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This chapter examines the effect of mutual monitoring and the personality trait of need for achievement on subordinates’ budgetary-slack creation in a team-based environment. Experimental results show that the creation of budgetary slack is lower when mutual monitoring is present than when it is absent. The results also show that a two-way interaction between mutual monitoring and the personality trait of need for achievement affects subordinates’ budgetary-slack creation.

Whether institutional investors monitor corporations and improve firm value is a key question for corporate governance and investment management. I find little empirical support for the hypothesis that institutions undertake monitoring that increases firm quality and valuation. Granger causation tests show that while quality firms do attract institutional investment, institutions do not monitor and firm value subsequently declines. Instead, institutional incentives are critical; some institutions with strong incentives to monitor do, indeed, monitor. Institutions with concentrated portfolios successfully monitor while institutions with a larger percentage stake do not. Pensions and endowments are better monitors than insurers, banks and mutual funds.

This study aims to explore whether investors’ inattention is associated with firms’ environmental, social and governance (ESG) decoupling, which is defined as the misalignment between the implementation and incorporation of ESG policies.

Focusing on a sample of the components of ESG ratings for China Securities Index (CSI) 300 companies between 2017 and 2019, the authors test the relationship between firms’ ESG decoupling level and mutual fund investors’ distraction by applying exogenous shocks to their portfolios.

The results show that firms with distracted mutual fund investors engage in more external than internal ESG actions, leading to a high ESG decoupling level. Mutual fund investors use “threat of exit” rather than “voice” as a governance mechanism to influence corporate ESG decoupling. While external ESG actions mitigate stock price crash risk, internal ESG actions increase firm value; firms with a high ESG decoupling level suffer lower valuations.

This study has implications for increasing the congruence between firms’ external and internal ESG actions, thereby improving firms’ ESG performance and long-term economic outcomes.

This paper helps policy-makers and regulators to reassess how ESG policies can be implemented to be consistent with organizations’ core business activities.

Contributing to prior studies of greenwashing and corporate social responsibility decoupling, this paper extends decoupling literature by revisiting ESG impacts in an integrated framework and explores the antecedents of corporate ESG decoupling from the perspective of institutional investor monitoring.

New Ways of Working practices like activity-based working and home-based work lead to different behaviors of employees. Due to these NWW practices, employees choose their own preferred times and places to work – albeit to a certain extent and within certain boundaries. This might have an impact on the possibilities for teamwork. Therefore, we suppose that teamwork and teamwork behaviors might moderate the relationship between NWW and outcomes. Does teamwork behavior have an influence on the relation of NWW and productivity or organizational commitment? And how, is it a positive or a negative influence on these relations? This chapter reports the results of an explorative study on the relationship between NWW practices, teamwork behavior, productivity, and organizational commitment. Quantitative data from the questionnaire will illustrate the main issues: the complex linkages between the four components of NWW, the outcome variables, and the effect of different components of teamwork behavior. This chapter describes the issue of teamwork and provides new data on the actual use and effectiveness of the different components of teamwork behaviors.

To provide decision makers in strategic alliances a risk‐time framework to: categorize types of potential deceitful behaviors by partners; and adopt appropriate deterrence mechanisms to curb and control such behavior.

The article identifies four types of deceitful behavior, based on: the degree of relational risk that characterizes interactions of a firm with its alliance partner; and the length of the deceit horizon.

Suggests a number of deterrence mechanisms for controlling the different types of deceitful behavior, with the aim of enhancing confidence in partner cooperation in alliances.

The article provides a practical template for alliance managers to decide what kinds of deterrence mechanisms to adopt on the basis of the type of perceived deceitful behavior of alliance partners.

The article responds to an unmet need of managers with alliance responsibilities for a framework to help select the most effective mechanisms to deter different kinds of potential deceitful behavior of alliance partners.

This systematic literature review analyses the determinants and consequences of executive compensation-related shareholder activism and say-on-pay (SOP) votes. The review covers 71 empirical articles published between January 1995 and September 2017. The studies are reviewed within an empirical research framework that separates the reasons for shareholder activism and SOP voting dissent as input factor on the one hand and the consequences of shareholder pressure as output factor on the other. This procedure identifies the five most important groups of factors in the literature: the level and structure of executive compensation, firm characteristics, corporate governance mechanisms, shareholder structure and stakeholders. Of these, executive compensation and firm characteristics are the most frequently examined. Further examination reveals that the key assumptions of neoclassical principal agent theory for both managers and shareholders are not always consistent with recent empirical evidence. First, behavioral aspects (such as the perception of fairness) influence compensation activism and SOP votes. Second, non-financial interests significantly moderate shareholder activism. Insofar, we recommend integrating behavioral and non-financial aspects into the existing research. The implications are analyzed, and new directions for further research are discussed by proposing 19 different research questions.

