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1 – 10 of over 2000Xiaoqing Feng, Wen Wen, Yun Ke and Ying He
This study aims to examine whether a firm's demand for high-quality auditors is influenced by multiple large shareholders (MLS). As one type of ownership structure, MLS have…
Abstract
Purpose
This study aims to examine whether a firm's demand for high-quality auditors is influenced by multiple large shareholders (MLS). As one type of ownership structure, MLS have gained popularity in China recently and have different types of large shareholders, including large institutional shareholder, large foreign shareholder and large state shareholder. The authors also examine whether different types of MLS have heterogeneous impacts on appointing high-quality auditors.
Design/methodology/approach
With a sample of 27,131 firm-year observations from Chinese public companies from 2003 to 2018, the authors use multivariate regressions to examine the effect of MLS on auditor choice. Heckman two-stage analysis, a firm fixed effects model, propensity score matching and difference-in-differences test are used as robustness checks.
Findings
This paper finds that the presence and power of MLS increase the likelihood of appointing high-quality auditors. With regard to the types of MLS, large institutional shareholders and foreign shareholders have significant positive effects on appointing high-quality auditors, while the presence of state-owned large shareholders has no effect on auditor choice. Further analyses reveal that the positive effect of MLS on high-quality auditor choice is more pronounced in firms with severe agency problems and information asymmetry. Taken together, these results suggest that MLS play a monitoring role by demanding high-quality auditors.
Originality/value
This paper contributes to the literature on the determinants of auditor choice. While prior studies primarily focus on the impact of concentrated ownership structure, corporate governance and the pressure from stakeholders on auditor choice, this paper complements the literature by providing evidence from the heterogeneous effects of different types MLS. This paper also extends the literature on the consequences of MLS from the perspective of auditor choice.
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Timm Gödecke and Dirk Schiereck
This paper aims to investigate the impact of the largest shareholder's voting stake on the firm's capital structure decision.
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to investigate the impact of the largest shareholder's voting stake on the firm's capital structure decision.
Design/methodology/approach
To empirically analyze the influence of the voting stake on leverage, a large sample of 814 exchange-listed firms is applied. The baseline regression analysis is complemented by several robustness tests and a difference-in-difference regression analysis to mitigate endogeneity concerns.
Findings
The authors find a negative relationship between the voting stake of the largest shareholder and leverage, consistent with the notion that large, undiversified shareholders have the incentive to reduce risk. Additionally, results reveal that family control has a positive moderating effect, indicating that the negative relationship is less pronounced for family controlled firms.
Research limitations/implications
The authors contribute to the research by suggesting ownership concentration as another determinant of capital structure. Further, the authors add to the literature by showing how the association between ownership concentration and leverage is moderated by family control and that the identity of the largest shareholder is of great importance.
Practical implications
The paper provides important insights to the current debate on the proposal of the European Commission to reintroduce shares with multiple votes as part of the Listing Act. The authors expect the regulation to exacerbate the concentration of voting rights, which results in lower leverage and thus limits corporate growth.
Originality/value
The authors differentiate from previous studies by focusing the largest shareholders' voting stake, instead of using the ownership stake, to assess the impact of ownership concentration on leverage.
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He Wan, Qiuping Peng and Xi Zhong
Noncontrolling large shareholders can reduce the agency problem of executives and can reduce the expropriation or tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders, thereby promoting…
Abstract
Purpose
Noncontrolling large shareholders can reduce the agency problem of executives and can reduce the expropriation or tunneling behavior of controlling shareholders, thereby promoting corporate innovation. However, too many noncontrolling large shareholders may also lead to excessive supervision, thereby inhibiting innovative activities that contribute to the long-term value of the firm. Research to date, however, has not examined the nonlinear impact of noncontrolling large shareholders on corporate innovation. Based on principal–agent theory and the too-much-of-a-good-thing (TMGT) effect, the authors discuss the inverted U-shaped influence of noncontrolling large shareholders on corporate innovation and the moderating effect of industry competition and corporate product diversification on the above relationship.
Design/methodology/approach
Based on the empirical data of Chinese listed companies from 2003 to 2017, the authors use the bidirectional fixed effects model to conduct empirical testing and robustness testing of the research hypotheses.
