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Seek to compare the consequences of single‐source versus multiple‐source lending for a borrower who has loans that can be prematurely terminated.

The considered model framework is an option‐theoretic firm value model similar to Merton (1974) but where lenders have the additional right to prematurely terminate the loans. The single lender is a monopolist, while multiple lenders are represented by a continuum without individual impact on the aggregate termination decision.

The model explains that, if the borrower is in financial distress but has positive net present value projects, a single lender has a higher incentive to save the firm and therefore terminates fewer loans than multiple lenders. In the opposite case where the firm is not under financial distress, it is the other way round and multiple lenders terminate fewer loans than a single lender. As a result, equity holders are better off by having a loan from a single‐source under financial distress but multiple‐source lending is advantageous in the absence of financial distress.

To focus on the origin for arising differences from single‐source and multiple‐source lending, consideration is given to the simple case with perfect information and without monitoring and renegotiation. These market imperfections can be incorporated into the model in a straightforward way.

While other models in the literature require market imperfections to explain the relevance of the bank relationship, this paper indicates that even in the absence of market imperfections the lending relationship is fundamental as long as lenders have the right for early terminations.

This paper aims to analyse the exposure at default (EAD) in the event of multiple banking relationships to understand the differences with respect to solo banking relationships and forecast the banks risk exposure.

The paper uses a unique database provided by the Italian public credit register representative of the full Italian market before the financial crisis. The analysis compares different EAD risk proxies for debtors with unique and multiple banking relationships to underline the main differences among the two groups.

Results show that EAD forecast could be improved considering the existence of exposures with other lenders and banks that consider such type of information can reduce the risk of underestimating the risk exposure of a debtor.

The paper is the first attempt to model the EAD on the basis of the existence of multiple lending exposures. Results demonstrate a different lender’s risk exposure for debtors with multiple credit risk exposure and show the usefulness of the information about the overall system exposure in evaluating the risk exposure related to this type of customers.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the use of single vs multiple lenders by Kansas farms. Previous studies suggest that as the risk level of the firm changes, borrowers desire to enhance the probability of obtaining credit at the lowest possible cost may cause them to use multiple lenders.

A model is adopted from the banking literature to describe farm behavior in obtaining credit from a single vs multiple lenders. Using farm-level data from the Kansas Farm Management Association, an empirical model analyzes how farm characteristics affect the number of lending relationships. A model is developed to analyze the number of lending relationships effect on the profitability of the farm.

It is found that highly leveraged farms seek additional lending relationships supporting the theoretical model and that additional lending relationships correlate to a decrease in profitability. Roughly, 50 percent of Kansas farmers that borrow use a single lender. Roughly 48 percent use from two to four lenders, with the remaining 2 percent using more than four lenders.

Provides empirical results to support developed theoretical framework on the number of lending institutions. This study helps understand factors correlated to a farmer's decision to use multiple lenders. Analyzing the number of lending relationships helps understand how farmers manage their debt to maintain access to credit when needed at the lowest possible cost.

Using the Dealscan database of large, U.S. corporate loans, we examine the determinants of the number of bank relationships and the presence or absence of collateral. Consistent with prior studies, we find that important explanatory variables are firm quality, desire for financial flexibility, the probability of financial distress, growth opportunities and firm size. Higher quality firms as well as firms with a stronger desire for financial flexibility are less likely to collateralize and borrow from more lenders. Larger firms as well as those with lower probabilities of financial distress and greater growth opportunities prefer multiple lenders.

The questions of loan availability and pricing were considered from the perspectives of financial economic theory and practice as well as a survey of lenders capable of financing a one-year bridge loan to determine the market's willingness to make such a loan and what rate of interest would be charged. Utilizing the sources above, in conjunction with professional knowledge and industry contacts, 101 lenders were selected as representative of the universe of lenders who had the capacity to make directly or otherwise to arrange, a $192 million bridge loan. The survey of lenders involved interviews with 67 of the 86 selected lenders from 59 firms. The paper aims to discuss these issues.

