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No one denies that Islamic finance has grown during the last 40 years and numerous Islamic financial instruments have innovated and developed in order to cater to the needs of Muslims. However, the sale- and service-based contracts remain dominant in the market and contribute to creating more debt. Partnership contracts such as mudarabah or musahrakah are least popular due to several practical problems. This chapter examines and identifies the practical challenges of classical mudarabah and proposes a new Islamic financing model – reserve mudarabah with appropriate examples. The model can be a useful tool for SME financing and in Islamic microfinance.

Islamic banks use Mudarabah contract to replace the interest-bearing deposits with profit-sharing investment accounts. The purpose of this paper is to explore the challenges and problems associated with the employment of Mudarabah contract by Islamic banks.

The study critically analyzes the Mudarabah contract used by Islamic banks. It reviews the evolution of the contract from its traditional type to more complicated types such as compound, unrestricted, commingled and continuous Mudarabah. The paper investigates the problems that have emerged from implementing such types in current business settings.

The paper proves that implementing the Mudarabah contract by banks imposes several problems among which are the following: difficulty in the determination of total profit resulting from Mudarabah and in allocating this profit to the multiple parties involved in Mudarabah; usage of reserves to cater against future losses may undermine the concept of Mudarabah profit-loss sharing and lead to earnings management; corporate governance is also a major problem in Mudarabah contract, as the depositors are exposed to risks but have no governance rights; and Mudarabah may also lessen the fair presentation of financial reporting.

The paper examines the evolving Mudarabah contract and its implementation challenges, based on available literature (no empirical analysis was conducted).

The implications are significant for the future development of Islamic contracts and Islamic accounting treatments.

Many studies explored the Mudarabah contract from a Shariah or law perspective. However, this paper investigates the Mudarabah contract with a focus on the implication on accounting and financial reporting because of the lack of studies in this area. Furthermore, it demonstrates the persistent flaws in the Mudarabah contract, and it proposes a new model for mobilizing funds, i.e. mutual fund.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the Shariah view on the legitimacy of requiring the entrepreneur to prove that he/she has complied with all business requirements in case the actual profit was below the expected profit in trust-based contracts such as mudarabah and musharakah.

This paper is part of the research which applies qualitative research approaches, including among others, content analysis, interviews, observations and descriptive analysis using fiqh muqaran (comparative analysis of jurists’ arguments) in few phases.

The study found that shifting the burden of proof to the fiduciary is the weightier view and necessary to ensure that both sides are protected. The considerations of protecting people’s wealth (ḥifẓ amwāl al-nās) and mitigating widespread greed (ṭamaʿ) are among the reasons for allowing elements such as ʿurf, tuhmah and dalālat al-ḥāl to be treated as bayyinah in trust-based contracts when the fiduciary is obliged to defend himself from litigation.

The study is meant to strengthen the practices of Islamic banks world wide.

Few protections can be applied for capital provider.

This study is meant to give solution in dealing with moral hazard of both parties, and to provide solution to the regulator for policy drafting and to increase confidence to the industry.

The finding is important in assisting the regulators in drafting the policy to protect both parties without neglecting the essence of trust-based contracts.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze individual financing instruments and portfolios of instruments, and find the location of the most efficient portfolio financing. The Indonesian Islamic banking industry is very promising with four dominant financing instruments, namely, Mudarabah, Musharakah, Murabahah and Istishna. Each instrument has unique pattern of return, expected return and risk. Moreover, the variances of two, three and four financing instruments suggest the importance of identifying the most prospective financing instruments. Further, the most efficient portion of the most prospective financing is determined by constructing an efficient portfolio financing frontier.

Technically, it uses risk and return theory to compute risk, return and variance of an instrument and set of financing instruments. In addition, it uses an efficient portfolio frontier curve to locate all combination of the most progressive portfolio financing and finds the most efficient portfolio financing.

It finds some interesting finding with regard to the pattern of return, characteristics of a financing instrument and groups of financing instruments. The most essential finding of the paper is the location of the most efficient portfolio financing.

The information and finding of this paper benefit the Indonesian Islamic banking industry to optimize the performance of an individual and groups of financing instruments. Particularly, for the most progressive financing instruments, it proposes the combinations of portfolio financing which give optimum output.

To the best of author’s knowledge, this is the first paper trying to analyze and construct an efficient portfolio financing frontier of the Indonesian Islamic banking industry.

The purposes of this study are twofold. First, to theoretically examine the profit-sharing (mudarabah) contract that produces an optimal distribution of return in the presence of social learning (shuratic process) within the environment of asymmetric information. Second, to empirically investigate the optimal condition of profit-sharing ratio (PSR) and social learning for profit-sharing (mudarabah) contract in Islamic banking.

