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This article attempts to answer the following questions: Who ultimately owns firms listed in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries? Does ownership structure depend on the institutional context? How does ownership affect firm performance? Do institutional factors influence the ownership–performance relationship?

We apply univariate analyses and generalised methods of moments estimations for a sample of 692 GCC listed firms during 2009–2015.

Our results reveal that corporations are mainly controlled by the state or families, the ownership structure is highly concentrated and pyramid structures are common in the region. Ownership is more concentrated in non-financial than financial firms, and ownership concentration and shareholder identity differ by institutional country setting. Finally, ownership concentration does not influence performance, but formal institutions play a moderating role in the relationship.

As our findings reveal potential type II agency problems due to ownership concentration, policymakers should raise awareness of professional corporate governance practices and tailor them to GCC countries’ institutional contexts.

Even with the introduction of new regulations by some GCC states to protect minority investors and promote corporate governance practices, ownership concentration is a rigid structure, and its use by investors to protect their economic endowment and power is culturally embedded.

Although previous studies have analysed ownership concentration and large shareholders’ identities across countries, this study fills a research gap investigating this phenomenon in-depth in emerging economies.

Lately, sustainability issues are increasingly affecting all sectors, even if oil and gas industry is highly required to improve its social performance because of the societal pressure to environmental protection and social welfare. Sustainability concerns and corporate governance features and practices are more and more connected because sustainability has been perceived as a crucial topic by owners and managers. In this perspective, the empirical analysis aims to explore whether and to what extent, sustainability-oriented corporate governance model is linked with social performance.

By adopting a multi-theoretical framework that includes the legitimacy theory, the stakeholder theory and the resource-based view theory, this analysis used a sample of 42 large European-listed companies belonging to the oil and gas industry. The authors run fixed effects regression models by using a dependent variable, i.e. the social score, available in ASSET4 Thomson Reuters, and some independent variables focused on sustainable corporate governance models, stakeholder engagement, firm profitability, market value and corporate risk level.

Drawing upon the investigation of a moderating effect, findings display that stakeholder engagement is positively associated with corporate social performance and it can be considered an important internal driver able to shape a corporate culture and most likely to address corporate social responsibility issues.

This study confirms the need to develop an organizational and holistic approach to corporate governance practices by analyzing internal and external governance mechanisms. From the managerial perspective, managers should opt for a sustainable corporate governance model, as it is positively correlated with corporate social performance.

There is an urgent need to investigate sustainability issues and their potential association with firm internal mechanisms, particularly in the oil and gas industry. This paper can extend the current body of knowledge by pointing out a positive relationship between stakeholder engagement and firm social performance.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of the control-ownership wedge of controlling shareholders (excess control) on the survival of French initial public offerings (IPOs).

This paper studies a large sample of 434 French IPOs. The empirical analysis uses the Cox proportional hazard and accelerated-failure-time models. Data are manually gathered from IPO prospectuses.

The findings support a positive relation between the control-ownership wedge and IPO survival time, indicating that survival is more likely in firms with high excess control levels. This result is consistent with the view that controlling shareholders with a large control-ownership wedge have incentives to preserve their private benefits of control by increasing firm survival chances. The findings also show that older IPOs are more likely to survive, while riskier and underpriced IPOs are more likely to delist.

The results provide a better understanding of the role of excess control in IPO survival. They also enrich the debate on the efficiency of the one-share-one-vote rule.

The research provides new insights into the role of agency conflicts in IPO survivability. In particular, it explores the effect of dominant shareholders with a control-ownership wedge on survival time.