Loan availability and pricing were considered from perspectives of financial economic theory and practice plus a survey to determine market's willingness to make a loan at what price. Utilizing professional knowledge and industry contacts, 101 lenders were selected as representative of those which had the capacity to make a $192 million bridge loan. When lenders were evaluated against criteria of size, product type, geographic territory, and willingness/capability to provide nonstandard loans, list selected for telephone interviews was narrowed, then subsequently expanded with referrals that led to identification of new potential lenders to be contacted.

Nine lenders offered conceptualized deal structures to provide the required financing. Though the price may be expensive, especially relative to what borrowers may wish to pay, financing is available. Developers’ and deal-makers’ protestations that “it's impossible,” should be discounted and rejected. Because the subject property is characterized by high-risk, it is logical conclusion that the lenders expressing a desire to provide the bridge loan would expect to earn a high return, meaning that the interest rate would approach, if not exceed, 20 percent.

Because the nature of the research required that the specific identities of the building and the parties were not revealed, some lenders might decline to consider this financing opportunity. And, real world negotiation of financing terms could result in higher rates than quoted and/or disinclination of lenders to proceed. Because of very specialized circumstances surrounding this proprietary research, conducted subject to nondisclosure agreement, publication had to be deferred until those constraints no longer applied. Though the data are more than a decade old, this consideration does not compromise the relevance, validity, or generalizability of the findings.

Markets can accommodate transactions that might be perceived as improbable. Investors which approach opportunities with creativity and open mind, can make deals that would not be possible, were strict, rigid, unbending eligible deal preference parameters to be employed. Strategists establishing policies for real estate enterprises should insist on progressive, expansive thinking in turning the scope of their potential venture involvements. Real estate education and training should address more attention to financial economic theory, strategic initiative, and creative deal making, which priority topics are too seldom prioritized, with the consequence that too many in real estate think narrowly rather than expansively.

This research substantiates a fundamental theory of financial economics and refutes conventional applied wisdom. Seldom do researchers and investors have the opportunity to “get inside” the lending decision process for a large scale commercial property, especially one characterized by daunting circumstances and considerable complexity, such as studied here. A unique real world date set – not normally accessible to property scholars – enables study of the proposition that every commodity has a price, no matter how severe or difficult the circumstances, in a manner fully congruent with the new AACSB Business School Deans policy emphasis on relevance in addition to rigor.

As commercial mortgages much less studied than residential mortgages, this paper is significant addition to undeveloped segment of literature. As the majority of mortgage finance research, estimated to be in the range of 90 percent, has been limited to single family residential financing, the study of commercial mortgage financing is relatively under-researched. Further, the studies of commercial mortgage finance tend to be illustrative case studies with stylized facts rather than explorations of empiricism-based investigations. As most researchers engaged in exploring real estate topics limit themselves to public information, research that provides access to real world private transactions is especially important.

This paper addresses the following questions: Why do some firms employ multiple debt types? What explains debt heterogeneity? Is the choice of the source of debt a function of corporate governance?

The author's paper is empirical and uses multiple regression analysis.

Firms under weak corporate governance have a higher propensity to use multiple debt types and have a dispersed debt structure. Contrastingly, firms that are well-managed tend to concentrate debt and borrow predominantly from a few creditors. The author also found that while bank debt is negatively associated with debt concentration, market debt is positively associated with debt concentration.

Firms under weak corporate governance have a higher propensity to use multiple debt types and have a dispersed debt structure. Well-managed firms tend to concentrate debt and borrow predominantly from a few creditors. Bank debt is negatively associated with debt concentration and market debt is positively associated with debt concentration.

Policymakers and practitioners need to account not only for changes in the firm’s total debt level but also for changes within the firm’s debt composition. Understanding a manager’s choice of debt structure can incentivize creditors to effectively monitor and use debt concentration as a form of commitment device that transfers some control rights from the manager to creditors.

While a vast body of corporate finance literature examines the conflict between shareholders and management, there is little empirical work on the conflict between creditors and management. In this paper, the author examines how managerial entrenchment affects debt structure. The results provide a comprehensive picture of how corporate governance influences debt choice(s).

