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In 2015, Malaysia’s investment vehicle, 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB), came under international scrutiny after it amassed a debt of US$11 billion (10.3 billion) (Wright & Clark, 2015), which it had difficulty repaying. More disturbingly, investigators found that US$700 million (658 million) was transferred into the personal bank account of Malaysia’s prime minister, Najib Razak, founder and chairman of 1MDB’s advisory board (Wright & Clark, 2015). Najib was also accused of embezzling state money (Reuters, 2015) and damaging the image of the country (“Najib tried to bribe me”, 2015). This chapter aims to examine the strategies used by the Malaysian prime minister to repair his image in the 1MDB scandal, the effectiveness of these strategies, and how these impacted Malaysia’s public diplomacy efforts in restoring the country’s image and reputation. Findings showed that the prime minister denied wrongdoing, and simultaneously bolstered his position and promised to turn 1MDB around. In contrast to the current explication of Benoit and Pang’s (2008) image repair strategies, Najib’s way of attacking the accusers sheds light into how image repair strategies may be operationalized in the Asian context. A new image repair strategy – diversion – is proposed to be added to the existing framework.

This paper aims to determine whether a connection can be formed between corruption, plea-bargaining and civil alternative dispute resolution.

Academic articles and textbooks are examined as are relevant reports by various academic institutions.

Despite the similarities between plea-bargaining and civil alternative dispute resolution, the differences between the two overwhelmingly supersede their similarities. As such, there is unlikely to be an interplay between corruption, criminal plea-bargaining and civil alternative dispute resolution.

There are limited data available in relation to the prevalence of corruption activities by Chinese officials within the Belt and Road Initiative. Any discussions within this study is based on the impressionistic observations of the author, which may not reflect the true state of affairs in China.

Those who are interested in examining the relationship between the criminal plea-bargaining and civil alternative dispute resolution will have an interest in this topic.

The value of the paper is to demonstrate the difficulties in cross-fertilizing criminal law procedures with civil dispute resolution.

This paper investigates the market responses towards four types of politically connected (PCON) firms during two political events – general election and change of leader in Malaysia.

The authors capture the market response using cumulative abnormal return and further test it using regression analysis. The authors use a sample of 376 politically connected (PCON) and non-politically connected (non-PCON) firms from 2002 to 2013.

The market reacted negatively towards government-linked companies (GLC) during both events, showing that GLCs are negatively perceived by the market during political instability. On the other hand, the reaction of the market towards firms connected by businessmen does not differ from other firms. When compared to the findings of past literature, it shows the decreasing influence that businessmen have over the government leader. In further analysis, this study finds firms that are connected to the incoming government leader recorded a higher CAR as compared to firms connected to the outgoing government leader.

The authors’ study offers several practical implications. Knowing how the market responds to the different types of political connections might prove beneficial to investors. With this information, investors can recognize stocks with potential returns before the event date and may consider buying or selling them to capture a short-term profit. The authors’ findings may also have important implications for the management of PCON firms in terms of implementing an effective risk management and asset allocation plan to safeguard their value during political events that may disrupt the stability of their firms.

This paper provides an insight on how the markets have a different perception towards different types of politically connected firms during short-run political events. Past studies usually categorize political connection into a single category. With this separation, the authors are able to see how their individual CAR differs from other types of PCON.