Findings
There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between noncontrolling large shareholders and corporate innovation; type I and type II agency costs play a mediating role between noncontrolling large shareholders and corporate innovation. In addition, firm product diversification weakens the inverted U-shaped relationship between noncontrolling large shareholders and corporate innovation, but industry competition has no significant moderating effect on the above relationship.
Practical implications
This research has important implications for policy makers, to better activate corporate innovation vitality, and investors, to better choose investment targets. Specifically, investors and policy makers should be aware that an appropriate increase in larger noncontrolling shareholders can maximize the enthusiasm of firms for innovation and enhance corporate value, but they should also realize that having too many noncontrolling large shareholders may backfire.
Originality/value
This research helps the authors to understand the pros and cons of increasing the number of noncontrolling large shareholders more comprehensively and also helps to understand corporate innovation more comprehensively from a supervisory perspective. In addition, this research also enhances the explanatory and predictive power of the TMGT effect.
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Jianhui Jian, Haiyan Tian, Dan Hu and Zimeng Tang
With the growing concern of various sectors of society regarding environmental issues and the promotion of sustainable development, green technology innovation is generally…
Abstract
Purpose
With the growing concern of various sectors of society regarding environmental issues and the promotion of sustainable development, green technology innovation is generally considered to be conducive to the long-term development of enterprises. However, because of the existence of agency problems, managers may have shortsighted behaviors. Then how will managers' shortsighted behaviors affect enterprises' green technology innovation?
Design/methodology/approach
This paper uses machine learning-based text analysis methods to construct a manager myopia index based on the data from A-share listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2015 to 2020. We examine the impact of manager myopia on green technology innovation in companies.
Findings
Our study finds that manager myopia significantly inhibits green technology innovation in companies. However, when multiple large shareholders coexist and the proportion of institutional investors' holdings is high, it can alleviate the inhibitory effect of manager myopia on green innovation. Heterogeneity tests show that the impact of manager myopia on green technology innovation is relatively significant in non-state-owned and manufacturing companies, as well as in the electricity industry. Robustness tests demonstrate that our conclusions remain valid after using propensity score matching to eliminate endogeneity problems.
Originality/value
From the perspective of corporate governance, this paper incorporates managers' shortsightedness, multiple large shareholders and institutional investors' shareholding ratios into the same logical framework, analyzes their internal mechanisms, helps improve corporate governance, enhances green innovation capabilities and has strong implications for the implementation of national innovation-driven development strategies and the achievement of “carbon peak” and “carbon neutrality” targets.
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Qian Wang, Xiaobo Tang, Huigang Liang, Yajiong Xue and Xiaolin Sun
In public firms, the largest shareholder can make decisions on cash dividends in favor of its own interests at the expense of other investors. While the second largest shareholder…
Abstract
Purpose
In public firms, the largest shareholder can make decisions on cash dividends in favor of its own interests at the expense of other investors. While the second largest shareholder can actively participate in corporate governance and protect the interests of investors, its impact has not been fully understood. This research investigates how shareholding ratio and ownership type of the second largest shareholder moderate the relationship between controlling shareholder's shareholding ratio and cash dividends.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors conducted econometrics analysis based on a panel data of China's A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2017.
Findings
The authors find that the controlling shareholder's shareholding ratio has a significant negative impact on cash dividends. However, this influence is conditional on the shareholding ratio of the second largest shareholder. The negative impact is weakened when the second largest shareholder holds a large proportion of shares or when the shareholding gap between the second largest and the controlling shareholder is small.
Originality/value
This research extends the existing literature by highlighting the nuanced moderating effect of the second largest shareholder on the relationship between the controlling shareholder and cash dividends, thus making a unique contribution to the understanding of corporate governances in the emerging financial market in China.
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Building on the institutional theory perspective on corporate governance change and based on interviews with investor relations (IR) managers in large Japanese companies, this…
Abstract
Purpose
Building on the institutional theory perspective on corporate governance change and based on interviews with investor relations (IR) managers in large Japanese companies, this study aims to examine Japanese IR managers’ perceptions of the influence of foreign shareholders on Japan’s corporate governance reform and stakeholder-based system. The paper examines tensions, conflicts and collaborations among different stakeholders involved in corporate governance changes in Japan, especially in the areas of firm ownership, employment relations and boards of directors. The paper explains why convergence does not happen in some large Japanese companies by investigating Japanese managers’ responses to and perceptions of foreign shareholders in multiple corporate contexts.
