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Seek to compare the consequences of single‐source versus multiple‐source lending for a borrower who has loans that can be prematurely terminated.

The considered model framework is an option‐theoretic firm value model similar to Merton (1974) but where lenders have the additional right to prematurely terminate the loans. The single lender is a monopolist, while multiple lenders are represented by a continuum without individual impact on the aggregate termination decision.

The model explains that, if the borrower is in financial distress but has positive net present value projects, a single lender has a higher incentive to save the firm and therefore terminates fewer loans than multiple lenders. In the opposite case where the firm is not under financial distress, it is the other way round and multiple lenders terminate fewer loans than a single lender. As a result, equity holders are better off by having a loan from a single‐source under financial distress but multiple‐source lending is advantageous in the absence of financial distress.

To focus on the origin for arising differences from single‐source and multiple‐source lending, consideration is given to the simple case with perfect information and without monitoring and renegotiation. These market imperfections can be incorporated into the model in a straightforward way.

While other models in the literature require market imperfections to explain the relevance of the bank relationship, this paper indicates that even in the absence of market imperfections the lending relationship is fundamental as long as lenders have the right for early terminations.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the use of single vs multiple lenders by Kansas farms. Previous studies suggest that as the risk level of the firm changes, borrowers desire to enhance the probability of obtaining credit at the lowest possible cost may cause them to use multiple lenders.

A model is adopted from the banking literature to describe farm behavior in obtaining credit from a single vs multiple lenders. Using farm-level data from the Kansas Farm Management Association, an empirical model analyzes how farm characteristics affect the number of lending relationships. A model is developed to analyze the number of lending relationships effect on the profitability of the farm.

It is found that highly leveraged farms seek additional lending relationships supporting the theoretical model and that additional lending relationships correlate to a decrease in profitability. Roughly, 50 percent of Kansas farmers that borrow use a single lender. Roughly 48 percent use from two to four lenders, with the remaining 2 percent using more than four lenders.

Provides empirical results to support developed theoretical framework on the number of lending institutions. This study helps understand factors correlated to a farmer's decision to use multiple lenders. Analyzing the number of lending relationships helps understand how farmers manage their debt to maintain access to credit when needed at the lowest possible cost.

This paper aims to analyse the exposure at default (EAD) in the event of multiple banking relationships to understand the differences with respect to solo banking relationships and forecast the banks risk exposure.

The paper uses a unique database provided by the Italian public credit register representative of the full Italian market before the financial crisis. The analysis compares different EAD risk proxies for debtors with unique and multiple banking relationships to underline the main differences among the two groups.

Results show that EAD forecast could be improved considering the existence of exposures with other lenders and banks that consider such type of information can reduce the risk of underestimating the risk exposure of a debtor.

The paper is the first attempt to model the EAD on the basis of the existence of multiple lending exposures. Results demonstrate a different lender’s risk exposure for debtors with multiple credit risk exposure and show the usefulness of the information about the overall system exposure in evaluating the risk exposure related to this type of customers.

Prior literature demonstrates that the effectiveness of bank monitoring decreases when multiple banks are involved, due to a free rider problem, leading to lower firm value. The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether this free rider problem exists in an emerging market context, and whether the relationship between multiple banking relationships and firm value is conditioned on bankers’ incentives to monitor.

The authors use multivariate panel regression to examine the hypotheses. The conditioning effect of the incentive to govern (the amount of average bank lending) is modeled using an interaction variable. Based on the result of the Hausman test, the authors employ two-way fixed effects estimator to estimate the coefficients.

First, the negative relationship between multiple banking relationships and firm value holds true among Indian firms. Second, the authors show that this negative relationship is lessened for firms with high average bank debt or higher free cash flows. The analyses suggest that these moderating effects are related to a reduction in the free rider problem rather than a decrease in financial constraints. However, these results are only significant among larger firms.

Prior literature has not considered the conditioning impact of the “incentives to govern” when examining the free rider problem, inherent in situations where multiple actors are involved. The authors show in this study that the free rider problem disappears when the incentives to govern are considered in the overall research framework.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether prior bank lending relationships affect firms’ liquidity management.

