recent years in the economic analysis of strike activity and to illustrate some of the insights provided by economic theories of the collective bargaining process and its breakdown. We begin with a brief survey of the literature which provides a discussion of its major findings and of the limitations of existing studies. In subsequent sections, some basic theoretical concepts are introduced and after a brief discussion of some important elements of bargaining theory these are used in the construction of an alternative model of the breakdown of the collective bargaining process and the occurrence of strikes. In the penultimate section, this alternative model is tested against UK data and in the final section the main findings are summarised.

The learning ability on critical bargaining information contributes to accelerating construction claim negotiations in the win-win situation. The purpose of this paper is to study how to apply Zeuthen strategy and Bayesian learning to simulate the dynamic bargaining process of claim negotiations with the consideration of discount factor and risk attitude.

The authors first adopted certainty equivalent method and curve fitting to build a party’s own curve utility function. Taking the opponent’s bottom line as the learning goal, the authors introduced Bayesian learning to refine former predicted linear utility function of the opponent according to every new counteroffer. Both parties’ utility functions were revised by taking discount factors into consideration. Accordingly, the authors developed a bilateral learning model in construction claim negotiations based on Zeuthen strategy.

The consistency of Zeuthen strategy and the Nash bargaining solution model guarantees the effectiveness of the bilateral learning model. Moreover, the illustrative example verifies the feasibility of this model.

As the authors developed the bilateral learning model by mathematical deduction, scholars are expected to collect empirical cases and compare actual solutions and model solutions in order to modify the model in future studies.

Negotiators could refer to this model to make offers dynamically, which is favorable for the parties to reach an agreement quickly and to avoid the escalation of claims into disputes.

The proposed model provides a supplement to the existing studies on dynamic construction claim negotiations.