Data from one of the biggest and earliest Islamic banks in Malaysia were taken as a proxy of an Islamic bank. The data are collected from the period of 2009 to 2013, and these will be used for the simulation process by using the genetic algorithm (GA) technique.

The empirical results discovered that Islamic banks had used social learning in their daily activities, especially in the asset side. The results also showed that the trend of social learning has a positive relationship with the trend of Islamic banks’ net profit. Additionally, the results also indicated that the Islamic banks’ net profit has a positive relationship with its PSR from the profit-sharing (mudarabah) financing and securities investment.

This study is the first of its kind that investigates the implementation of the social learning process in Islamic banking operation. This study also used the latest technique from artificial intelligence system, i.e. a GA, to attain an optimal value for PSR and social learning process.

This study aims to examine the nexus between CAMELS, risk-sharing financial performance and Islamic banks' stability. It also attempts to assess the conditioning effects of institutional quality in the relationship between risk-sharing contracts and the stability of Islamic banks.

The quantitative research design was employed using secondary data from 20 Islamic banks in six countries over the period 2007–2019. The study utilized the feasible generalized least squares method for the analysis.

The results indicate that not all CAMELS variables support the stability of Islamic banks. The musharakah contract induced stability of the banks, whereas mudarabah financing reduced it. The interaction between risk-sharing finance and the quality of institutions suggested that the mudarabah contract via institutional quality raises the stability of Islamic banks. On the other hand, the quality of institutions encourages the banks to offer more musharakah, but it leads to an increase in their risk-taking. We show the impact of changes in risk-sharing variables on stability amplified by institutional quality. The results were robust when alternative measures of stability were used.

Various stakeholders in banking activities could learn from the results of this study. Islamic banks could improve their positions in terms of screening for risk-sharing financing. They could also leverage more on musharakah, as it promotes stability and could generate more returns for the banks. The mudarabah financing can be improved if there is a proper evaluation of entrepreneurs. Policymakers would learn more about the importance of institutional quality, as it provides a friendly environment for both mudarabah and musharakah businesses to thrive. This could increase the participation of Islamic banks in the real economy.

Previous studies concentrated on the effects of CAMELS on the profitability of Islamic banks. This study shows that CAMELS alone might not necessarily capture the financial performance of Islamic banks. Therefore, the risk-sharing financing variables are included alongside CAMELS to determine their effects on stability. Second, unlike the past research, this study used the quality of institutions to moderate the nexus between risk-sharing financing and the stability of Islamic banks.

The purpose of this paper is to study the differences or variance in the yields of Islamic and conventional bank deposits and capital, respectively, in view of their contractual differences, namely the former which is based on equity and the latter on debt.

The paper uses a financial ratio approach.

It was found that deposit yields in conventional banks were lower than return on equity (ROE), which truly reflect the contractual differences between fixed deposit and bank's capital. Also, it was found that Islamic banks' deposit yield and ROEs do not reflect their risk‐taking properties, as their variances were found to be smaller.

The paper adds to the literature on risk‐return relationship in Islamic capital theory, which currently lacks theoretical studies.

The paper shows that increasing the level of risk taking in mudarabah investment account could increase its expected returns.

Since both shareholders' capital and mudarabah investment accounts constitute risk capital, variance in yields should be proportional to risk. The paper is the first attempt to explore and compare yields from Islamic bank capital and mudarabah deposits.

The trust in participation banks depends largely on authentic dependence on Sharia, legal financial instruments and fair yet transparent distribution among account owners and banks. Taking into account the economic Islamic principles and those of mudarabah agreement, this study aims to identify problematic areas pertaining to profit sharing in addition to revealing opportunities leading to the improvement of the profit distribution system while developing a new profit distribution system proposal.

This study proposes two hypotheses (H). H1: There are partial deviations between the profit considered to be legal according to the economic principles of Islam and the practice of participation banking. H2: There are partial deviations or loss of right in practice between the mudarabah contract concluded among owners of participation account and participation banks. In-depth interview technique and review of the literature including legislation were used to determine the parameters affecting the distributed profit. The collected data was tested through comparison with the theoretical framework of the mudarabah contract.

There are two separate fund pools used in participation banks, including equity and participation accounts. Managers’ selection of pools set according to their personal goals related to balance sheet profit management may cause profit to pass between participation accounts and equity. Many issues negatively affect the distributed profits. For example, incomes from funding commissions, reserve requirements and idle funds, although they originate from participation accounts, are recorded in the bank’s income. In addition, the bank does not return the profit initially recorded in its own account to participation pools, whether or not profit.