The authors mainly work on evaluating first, whether prior lending relationships affect corporate cash holdings? and second, whether the cash flow sensitivity of cash varies systemically with lending relationships. Three different ways are used to define lending relationships, including the lending relationship dummy, a firm’s maximum relationship intensity in terms of number of deals across all lenders and a firm’s maximum relationship intensity in terms of dollar amounts across all lenders. In addition, the paper applies two-stage least squares (2SLS) to address the concern of endogeneity between firms’ liquidity management and banking relationships.

The authors find that firms with lending relationships maintain a lower level of cash holdings and save less cash out of cash flow. Furthermore, the effect of lending relationships is more profound for firms with high cash flow. The results suggest that prior lending relations alleviate information asymmetry, lower the cost of capital and therefore affect firms’ propensity to retain cash and maintain a high level of cash holdings.

This paper contributes to both the liquidity management literature and the literature on the value of maintaining lending relationships with banks. Researchers should take into consideration the lending relationships built over the course of the lending when assessing firms’ cash policies.

Bank lending relationship mitigates the information asymmetry problem, one type of market friction, and facilitates firms’ future external financing, thereby affecting firms’ cash policies and giving more flexibility in liquidity management. The value of lending relationships distinguishes bank loans from public bonds. Therefore, firms, especially those facing more information asymmetry issue, should take into account the benefits from lending relationships in their future debt financing.

Extant literature examines how firm characteristics affect firms’ cash holdings. This paper introduces a new factor that could explain corporate cash policy.

Microfinance emerged as an essential catalyst for socio-economic development and financial inclusion to reduce poverty. Microfinance institutions cannot meet their primary objective of poverty reduction if they are not sustainable financially. With the theoretical support of profit incentive theory, this paper aims to investigate the impact of organizational structure (OS), growth outreach (average loan per borrower [ALPB] and number of active borrowers), women empowerment (percentage of women borrowers [PWB]), liquidity, leverage and cost efficiency (cost per borrower) on the financial sustainability of microfinance providers (MFPs) in India and explore the possible moderating effect of the national governance indicators (NGIs).

A financial sustainability index has been developed by using principal components analysis, including both conventional measures (return of assets and return on equity) and efficiency measures (operational self-sufficiency and financial self-sufficiency). Due to the existence of endogeneity and heteroskedasticity, this study uses two-step system generalized method of moments estimates to examine the relationships for a period of 2006 to 2018.

The finding reveals that there is a strong significant relationship between financial sustainability and its influential factors. Organizatioanl Structure, loan size, women borrowers, Gross Domestic Products and inflation enhance the financial sustainability of India’s microfinance sector. However, a number of borrowers, liquidity, leverage and operating costs negatively affect the financial sustainability of MFPs of India. The estimates demonstrate that NGIs significantly moderate the association between financial sustainability and its influential factors. The NGIs negatively affect the positive impact of Organizatioanl Structure on financial sustainability. National governance increases the positive effect of loan size (ALPB) and reduces the negative effect of a number of borrowers and leverage on the financial sustainability of MFPs of India. However, NGIs negatively affect the positive relationship between Percentage of Women Borrowers and Financial sustainability of Microfinance Providers of India.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first of its kind that incorporates all of the six dimensions of the National Governance Indicators (NGIs) and uses as a moderator. Secondly, a financial sustainability index has been developed for measuring the financial sustainability of Microfinance Providers (MFPs).

The purpose of this article is to examine the effects that dynamic incentives and the borrowing histories of clients of informal lending institutions have on loan repayment performance, in particular, the extent to which multiple borrowing and progressive lending affect the repayment of loans.

The paper uses a data set of 835 borrowers drawn from an informal lending institution in Tanzania. Descriptive analysis and econometric models are used to test the developed hypotheses.

