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Purpose – In this chapter, we propose a process model of emergent multiculturally shared mental models (MSMM) in multiparty negotiation.

Methodology – Building on existing models of collective cognition, we incorporate our research on culture, negotiation, and shared mental models to propose a three-stage model that addresses the unique challenges of a multiparty and multicultural context at each stage.

Implications – The challenges of multiparty negotiation (e.g., increased information load, managing coalitions, etc.) are exacerbated in a multicultural context because negotiators each bring unique approaches and expectations that are grounded in their national cultural values and norms. Our model addresses these complexities and illustrates moderators that can facilitate or hinder the development of a shared understanding in multicultural multiparty negotiation.

Originality – Multicultural multiparty negotiations are common in international business mergers, international peace keeping efforts, and international political, economic, and environmental treaties. This chapter is the first to consider the process of shared cognition in the context of multicultural multiparty negotiations.

Purpose – To provide a framework for organizing research on group negotiation, including the contributions of the current volume.

Methodology – The organizing framework arranges past research on group negotiation and the contributions offered in this volume according to the core negotiation elements of people, processes, and places, and their impact on the integration of negotiators' preferences.

Findings – There is an extensive literature on negotiation, but historically group negotiation has represented only a small part of that dialogue. There are three general categories of group negotiation: multiparty negotiation, team negotiation, and multiteam negotiation. The core issue addressed in this chapter is how – viewed through the lens of the four identified core negotiation elements of preferences, people, processes, and places – the quantity and arrangement of negotiators involved in a negotiation qualitatively changes the negotiation experience, and specifically how (different types of) negotiating groups make more complex the challenge of identifying, agreeing to, and implementing integrative agreements.

Implications – More than dyadic negotiation, the difficulty of reaching agreements that satisfy all parties can lead to agreements that some negotiators are less than enthusiastic about implementing. It is the difficulty and importance of finding agreements that satisfy all parties in group negotiation that makes it so important to understand the influence of group negotiation by people, processes, and places.

Value of the Paper – This chapter organizes the landscape of group negotiation research by illuminating both what we know about the people, processes, and places that influence the negotiation of group members' preferences, as well as pointing the way – both theoretically and methodologically – for future researchers to fill in the blanks that remain.

This experiment examined the effects of motivational orientation (prosocial versus egoistic) on interpersonal trust, negotiation behavior, amount of impasses, and joint outcomes in three‐person negotiations. Students participated in a joint venture negotiation, in which motivational orientation was manipulated by allocating individual incentives (egoistic motive) vs. team incentives (prosocial motive). Results indicated that prosocially motivated negotiators achieved more integrative agreements and fewer impasses, and reported higher trust, more problem solving, and less contending behavior than egoistically motivated negotiators. Hierarchical regression suggested that the finding that prosocial groups achieved higher joint outcomes can be explained by higher levels of trust, more problem solving behavior, and less contending behavior in prosocial groups.

This paper aims to review and synthesize the existing literature related to negotiation complexity and provides an integrative model to systematically identify and examine factors contributing to negotiation complexity and how they affect negotiating parties’ behaviors and economic and subjective outcomes.

The approach was to combine relevant literature from negotiation in general and from negotiation complexity in particular and to develop and support an integrative model of complexity in real-world negotiations.

The literature on negotiation complexity and previous analytical frameworks are reviewed from a cross-disciplinary perspective. Based on the integrative review, an integrative model of negotiation complexity is proposed for identifying important complexity contributory factors. Six contributory factors are distinguished based on the three negotiation components – negotiation task, dynamic variables of negotiators and negotiation context. Their effects on negotiation complexity are examined and discussed with respect to four complexity dimensions (i.e. informational and computational, procedural, social and strategic dimensions). Finally, the effects of negotiation complexity on parties’ behaviors and outcomes are examined based on previous theoretical and empirical research and practical tools for managing negotiation complexity are delineated.

The integrative review and conceptualization of negotiation complexity are helpful for gaining a better understanding of negotiation complexity and its management in various real-world domains.

Breakthrough negotiators never treat the structure of a negotiation as pre‐ordained or fixed. In other words, the game can be played as it's dealt, but it cal also be changed. Structure shapes strategy—but strategy can also shape the structure, often by means of actions take to influence who will be at the table and what the agenda will be. Skilled negotiators act as architects of structure by, for example, transforming two‐party negotiations into multiparty negotiations by inviting in additional parties. Much of what is decisive in shaping the structure, such as decisions about whom one negotiates with and what the issue agenda is, takes place before the parties sit down across the table from each other. Similarly, actions taken away from the table can be as important as what goes on at the table. Even after the negotiation has begun, adroit negotiators continue shaping the structure by altering the agenda, introducing action‐forcing events, and linking or delinking negotiations.