Integrating transaction costs economics and task-technology fit theory, this study distinguishes two categories of social media–enabled interactions, namely task-related interactions and tie-related interactions, and explores the match between these two and firms' use of contracts in achieving safeguarding and coordinating purposes in interfirm governance.

Two studies were conducted to test the hypotheses. In Study 1, this study collaborated with a professional market research firm and collected responses from Chinese manufacturing firms in a survey. In Study 2, this study designed a scenario-based experiment and collected 239 participants from the Credamo platform.

This study categorized social media–enabled interactions into task-related interactions and tie-related interactions and conducted two studies to reveal that the safeguarding purpose of contract specificity is amplified by tie-related interactions, whereas the coordinating purpose of contract specificity is strengthened by task-related interactions.

This study assumes that firms permit and encourage the use of social media. However, some firms might prohibit the use of social media due to risk issues, or their partners may be prohibited from using social media.

Given that social media–enabled interactions have joint effects with contracts in achieving safeguarding and coordinating purposes, a firm's employees should match their goals with an appropriate type of social media–enabled interactions.

This study enriches the interfirm governance literature by uncovering the roles of these two types of interactions in matching contract specificity to achieve safeguarding and coordinating purposes, which provides actionable insights for managers in governing interfirm relationships.

The popular press often touts workforce demographic diversity as profit enhancing because it may reduce the firm's communication costs with particular segments of customers or yield greater team problem-solving abilities. On the other hand, diversity also may raise communication costs within teams, thereby retarding problem solving and lowering productivity. Unfortunately, there is little empirical research that disentangles the above countervailing effects. Diversity in ability enhances the team productivity if there is significant mutual learning and collaboration within the team, while demographic diversity may harm productivity by making learning and peer pressure less effective and increasing team-member turnover. We evaluate these propositions using a novel panel data from a garment plant that shifted from individual piece rate to group piece rate production over three years. Because we observe individual productivity data, we are able to econometrically distinguish between the impacts of diversity in worker abilities and demographic diversity. Teams with more heterogeneous worker abilities are more productive at the plant. Holding the distribution of team ability constant, teams composed of only one ethnicity (Hispanic workers in our case) are more productive, but this finding does not hold for marginal changes in team composition. We find little evidence that workers prefer to be segregated; demographically diverse teams are no more likely to dissolve, holding team productivity (and hence pay) constant, than homogeneous teams.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of independent directors in reducing firms’ information asymmetry. Moreover, the authors enrich this investigation by differentiating the effectiveness of independent directors in an intriguing comparative setting of family vs non-family firms. Family firms are used to represent an interesting environment where controlling insiders (i.e. firms’ founding families) have dominant control over corporate decisions. This study addresses the question of whether controlling-insiders dominate independent directors.

The authors manually collect firms’ founder information to identify family firm status in a sample of S&P 500 firms. Following a large literature in capital market research, the authors proxy information asymmetry by trading volume, bid-ask spread and price volatility. The authors employ multivariate regression with two-stage least square analysis, instrumental variable method, Heckman selection model and Hausman–Taylor model to address the issue of endogenous selection of board of director and family firm status.

The authors find a negative relation between the board independence and information asymmetry, suggesting independent directors are effective in reducing information asymmetry. Furthermore, the authors find this negative relation is stronger in family firms. These results are robust after controlling for the endogenous issues using various models.

Our results suggest that independent directors in family-controlled firms are more successful in reducing information asymmetry than their counterparts in non-family firms. The authors provide direct evidence to support the existing theoretical arguments from Rediker and Seth (1995) and Anderson and Reeb (2004) that founding families and independent boards might be a powerful combination for aligning the interest of insider and diffused shareholders. The findings ease a prevalent concern that the role of independent directors might be compromised in an environment with controlling shareholders, and advocate regulations promoting board independence for various business practices.

A number of studies concentrate on the practice of corporate disclosure of firm’s performance and governance and how corporate disclosure mitigates information asymmetry (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Ali et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2008). To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to examine the impact of independent directors in reducing information asymmetry. The research adds to understanding the incentives of board members and supports recent findings that different types of investors have heterogeneous incentives for corporate disclosure (Srinidhi et al., 2014).