Whereas clients with multiple loans are associated with poor loan repayment, progressive lending contributes to positive repayment outcomes. Multiple borrowers face increased debt levels and thereby an increased inability to meet their repayment obligations; in contrast, progressive lending by building up a lender–client relationship helps clients to obtain higher loans with a minimum amount of screening.

This was a cross-sectional study based on a sample of individual clients drawn from a single institution. However, since the majority of clients had also taken out loans with other financial institutions, the sample is considered to be representative.

A client’s past repayment performance and multiple loan history must be assessed so that multiple borrowing can be prevented and credit absorption capacity can be gauged more accurately. The repeated nature of the interactions and the threat to cut off any future lending (if loans are not repaid) can be exploited to overcome any information deficit.

This study was conducted in a context in which the degree of information sharing was low and institutional access to clients’ credit histories was limited. It contributes knowledge on how lenders minimise the risk flowing from the ex ante information gap and moral hazards arising from the ex post information gap.

This paper examines the influence of relationship lending on the financial performance of Savings and Credit Co-operative Societies (SACCOS) in Tanzania.

A panel data of 460 observations representing 115 SACCOS from Tanzania was used. Descriptive statistics and panel regression models were employed to analyse the data.

The results show that the duration of the relationship is negatively and significantly related to SACCOS financial performance, substantiating the relationship lending theories. The number of relationships has an insignificant effect on financial performance.

The study focused on the duration and the number of relationships as aspects of relationship lending. The paper is limited in the sense that other aspects of relationship lending such as the concentration of relationships that could affect financial performance are not included in this study. The results apply to SACCOS and not to other microfinance institutions with strong bargaining power.

This study positions relationship lending in the SACCOS context where the market for the wholesale loan is less competitive.

The purpose of this paper is to draw on social exchange theory and heuristic–systematic model to examine how peer-to-peer (P2P) lending firms can enhance their customer acquisition by achieving mobile social media popularity.

Content data collected from multiple sources (websites and mobile applications) were employed to validate the research model.

The mobile social media popularity of P2P lending firms positively influences their customer acquisition. Furthermore, the heuristic cues (i.e. source credibility and content freshness) and the systematic cue (i.e. transaction relevance) potentially affect the firms’ mobile social media popularity.

Mobile social media is not only a platform for firms’ image-building but a critical means of acquiring actual customers. The appropriate use of heuristic–systematic cues in a mobile interface is useful for firms to achieve high user popularity despite the challenges derived from the mobile context.

To achieve higher user popularity in the competitive online world, firms should dedicate greater effort in determining the adequate heuristic–systematic cues designed for the interface of their mobile social media account. The effect of popularity can then help the firms acquire more customers.

This study extends the understanding of social exchange in the context of mobile social media accounts and enriches the knowledge on business value of mobile social media popularity. This paper also contributes to the literature by relating heuristic–systematic cues to firms’ mobile social media popularity.

This paper aims to investigate the link between uncertainty in banking and bank lending behavior, particularly shedding light on the modifying role of bank competition in the nexus.

The study uses a panel of Vietnamese banks over the 2007–2019 period for empirical analysis and the dispersion of shocks to bank-level variables to measure banking uncertainty. To strongly confirm our findings, the authors perform a battery of alternative checks based on different econometric techniques, including fixed effect regressions with Driscoll–Kraay standard errors, the two-step system generalized method of moments estimator and the least squares dummy variable-corrected estimator.

Uncertainty induces multifaceted unfavorable impacts on bank lending. Concretely, banks tend to restraint loan growth, suffer more credit risk, and charge higher lending rates during periods of higher uncertainty. Further investigation reveals that lending activities of banks with greater market power are less sensitive to adverse uncertainty shocks; in other words, increased competition in the banking system is associated with more substantial consequences of uncertainty on bank lending.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first attempt to simultaneously explore the impacts of uncertainty on quantity, quality and prices of bank lending. This paper also aim at putting forth the level of uncertainty particularly related to the banking sector. Importantly, examining the conditionality of the linkage between uncertainty and bank lending with respect to bank competition is entirely novel.