The purpose of the study is to empirically investigate the similarities and differences between dyads and four‐party groups in an integrative negotiation.

Data are collected in a between subjects experiment. A total of 182 participants completed a negotiation role play and questionnaire. Hypotheses are tested using t‐tests, MANOVAs and two multiple regression analyses.

Results demonstrate that dyads do outperform groups on both the economic and subjective measures of outcomes. Sharing of priority information and the fixed pie bias was higher in groups than in dyads. For dyads the procedure used (considering more than one issue at a time) led to higher economic outcomes, and both procedure and problem solving were important for subjective outcomes. For four‐party negotiations, problem solving was significantly related to higher outcomes, on both economic and subjective outcomes, and procedure was moderately related to economic outcomes. Problem solving was significantly more important for the groups than for dyads on economic outcomes.

The controlled experimental setting could limit the generalizabiltiy of the findings. Measures of the intermediate variables could be improved by including additional items and observations. Future research is required in field settings using multiple measures of the process.

In multiparty negotiation information sharing and the presence of cognitive biases may not be as important as focusing on a problem solving approach.

An empirical investigation that groups under‐perform dyads in an integrative negotiation has not been conducted before.

The medium negotiators choose for communication will influence both process and outcome. To understand how medium influences power expression, this paper aims to compare value claiming by asymmetrically powerful negotiators, using face-to-face and computer-mediated messaging across two studies. Following up on long-standing conjectures from prominent coalition researchers, the authors also directly tested the role of the apex negotiator's personality in coalition formation and value expropriation.

The authors conducted two laboratory experiments which manipulated communication medium (computer-mediated vs face-to-face) in three- and four-person bargaining. They also varied asymmetry of power so the apex negotiator either could not be left out of a winning coalition (Study 1) or could be (Study 2). The authors measured trait assertiveness along with multiple indicators of hard bargaining behavior.

Communicating using instant messages via a computer interface facilitated value claiming for powerful negotiators across both studies. Trait assertiveness correlated with hard bargaining behavior in both studies. An index of hard bargaining behavior mediated the effect of assertiveness on value expropriation but only in the context where the powerful negotiator held a genuine monopoly over coalitions.

The authors contribute to the literature on multiparty negotiations by demonstrating persistent media effects on power utilization and by finally confirming the conjectures of prominent coalition researchers regarding personality. Though personality traits generate consistent effects on behavior, their influence on negotiation outcomes depends on the power structure. Negotiation theory needs to incorporate structural and situational factors in modelling effects of enduring traits. Negotiation research should move beyond a rigid focus on dyads.

This paper aims to study recent approaches to peacemaking, particularly by Turkey and Russia, in a changing world and their implications for UN-led peace processes. The authors analyze the factors that allow parallel processes to UN mediation to emerge and discuss their influence.

The paper presents two in-depth case studies of mediation in Syria and Libya, where the UN, as well as Russia and Turkey, were actively involved in peacemaking.

The authors find that parallel processes to UN mediation emerge if the UN process does not show progress toward a negotiated settlement and other third parties have leverage over the conflict parties. However, whether these parallel processes pose a fundamental challenge to the UN-led process depends on how sustained the third parties’ leverage over the conflict parties is. If it lasts, it puts the UN in a difficult position to either participate in the parallel process and contain it but thereby also legitimizing it, or to abstain from participating but thereby risking to lose control over the mediation process.

Analyzing different approaches to mediation helps to better understand current dynamics of multiparty mediation, including an increased questioning of the effectiveness of UN mediation, and provides insights on how the UN may adapt to keep its relevance in a changing world.

The paper is based on original first-hand data gathered between 2018 and 2022 through more than 50 interviews with UN officials, negotiation team members, political and civil society actors from Syria and Libya, (former) state officials and experts from Russia and Turkey, as well as external observers.

Much of the negotiation literature involves two parties that are each assumed to behave in a unitary manner, although a growing body of knowledge considers more complex negotiations. Examples of the latter include two parties where one or both parties do not behave in a unitary manner, multiple parties on one or both sides, parties on multiple sides and parties engaged in separate but linked negotiations. Greater degrees of complexity distinguish these negotiations from negotiations with two unitary parties.

This essay presents models of multiparty negotiation as a means to compare the conventional public meetings format of planning to a preliminary process, the technical advisory committee. A metric of market concentration, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, is used to quantify the structural advantages in each, and presented within the context of municipal planning processes. In doing so, this work advances several propositions: First, open meetings expand power differentials between parties, which lead to outcomes that reflect the political efficacy of participants over the regulatory purpose of government. Second, such meetings create substantial transaction costs for the public, creating a barrier to the expression of community values. Finally, preliminary processes constitute a more effective forum for citizen participation than open meetings.