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We develop an interactive framework to model speculation (over regulation) and regulation (of speculation) in a greenhouse gas (GHG) permits market. In our proposed model, big traders engage in speculation by strategically withholding and releasing permits to influence the temporal path of permit prices in order to maximize their profits. The national government/regulator has an incentive to stabilize permit prices by suitably manipulating stocks of permits. Thus, the GHG permits market can typically be characterized by circular interdependence in which big traders will be “gaming” the regulator to generate profits: the state of the market affects speculative behavior of traders that in turn impacts on government's behavior, which in turn impacts on the state of the market. The interactive framework explores the gaming between speculators and a regulator, or government, to shed crucial insights on the nature of equilibrium in possible global emissions trading schemes (GETS). By so doing, we are able to unravel potential pitfalls of any global trading system in pollution permits for arresting global warming. Once policy makers are aware of these pitfalls, for example, a “culture of speculation” as opposed to a culture of safety, they can devise a suitable mechanism to bypass these potential pitfalls.

We investigate the positive and normative consequences of child-labor restrictions for economic aggregates and welfare. We argue that even though the laissez-faire outcome may be inefficient, there are usually better policies to cure these inefficiencies than the imposition of a child-labor ban. Given this finding, we investigate the potential political-economic reasons behind the emergence and persistence of child-labor legislation. Our investigation is based on a structural dynamic general equilibrium model that provides a coherent and uniform framework for our analysis.

This paper studies banking crises in a framework where the government can be biased in favor of a “business elite.” When the deposit contract is such that the run on the bank takes place only if the economic system is in a recession, the presence of a “crony” government introduces an element of indeterminacy, i.e. equilibrium can be multiple. Moreover, by means of an information updating mechanism, it is shown that the crisis may spread out to countries “similar” to the one that is examined, i.e. that contagion is possible.

In many societies, conflicts of violent nature regularly spring up that usually cause a destruction of economic and social assets and needless loss of human lives. Violent conflicts and food entitlements seem to bear mutual feedbacks: first and foremost, as violent conflicts result in destruction of economic assets, conflicts usually tell upon the cultivation of foods, procurement and storage of foods and also the distribution and marketing of foods. The disruption in the agrarian sector can lead to serious decline in food availability and consequent famines, which can exacerbate and fuel further conflicts. On the other hand, the distribution and availability of foods can trigger violent conflicts in backward societies as a means to acquire and retain food entitlements, which can in turn jeopardise the agrarian equilibrium. Thus, the relationship between food entitlements and conflicts are a double-edged sword that can lend precarious instability to a backward society. During the last five decades, governments in developing nations have kept a close vigil on their agrarian sector, yet there is a clear indication in the global economy that warns of a looming food crisis, especially in the poorer regions of our globe. Food crises can seriously challenge global peace. Conflicts and hunger are hence complex phenomena. This chapter provides a comprehensive, and possibly the first, study of the economics of food entitlements and potential threats of conflicts in the current conjuncture.

The conflict between economic growth and sustainable development is foregone and there is prodigious literature examining the nature and causes of such trade-off. Keeping with this dispensation, the current chapter examines the dynamics of such trade-off in Ramsey–Cass–Koopmans (R–C–K) optimal growth-theoretic lines. The model developed in the chapter departs from the fundamental feature of R–C–K framework in as much as the capital is considered on a broader spectrum having its marginal productivity being increasing in nature and it considers a centralised economy with the planner maximising discounted utility over per capita consumption (private good) and pollution (public bad) over the infinite horizon of time. The study reveals potential trade-off between consumption and environmental emission quiet emphatically for the developed, developing and less developed countries, in both single equilibrium and multiple equilibrium cases. Besides, the study examines the impact of rise in population growth and fuel price on the steady-state equilibrium with respect to per capita capital, relative intensity of energy usage, emission and consumption using comparative static exercise.

We study a microfounded search model of exchange in the laboratory. Using a within-subjects design, we consider exchange behavior with and without an intrinsically worthless token object. While these tokens have no redemption value, like fiat money they may foster greater exchange and welfare via the coordinating role of having prices of goods in terms of tokens. We find that welfare is indeed improved by the presence of tokens provided that the economy starts out with a supply of such tokens. In economies that operate for some time without tokens, the later surprise introduction of tokens does not serve to improve welfare. We also explore the impact of announced changes in the economy-wide stock of tokens (fiat money) on prices. Consistent with the quantity theory of money, we find that increases in the stock of money (tokens) have no real effects and mainly result in proportionate changes to prices. However, the same finding does not hold for decreases in the stock of money.

Purpose – This chapter aims to examine trade patterns and gains from trade in a two-country general equilibrium model of increasing returns and oligopoly.

Approach – A general equilibrium model of increasing returns and oligopoly.

Findings – The determination of patterns of specialization and trade and gains from trade highly depends on the interaction between the degree of increasing returns and market power as well as the cross-country difference in factor endowments.

Originality – Unlike the existing literature, we endogenize the determination of specialization by using an allocation curve approach by Ethier (1982). To our knowledge, there is no comparable study that incorporates Ethier's (1982) approach to oligopolistic models of international trade.