Design/methodology/approach
The author conducted in-depth interviews with ten IR managers at large, listed Japanese companies in Kyoto and Tokyo and two managers at foreign investment banks in Tokyo, between 2018 and 2021.
Findings
This paper explores five themes that emerged from my interviews: Chief executive officers’ (CEOs’) mixed perceptions of foreign investors, the effectiveness of CEO compensation and outside directors, managers’ reluctance to accept stock price-driven business strategies, foreign investors’ engagement vs investments in index funds and gender patterns, including the effectiveness of token female outside directors. The Japanese companies the author looked at incorporated foreign shareholders as consultants and adopted a few major shareholder-based customs, such as CEOs communicating with investors, having outside directors, increasing CEO compensation and slimming down unprofitable parts of the business via restructuring and downsizing. Simultaneously, they resisted a few major shareholder-based practices. Foreign shareholders’ pressure revealed tensions and contradictions between the Japanese stakeholder system and shareholder primacy-based customs.
Originality/value
This paper is one of the few qualitative studies that explores Japanese IR managers’ responses to and perceptions of foreign shareholders in corporate governance reform, with a particular focus on ownership, employment relations and board members. This paper provides examples of tension, conflict and cooperation between Japanese managers and foreign investors, as seen through the eyes of Japanese IR managers. Examining changes in Japan’s stakeholder-based system of corporate governance reform enables us to better understand the processes by which, with vigorous pressure from government and foreign shareholders, a non-western country like Japan may adopt shareholder-based customs and how such a change may also lead to institutional changes.
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Silvia Ferraz Nogueira De Tommaso and Felipe Mendes Borini
Understanding how firms manage multiple stakeholders is an academic and business call. This paper aims to describe a firm’s processes to implement a stakeholder value creation…
Abstract
Purpose
Understanding how firms manage multiple stakeholders is an academic and business call. This paper aims to describe a firm’s processes to implement a stakeholder value creation system, defined as the firm’s processes to create appropriate value with multiple stakeholders.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors based their investigation on a conceptual framework extracted from a previous literature review. From there, the authors conducted qualitative empirical research designed as a multiple-case study. In-depth interviews with 47 people from 11 different firms are the key source of this study.
Findings
This paper proposes a framework demonstrating how a firm can implement a stakeholder value creation system. Results pointed to three processes: value creation, distribution and capture. Value distribution mechanisms are drivers for both value creation and capture processes. The system is a set of multiple flow relationships between the firm and its stakeholders.
Research limitations/implications
This research is limited to the Brazilian context.
Practical implications
The stakeholder value creation system is composed of seven elements: walk-the-talk organizational behavior, stakeholder business model, societal non-attended need, stakeholder preference matrix, stakeholder bargaining power, retention of rents and governance mechanism. Managers may design their firm’s unique processes using these elements as drivers.
Social implications
The present investigation demonstrates that societal issues matter for firms to formulate strategies that positively impact their economic, social and environmental results.
Originality/value
The authors investigated competitive strategy concepts of value creation and appropriation from a combination of resource-based and stakeholder theories and a system perspective. The framework of this study consolidated both theories’ ideas from a complementary perspective. The authors suggest managers and academics should adopt the power of the “AND” position instead of the “OR” trade-off position.
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Gerard Callanan, Sandra M. Tomkowicz, Megan V. Teague and David F. Perri
This study aims to present a pedagogical approach that allows students to discuss and debate the differences between two competing models of corporate governance – the shareholder…
Abstract
Purpose
This study aims to present a pedagogical approach that allows students to discuss and debate the differences between two competing models of corporate governance – the shareholder primacy philosophy and the stakeholder value viewpoint.
Design/methodology/approach
This study first presents the conceptual bases for each framework, noting that while shareholder primacy is the historically dominant approach to corporate governance that guide strategic business actions in the USA, pressures from investor and societal groups and government agencies have forced publicly traded companies to recognize the need to take stakeholder interests into account in strategic decision-making, as is the dominant model in Europe and other parts of the world. This study then provides a pedagogical structure on how these opposing perspectives can be used to foster discussion, debate and reflection within the classroom.
