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One important assumption in the conventional cooperative game theory is that payoffs are assumed to be deterministic. In terms of the players’ cognitive ability of the realistic world, this is a very strict assumption. The classical game theory can find no way out when a particular game circumstance involves uncertainty, such as limited knowledge, small sample, and inadequate information, the payoff values of the game can only be described with interval grey numbers. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

In this study the concept of N-person grey games is proposed in which payoffs are represented with interval grey numbers opposed to the classical game theory. A straight forward solution methodology is submitted compatible to grey numbers. Then, a currency war between anonymous countries is handled and modeled as an N-Person grey game. A generic currency war scenario is developed to follow the proposed solution procedure thoroughly.

Based on the outcomes of this work, the authors can say that N-person grey game is an expansion of the classical N-person game under uncertain grey information and can be applied in more complex and uncertain environments, such as those seen in complicated currency warfare.

This study combines the grey system theory with the classic N-person game theory and sets up the N-person grey game with grey payoff functions. Based on the grey number operating methods, the grey linear programming algorithm is established to calculate and distribute benefits to the players. In this respect this study has the feature of being the pioneer in the N-person grey game area.

In this work, the author explores the specific structural conditions that render multilateral arms control agreements problematic by situating their dynamic in a three-person Prisoner’s Dilemma game. The addition of even a third state to an arms race compounds many times over the structural difficulties that face two racing states. Nevertheless, even in multilateral arms races, conditions exist that make it rational for all participating states to pause. The most salient of these conditions is the existence of a coalition that is collectively rational for a subset of the racing states. It was suggested that if such a coalition exists naturally, or if one forms as a result of a exogenous shock to the system, then it is possible for it to offer incentives to all states not in the coalition to join it and, at the same time, increase the payoffs to the original members of the coalition. Thus, if such a coalition exists, then the possibility also exists that all the participating states could be induced to stop arming. Nonetheless, the major lesson that should be drawn from this chapter is the realisation that the conditions under which multilateral arms races might rationally be terminated are generally quite restrictive.

The purpose of this paper is to extend the results of Meca et al. (2004) depending on the grey information revealed by the individual firms.

The authors introduce cooperative grey games and focus on sharing ordering cost rule (SOC-rule) to distribute the joint cost.

In this study, the authors introduce a model, where inventory costs are assumed as grey numbers instead of crisp or stochastic ones studied in literature. At first, grey numbers and classical cooperative inventory games are recalled. Then, cooperative grey games are introduced and related results are given. Finally, an application is performed for three shotgun companies in Turkey.

It is an effective approach for theoretical analysis of systems with imprecise information and incomplete samples. Therefore, grey system theory, rather than the traditional probability theory and fuzzy set theory, is better suited to model the inventory problems by using cooperative game theory. To the best of the knowledge no study exists modeling inventory situations by using cooperative grey games. From this point of view this study is a pioneering work on a promising topic.

In recent times there have been attempts by well known economists towards integrating the questions of ethics and values in the body framework of economic theory. Yet their pursuits have remained subservient to one or the other of received economic doctrines. This has proven to be a drawback in the development of an independent inquiry into the possibility of treating the problem of ethical integration as an endogenous phenomen of the system. The idea of ethical endogeneity here means, that society is not merely a reflection of the social policies undertaken by the collective of members of a democratic and decentralized polity. It must also reflect multiple rounds of social transformation realized by the impact of the reverse relation of the ecological environment on the polity itself. Contrary to this concept, the view on ethics and values in the social system presented by the contemporary school of economists and philosophers has the essence of exogeneity. That means ethics and values are made to impact upon the economy but from outside the system. In the system itself they become irrelevant. Vickrey has the following words on the treatment of values by economists in the area of normative economics: “But it is only recently that economists have begun to probe into the systems of values that underlie their discussions, and indeed in many cases the judgements are implicit, rather than explicitly stated.”

The purpose of this paper is to illustrate how game theoretic solution concepts inform what classes of problems will be amenable to artificial intelligence and machine learning (AI/ML), and how to evolve the interaction between human and artificial intelligence.

The approach addresses the development of operational gaming to support planning and decision making. It then provides a succinct summary of game theory for those designing and using games, with an emphasis on information conditions and solution concepts. It addresses how experimentation demonstrates where human decisions differ from game theoretic solution concepts and how games have been used to develop AI/ML. It concludes by suggesting what classes of problems will be amenable to AI/ML, and which will not. It goes on to propose a method for evolving human/artificial intelligence.

Game theoretic solution concepts inform classes of problems where AI/ML 'solutions' will be suspect. The complexity of the subject requires a campaign of learning.

Though games have been essential to the development of AI/ML, practitioners have yet to employ game theory to understand its limitations.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects and implications of free‐ride within culturally diverse virtual teams (VTs).

Game theoretic concepts were applied to model the phenomenon of free‐ride within global VTs. Further, longitudinal data were collected to verify the validity of the applied methodology.

It was found that less competent group members tend to engage more often in free‐ride at the cost of their fellows. Socio‐cultural factors have significant impact on the amount and timing of reporting free‐ride. Larger groups experience free‐ride at higher rates compared to smaller groups.

The experiments are conducted in a controlled lab environment that may not mimic the real‐world global VT dynamics.

Business managers could use the results in this paper to form more effective and productive VTs by paying attention to group size and cultural effects on group behavior.

Game theoretic concepts have long been applied to traditional groups to study their dynamics. This work applies those concepts to VTs along with studying the cultural effects on the phenomenon of free‐ride.

This paper aims to determine the conditions for the core of the Triple Helix game to exist. The Triple Helix of university-industry-government relationships is a three-person cooperative game with transferable utility. Then, the core, the Shapley value and the nucleolus were used as indicators of the synergy within an innovation system. Whereas the Shapley value and the nucleolus always exist, the core may not.

The core of a three-person cooperative game with transferable utility exists only if and only if the game is convex. The paper applies the convexity condition to the Triple Helix game.

The Triple Helix game is convex if and only if there is output within the system; it is strictly convex if and only if all the three bilateral and the trilateral relationships have an output.

Convex games are competitive situations in which there are strong incentives towards the formation of large coalitions; therefore, innovation actors must cooperate to maximise their interests. Furthermore, a Triple Helix game may be split into subgames for comprehensive analyses and several Triple Helix games may be combined for a global study.

This paper extends the meaning of the Shapley value and the nucleolus for Triple Helix innovation actors: the Shapley value indicates the quantity a player wins because of the coalitions he involves in and the nucleolus the return for solidarity of an innovation actor.