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About 500 municipalities have declared bankruptcy since Congress passed the Municipal Bankruptcy Act in 1937. Based on the experiences of these municipalities and the municipal bankruptcy literature, this paper develops a theory of why municipalities go bankrupt and discusses various ways to prevent other municipalities from going bankrupt. The paper identifies three-dimensional factors that may make municipalities go bankrupt: long-term and short-term, political and economic, and internal and external perspectives. The paper ends with an observation that government failure in the form of municipal bankruptcy can be reduced by strengthening the audit powers of the states and by utilizing more municipal bond and liability insurance policies.

Since 1934, the federal government has provided a process for municipalities to declare bankruptcy, and approximately 500 governments have done so. In recent years, an average of less than one city government declares bankruptcy each year. In this article, the authors identify five factors that contribute to financial distress for cities which, if left unattended, can lead to municipal bankruptcy. This discussion is followed by an examination of the events that led to the bankruptcy of the City of Prichard, Alabama, once a prosperous suburb of Mobile. The authors conclude that this municipal bankruptcy occurred, in large part, because Prichard failed to face the factors of financial distress identified by the authors in the years prior to filing for bankruptcy.

This study attempts to analyze the role of governance mechanisms in municipal bankruptcy, which appears to be a neglected area of research. The analysis considers both the organizational level (micro) and the regulatory system (macro).

We use a relevant case of municipal bankruptcy in Italy to discuss the influence of governance characteristics, such as the political and management structure, interaction, and behaviors. The issues related to the accounting system and external audits are also considered. The data for this study are obtained from secondary sources such as audited budgetary reports, public documents, and reports from the Supreme Audit Institution.

The study indicates that the spoils system can favor the politicians’ exercise of power over public managers and undermine the capacity to prevent and manage financial distress. Poor accounting and weak control systems may facilitate this process. The high turnover of top management throughout a mayor’s term in office may reflect political pressure to force accounting rules and achieve flexibility to obtain the expected results or to correct poor financial performance.

To avert municipal bankruptcies, regulations should consider enforcing ex ante control by external oversight bodies, forbidding risky operations and limiting the spoils system for financial management positions and internal auditors.

Municipal defaults around the world have indicated that regulations and audits are ineffective to prevent local governments from failing. A full understanding of complex mutual interactions between the mechanisms of governance and the behaviors of politicians and managers can provide valuable insights to prevent local governments from failing.

To date, only two counties in the United States have filed for bankruptcy protection: Orange County, California (1994) and Greene County, Alabama (1996). This case study pertains only to Greene County. Although economic decline due to a loss of gaming revenues was involved, financial mismanagement was the primary causal factor for Greene County’s fiscal stress. This research chronicles an impoverished rural Alabama county whose legislative and administrative decisions resulted in its fiscal stress and municipal bankruptcy. The Greene County bankruptcy case was closed in 1999 and the County continues to operate under a fiscal recovery plan. However, the County has yet to comply with the miscellaneous provisions of the bankruptcy plan that could improve the financial management of the County.

Jefferson County was in a financial crisis as the commissioners faced a decision concerning whether the County should file for bankruptcy. The County was under an EPA mandate to update an outdated and overrunning sewer system. Estimates to do the work ranged from $250 million to $1.2 billion. The situation led to graft, corruption, bribery and illegal activities. More than 20 people were prosecuted in association with the illegal activities involved in financing and construction of the sewer system and four of the five commissioners were sentenced for their involvement in the corruption. Five new commissioners were elected and had to determine what to do after the down-grade of the County's bonds and warrants; the reduced revenues; and the corruption had put the County in a situation where funds were not available to continue to operate the County and provide services to its citizens. Should they declare bankruptcy or choose other paths open to them?

Data sources – this case is based on field research and interviews with a commissioner, court documents and from many other public sources. Extent of disguise – the case is not disguised.

The case can be used in graduate or upper division undergraduate courses in accounting, strategy, public administration or finance. There are several topics in the case that could be addressed: governance; economics, government and political issues, ethics, accounting, financial instruments, and strategy.

Jefferson County, Alabama undertook a series of risky financial maneuvers in 2003 that included issuing large amounts of variable rate and auction rate securities as well as engaging in numerous interest rate swaps in order to lower the burgeoning costs of repairing its sewer system to comply with federal regulations. These complex financial instruments, intended to lower debt service costs on the countyʼs $3 billion in outstanding sewer warrants, led the county to financial bankruptcy in the wake of the financial markets collapse. This paper explores the choice of securities by analyzing the risk of adjustable rate securities and interest rate swaps, examining the Jefferson County case in detail, and providing some lessons for future financial management within the context of unexpected events such as the current recession.

This paper analyzes the impact of economic downturns on the revenue and expense sides of city financing for the period 2003 to 2009 using a convenience sample of the audited end of year financial reports for thirty midsized US cities. The analysis focuses on whether and how quickly and how extensively revenue and spending directions from past years are altered by recessions. A seven year series of Comprehensive Annual Financial Report (CAFR) data serves to explore whether citiesʼ revenues and spending, especially the traditional property tax and core functions such as public safety and infrastructure withstood the brief 2001 and the persistent 2007 recessions? The findings point to consumption (spending) over stability (revenue minus expense) for the recession of 2007, particularly in 2008 and 2009.

This paper aims to explain the weaknesses and inconsistencies inherent in the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 (USA).

The approach is entirely theoretical and multi-disciplinary (and relies on some third-party empirical research), and it consists of a literature review, critique and the development of theories which are applicable across countries.

The Dodd-Frank Act is inefficient and inadequate as a response to the global financial crisis. The Dodd-Frank Act has not resulted in significant economic growth and has increased transaction costs and compliance costs for both government agencies and financial services companies.

The author developed the theories introduced in the paper.

This study aims to analyze whether and how a set of financial ratios calculated on the basis of financial statement information would allow auditors of Italian local governments (LGs) to get an indication of LGs’ financial distress risk and, hence, to support politicians and managers in promptly detecting financial distress.

A model comprising a set of financial indicators that would distinguish distressed from not distressed LGs through a logistic regression approach has been estimated and applied to Italian LGs. The model is built on the basis of information pertaining to 44 distressed and 53 not distressed LGs for up to five years prior to bankruptcy and covers the period 2003-2012.

The model reveals that the percentage of personnel expenses over revenues, the turnover ratio of short-term liabilities over current revenues and the reliance on subsidies (calculated as subsidies per capita) are factors discriminating non-distressed LGs from the distressed ones.

The model could have political and practical implications. The possible use of this model as a complementary tool in auditing activities might be helpful for auditors in detecting financial distress promptly, thus potentially enabling politicians and managers to search for different ways to manage public resources to avoid the detrimental consequences related to the declaration of distress.

This model, contrary to existing models that use accrual accounting data, is applicable to LGs that adopt a modified cash accounting basis.