Findings
This paper presents a pedagogical structure that allows students to recognize the competing pressures that businesses face of maximizing profits versus concerns over social causes. There are a number of positive pedagogical outcomes that can be realized from a classroom discourse on the differing perspectives on strategic management, corporate governance and social responsibility.
Practical implications
This pedagogical structure should help future business leaders throughout the world understand the differences between the two models of corporate governance. This study offers suggestions on how this pedagogical structure can be used in the student assessment process.
Originality/value
This study fills a gap in the literature by providing a pedagogical structure to guide discussion and debate on the competing theories of corporate governance and how organizational decision-makers can devise strategies to manage the potential competing demands that can arise from the shareholder versus stakeholder models. It is highly relevant and well-suited for courses such as Business Law, Business Policy, Business and Society and Ethics.
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Qi-an Chen, Anze Bao, Junpei Chen and Yi Lu
The primary objective of introducing nonstate ownership into state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is to enhance corporate performance. This study explores how nonstate ownership affects…
Abstract
Purpose
The primary objective of introducing nonstate ownership into state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is to enhance corporate performance. This study explores how nonstate ownership affects corporate performance, emphasizing agency costs as the primary mechanism.
Design/methodology/approach
Using data from 2010 to 2019 for listed SOEs, the authors measure nonstate ownership based on shareholding ratios, control rights and shareholding–control matching. The authors also use fixed-effects and mediation-effects models, with agency costs as the primary mechanism.
Findings
Increased nonstate shareholding ratios, stronger control rights and improved shareholding–control matching promote SOE performance. Nonstate shareholding ratios boost performance through resource effects, while control rights and shareholding–control matching promote performance by mitigating agency costs. A heterogeneity analysis indicates stronger effects in local SOEs and highly marketized regions. Moreover, control rights and shareholding–control matching reinforce the positive impact of shareholding ratios on performance.
Originality/value
The mixed-ownership reform of Chinese SOEs aims to optimize shareholding and control structures between state and nonstate shareholders. Therefore, research on the impact of nonstate shareholding ratios, control rights and shareholding–control matching on corporate performance is highly pertinent. However, existing studies have focused on the effects of single factors on performance, without exploration of the economic implications of shareholding–control matching. This study not only prioritizes the optimization of shareholding and control structures but also underscores the importance of granting nonstate shareholders control rights proportionate to their shareholding, providing critical evidence of the value of improving SOEs' ownership structure.
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Melissa Carlisle, Melanie I. Millar and Jacqueline Jarosz Wukich
This study examines shareholder and board motivations regarding corporate social responsibility (CSR) to understand boards' stewardship approaches to environmental issues.
Abstract
Purpose
This study examines shareholder and board motivations regarding corporate social responsibility (CSR) to understand boards' stewardship approaches to environmental issues.
Design/methodology/approach
Using content analysis, the authors classify CSR motivations in all environmental shareholder proposals and board responses of Fortune 250 companies from 2013 to 2017 from do little (a shareholder primacy perspective) to do much (a stakeholder pluralism perspective). The authors calculate the motivational dissonance for each proposal-response pair (the Talk Gap) and use cluster analysis to observe evidence of board stewardship and subsequent environmental disclosure and performance (ED&P) changes.
Findings
Board interpretations of stewardship are not uniform, and they regularly extend to stakeholders beyond shareholders, most frequently including profit-oriented stakeholders (e.g. employees and customers). ED&P changes are highest when shareholders narrowly lead boards in CSR motivation and either request both action and information or information only. The authors observe weaker ED&P changes when shareholders request action and the dissonance between shareholders and boards is larger. When shareholders are motivated to do little for CSR, ED&P changes are weak, even when boards express more pluralistic motivations.
Research limitations/implications
The results show the important role that boards play in CSR and may aid activist shareholders in determining how best to generate change in corporate CSR actions.
Originality/value
This study provides the first evidence of board stewardship at the proposal-response level. It measures shareholder and board CSR motivations, introduces the Talk Gap, and examines relationships among proposal characteristics, the Talk Gap, and subsequent ED&P change to better understand board stewardship of environmental issues.
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