The interviewed officials were cautious to avoid a negative perception of the sector. This made it difficult to determine the real situation of applications decided with initiative in profit distribution. Although the authorization documents have partially been published, it is still difficult to access most licensed documents. There is no independent audit report made considering the interest-free banking principles regarding the profit distribution system of participation banking. The scarcity of the literature on the subject is another limitation. The research does not cause any harm to the reputation of participation banks.

Adopting a single-pool system in line with the global practices will end the shift of right between pools while ensuring a fair and transparent system. In this system, the bank equities, other shareholders’ funds and participation accounts are collected and operated in a single pool. The pool profit and loss are distributed as per the shares in the pool. The profit per each participation account is distributed based on the share of each participation account in the pool and profit-sharing ratio.

Participation banking is expected to support the real economy by means of production, leasing, merchandising based on certain religious, ethical and contractual principles. Bringing funds of conservatives, that does not go to conventional banks for avoiding of interest, in the economy is expected to provide new sources to reduce the foreign dependency for the economy and to supply a financial alternative for the conservatives who stay away from interest-based economic activities. However, if this will represent an alternative to debt-based systems, then products, contracts, business processes and legislations driven according to interest-free banking principles should be developed.

This study introduces and analyzes a new proposal of the profit distribution system of participation banking. A similar methodology is used in interest-free banking on a global scale, especially in Malaysia, and is compatible with the profit distribution decisions in AAOIFI’s depositor accounts. However, this methodology is considered to be new as far as participation banking is concerned. The implementation of this new methodology will eliminate several problems identified in the profit distribution system of participation banks. This research provides an academic contribution to the participation banking profit distribution system and represents a reference material on the subject.

This paper attempts to construct Islamic gracious monetary instruments namely Qardh hassan, Waqf and Gift central bank certificates. The certificates do not only function as monetary instruments per se, but also give economic and social benefit for the public such as the needy. However, the central bank and its counterparts still need to manage the funds professionally to produce profit, maintain the values of the funds and prevent business losses. As such, this theoretical study aims to offer alternative Islamic monetary instruments for the central bank to manage liquidity and especially to improve the welfare of the people.

The paper exercises three Islamic gracious monetary instruments (Qardh hassan, Waqf and Gift central bank certificates) for both investment based (Mudarabah and Musharakah) financing and trading based (Ijarah and Murabahah) financing. Every instrument is elaborated mathematically to analyze its economic impact, treatment of profit and loss coming from the business and status of the funds. Finally, the paper compares every gracious certificate and explains the terms and conditions to use them optimally.

The exercises find unique characteristics, operations and contribution of every Islamic gracious monetary instrument to the economy. Based on economic impact, nature of the contracts and management of the funds, the central bank can now have alternative Islamic monetary instruments to be offered to the generous depositors to improve the welfare of the people particularly the needy.

The paper only assesses the feasibility of three Islamic gracious monetary instruments. There might be more alternatives of Islamic gracious monetary instruments to be considered and elaborated.

To the best of author's knowledge, this is the first paper to try to exercise the alternative of the Islamic gracious monetary instruments.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the accounting treatment for mudarabah contract and its implications on the reliability and fairness of the financial statements. In addition, the paper also aims to explore the effect of provisions and reserves on profit allocation among unrestricted investment account holders (UIAHS).

This study reviews the accounting treatment for mudarabah contract as stated in the Accounting Standards for Islamic Financial Institutions issued by the AAOIFI and compares it with other financial reporting frameworks, especially the IFRS.

The paper finds that presenting UIAHS in a separate category in the financial position statement (balance sheet), without reclassifying the assets in the financial position statement to reflect the assets attributable to UIAHS, suggests undue bias in the financial statements. This contradicts the concepts of full disclosure and true and fair view of the financial statements. The paper also reveals that reserves may result in profit misallocation among UIAHS. Additionally, there is an overlap between provisions and reserves, which may affect the reliability and fairness of the financial statements. It is also revealed that reserves presented under the UIAHS section could not be readily understandable since investors have no right to these reserves. The paper further finds that using a donation contract in business may result in diverting wealth from the less wealthy to the wealthier.

The paper criticizes the AAOIFI treatment for UIAHS and suggests an extension to this treatment by presenting assets attributable to UIAHS in order to enhance disclosure. Additionally, it questions the applicability of using donation (Tabarru) contract in transactions with profit‐making substance.