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Using a general model of corruption that explains and accounts for corruption across professions and institutions, this chapter will examine how certain practices in the media, especially in areas where journalism, advertising and public relations regularly intersect and converge, can be construed as instances of corruption. It will be argued that such corruption, as in the case of cash-for-comment scandals, advertorials, infomercials, and infotainment, as well as public relations media releases disseminated misleadingly as journalistic opinion, is regular, ubiquitous, and systematic.

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how some of the information and communication practices of the Tech Media and specifically of Facebook, constitute media corruption. The paper will examine what the professional role of Facebook is regarding its information/communication practices and then demonstrate that Facebook is essentially a media company and not merely a “platform,” therefore liable to the same normative responsibilities as other media companies.

Applying the dual obligation information theory (DOIT), a normative information and communication theory that applies generally to all media companies that disseminate and share information, the paper demonstrates that Facebook’s role of mediating and curating the information of its users places upon it a normative editing responsibility, to ensure both the preventive detection and corrective editing of fake news, as well as other forms of misinformation disseminated on its platform. Finally, applying a philosophical model of media corruption the paper will demonstrate that Facebook’s role in the Cambridge Analytica case was not only unethical but moreover, constituted media corruption.

The paper concludes that Facebook’s media corruption illustrated in the Cambridge Analytica case is not a one-off case but the result of a systemic and inherent conflict of interest between its business model of selling users’ information to advertisers and its normative media role rendering the conflict of interest between those two roles conducive to media corruption.

The paper's originality is twofold. It demonstrates that Facebook is a media company normatively accountable on the basis of an original theory the DOIT and moreover, on the basis of an original media corruption theory its actions in the Cambridge Analytica case constituted media corruption.

Technology facilitates certain behaviours. This underlies the argument that the Internet may not be as benign as we might like to think. It is argued in this paper, through examination of the case of the capture of a large number of people on charges of possession of child pornography, that the Internet constitutes a kind of unintentional entrapment. Some consequences of this are explored.

We often hear questions like “What must that leader have been thinking?” “What possessed her to do that?” “That leader needs to give his head a shake!” or “It is so disappointing to see the pain caused by one wrong-headed and self-serving leader!” This chapter describes how leaders may subtly fall into rationalization, self-justification, foolishness, and callous indifference through maleficent internal narratives. How is it that leaders who have found the favor of others in the service of a great cause (i.e., the education of children and youth) find themselves sucked into clearly wrong or unthinkably bad actions? In this chapter, vicious (non-virtuous) thinking, inner political churnings, unconscious reinforcement of systemic evil, and hurtful ways of influencing others are explored, named, and challenged.

Book VI of Aristotle′s Nicomachean Ethics is commented on, aimed at showing its relevance to some themes in contemporary moral philosophy. It is argued that the classical approach to morality (Aristotle) and the Enlightened approach (Kant) need not compose antinomy. Instead, the Aristotelian emphases on the development of virtuous character and the nature of practical wisdom coalesce with the Kantian emphasis on autonomy – what Falk calls “responsible self‐direction” – in the person of the moral leader. In particular, great moralists have recognised that moral wisdom is not mainly a matter of strict obedience to rules. While rules have their place, the subject matter of ethics cannot be determined by a quasi‐mathematical formalism. Over‐emphasis on the formalism of the categorical imperative obscures Kant′s more fundamental emphasis on autonomy. The autonomous person, able to exercise moral leadership, cultivates the Aristotelian virtue of phronēsis.