The purpose of this paper is to examine if credit rationing persists even in the era of financial liberalization, the extent to which individual, firm and loan characteristics influence the rationing behavior of commercial banks and whether the agricultural sector is discriminated against in the commercial bank credit market.

The study employed a probit model with marginal effects and a generalized Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition estimation on a randomly selected data of 1,239 entrepreneurs from eight commercial banks’ credit records about their individual, firm and loan characteristics.

The study revealed that credit rationing persists and that applying for a relatively longer payment period, providing collateral and guarantor, being illiterate, being relatively older and being in the agricultural sector increases the likelihood of being credit rationed, while having some relationship with the bank, having non-mandatory savings and applying from a bank with relatively high interest rates reduce the likelihood of being credit rationed. The study also revealed a credit gap of 17.77 percent and a positive discrimination against borrowers in the agricultural sector as the gap was largely being influenced by unexplained factors.

The research was intended to cover a large number of commercial banks in Ghana. However, most of the banks were unwilling to provide such information about their borrowers; hence, the research was limited to only eight commercial banks who provided the author with the information needed for the study.

The study concludes that policies that enhance human capital, women, and older access to credit and agricultural-oriented financial services and others, will go a long way to reduce rationing and increase access to credit, especially to the agricultural sector.

The research proposes the use of group lending as a form of collateral and monitoring to ease risks and default, and hence supports sustainable funding to increase access and outreach.

The paper looks at the comprehensive way about the various factors determining credit rationing in that it considers not only the individual, economic/firm and loan characteristics but also the extent to which discrimination toward the agricultural sector exists in the commercial banks credit market.

The case illustrates the sequence of events that played out between the customer and his interaction with a Bank from which he availed a credit card and a loan. The failure of service deliverables and deficiencies in the processes of the bank resulted in default of the loan amount and inconvenienced the customer. In the case, the focus on the customer helps in understanding that organizations need to initiate responses for customer satisfaction at their interface points, as expected by its customers. The case is suitable for use in courses on ‘Services Marketing’ for Post Graduate courses and Management Development Programmes.

Despite lessons learned from prior disaster relief funding programs, billions of dollars in fraudulent loans were issued by the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) during the COVID-19 pandemic in the USA. The misuse of funds prevented business owners and their employees who are in true financial need from accessing program funds. The purpose of this paper is to identify techniques perpetrators used to obtain funds from the program illegally since its inception in March 2020 and concludes with suggestions on internal controls to reduce fraud occurrences in future relief packages.

The authors analyze 106 loan fraud cases reported by the US Department of Justice and compiled by the Project on Government Oversight to examine methods individuals used to illegally obtain funds from the program. The authors complement the data with lender characteristics from Call Reports and Business Insights. They further compare the fraud sample to the entire population of PPP loans, which is available on the US Small Business Administration website. The authors report descriptive statistics, correlations and multivariate regressions.

The authors find that most fraud cases falsify tax data to access program loans and inflate payroll numbers to obtain larger loan amounts. Applicants who sought large amounts applied using multiple companies and across multiple lenders, consistent with the use of multiple loans to avoid the scrutiny of a single large loan with a single lender. The authors find that cases with larger amounts relied on less regulated lenders, such as lending companies, rather than more regulated lenders.

The PPP is part of the largest ever US stimulus in which the private sector allocated funds. This study provides novel evidence of how fraudsters adapted to the program's rules to defraud the government.

This paper examines the influence of relationship lending on the financial performance of Savings and Credit Co-operative Societies (SACCOS) in Tanzania.

A panel data of 460 observations representing 115 SACCOS from Tanzania was used. Descriptive statistics and panel regression models were employed to analyse the data.

The results show that the duration of the relationship is negatively and significantly related to SACCOS financial performance, substantiating the relationship lending theories. The number of relationships has an insignificant effect on financial performance.

The study focused on the duration and the number of relationships as aspects of relationship lending. The paper is limited in the sense that other aspects of relationship lending such as the concentration of relationships that could affect financial performance are not included in this study. The results apply to SACCOS and not to other microfinance institutions with strong bargaining power.

This study positions relationship lending in the SACCOS context where the market for the wholesale loan is less competitive.