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Building on the institutional theory perspective on corporate governance change and based on interviews with investor relations (IR) managers in large Japanese companies, this study aims to examine Japanese IR managers’ perceptions of the influence of foreign shareholders on Japan’s corporate governance reform and stakeholder-based system. The paper examines tensions, conflicts and collaborations among different stakeholders involved in corporate governance changes in Japan, especially in the areas of firm ownership, employment relations and boards of directors. The paper explains why convergence does not happen in some large Japanese companies by investigating Japanese managers’ responses to and perceptions of foreign shareholders in multiple corporate contexts.

The author conducted in-depth interviews with ten IR managers at large, listed Japanese companies in Kyoto and Tokyo and two managers at foreign investment banks in Tokyo, between 2018 and 2021.

This paper explores five themes that emerged from my interviews: Chief executive officers’ (CEOs’) mixed perceptions of foreign investors, the effectiveness of CEO compensation and outside directors, managers’ reluctance to accept stock price-driven business strategies, foreign investors’ engagement vs investments in index funds and gender patterns, including the effectiveness of token female outside directors. The Japanese companies the author looked at incorporated foreign shareholders as consultants and adopted a few major shareholder-based customs, such as CEOs communicating with investors, having outside directors, increasing CEO compensation and slimming down unprofitable parts of the business via restructuring and downsizing. Simultaneously, they resisted a few major shareholder-based practices. Foreign shareholders’ pressure revealed tensions and contradictions between the Japanese stakeholder system and shareholder primacy-based customs.

This paper is one of the few qualitative studies that explores Japanese IR managers’ responses to and perceptions of foreign shareholders in corporate governance reform, with a particular focus on ownership, employment relations and board members. This paper provides examples of tension, conflict and cooperation between Japanese managers and foreign investors, as seen through the eyes of Japanese IR managers. Examining changes in Japan’s stakeholder-based system of corporate governance reform enables us to better understand the processes by which, with vigorous pressure from government and foreign shareholders, a non-western country like Japan may adopt shareholder-based customs and how such a change may also lead to institutional changes.

Companies around the globe increasingly receive immense shareholder scrutiny due to perceivably excessive executive director remuneration. The debate in South Africa intensifies due to severe pay inequality. The authors thus accounted for the perspectives of asset managers and listed financial services companies in South Africa pertaining to the impact of voting and engagement on director pay policies and practices.

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with selected asset managers, chief executive officers, chief financial officers and remuneration committee members of listed financial services companies to gauge their views on the impact of shareholder activism endeavours on remuneration governance. The qualitative data was analysed by conducting thematic analysis.

Most of the asset managers and financial services representatives preferred proactive, private engagement on pay concerns, given the impact thereof on voting outcomes, and ultimately director remuneration practices and policies. Independent remuneration committees have a prominent role in facilitating engagements with investors to ensure fair remuneration.

The consequences should be clearer if organisations receive substantial votes against their pay policies and implementation reports. South African regulators can consider the “two-strikes” rule to ensure that action is taken in response to shareholder voting on director remuneration matters.

Representatives of asset managers and listed financial services investee companies offered valuable insights on remuneration governance deliberations in an emerging market. This in-depth analysis highlights the importance of proactive engagement to ensure that corporate leaders are paid fairly.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between a company’s environmental, social and governance (ESG) performance and its financial performance. This paper also investigates the relationship between ESG performance and a company’s market valuation. This paper provides convincing empirical evidence that delivering superior ESG performance pays off financially.

The financial data and ESG scores of 150 publicly traded companies listed in the Standard and Poor’s 500 index for 2017–2020, comprising 5,750 observations, were collected. STATA was used to run a fixed-effect regression and a weighted least squares model to analyze the panel data.

The results of the empirical analysis suggest that companies with superior ESG performance perform better financially and are valued higher in the market compared to their industry peers. The ESG rating score impacts both return-on-capital-employed as a proxy for financial performance and Tobin’s Q as a proxy for the market valuation of a company.

This study contributes to the existing research on ESG performance and financial performance relationship by providing empirical evidence to resolve confusion in the existing literature caused by contradictory evidence. Taking advantage of worldwide crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, this study shows that a positive relationship between ESG performance and a company’s market valuation holds even during times of unexpected crises. Further, this study contributes to business practitioners’ knowledge by showing that ESG aspects constitute highly relevant non-financial information that impact the market’s perception of a company and that investing in sustainability positively impacts a company’s bottom line.

The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between corporate governance and risk-taking behaviour of banks operating in the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries.

In doing so, the authors use a data set covering 165 banks located in 13 MENA countries over the period 2005–2012 and apply dynamic panel data methodology.

The results show that good governance acting in the interests of shareholders could lead to excessive risk taking; in this sense, a conflict of interest between the stakeholders, interested in the solvency of the financial system, and shareholders, trying to maximise their benefit, may occur. The greater risk can be reinforced by the governance of the country and a strong macro governance framework can incentivise a higher risk exposure in banks, showing the influence of bank regulation and law enforcement on the risks taken by banks.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first paper showing that corporate governance is relevant for explaining risk taking at the country and bank levels in MENA countries.

State ownership has been common especially in industries with restricted competition. In Russia, state-controlled firms represent around 41 percent of the market value of all listed firms (Deloitte, 2015). Yet, there is a significant gap in the literature regarding the effects of various forms of government control in listed firms. The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap by exploring the impact of the complexity of state ownership and competition on the performance of Russian listed firms.

The sample consists of data for 72 firms (360 firm-years) in the Russian MOEX broad market index during 2011–2015. The complexity of state ownership is captured by studying forms of state control including majority/minority, direct/indirect, federal/regional, mixed structures and golden shares.

The authors find significant differences in performance relating to different forms of state ownership. State control is negatively related to firm valuation and the sales/employees ratio. Performance is weakest when state ownership takes the form minority, regional or direct ownership. State control through golden shares typically outperforms other state-controlled firms. The authors find indications of employment prioritization beyond the economical optimum. In addition, the relation between state ownership and profitability becomes positive in sectors where state firms appear to enjoy lower competition.

While the effects of state ownership have been studied on many markets, there is a lack of studies on the effects of different forms, or the complexity, of state ownership beyond direct and indirect ownership. The authors contribute to the literature on the performance effects of state ownership by studying a multitude of forms of governmental ownership as well as the role of competition in Russia. Especially the profitability of state-controlled firms is significantly affected by industry characteristics. Implications of the results are discussed both from firm and policy maker perspectives.

This paper examines how the degree of happiness affects corporate risk-taking and the moderating influence of family ownership of firms on this relationship.

The authors use an international sample of 17,654 firm-year observations from 24 countries around the world from 2008 to 2016.

Using the happiness index from the World Happiness Report developed by the United Nations Sustainable Development Solutions Network, the authors show that a country's overall happiness is negatively correlated with risk-taking behavior by firms. The findings are robust to an alternative measure of risk-taking by firms. Further analyses document that the negative influence of happiness on firm risk-taking is more pronounced for family-owned firms.

The paper is consistent with the notion that happier people are likely to be more risk-averse in making financial decisions, which, in turn, reduces corporate risk-taking.

This study contributes to the broad literature on the determinants of corporate risk-taking and the growing literature on the role of sentiment on investment decisions. The authors contribute to the current debate about family-owned firms by demonstrating that the presence of family trust strengthens the negative influence of happiness on corporate risk-taking, a topic that has been unexplored in previous studies.