Search results

This study attempts to find the response of the real estate market to economic changes by identifying cause-effect relationships between mortgage, residential investment, and Saudi employment.

A quantitative approach to analytically examine the relationship among the variables. To find out the impact of investment, mortgage and Saudi employment on the Saudi real estate growth from 1970 to 2019. All data sets were obtained from the General Authority for Statistics (GAST), Saudi Central Bank (SAMA) and World Bank Group.

This study reveals a positive relationship between the mortgage and GDP in the Saudi Arabian real estate market. The same results for employment and investment; both have a positive effect on the GDP of the real estate market.

Analyzing the impact of real estate financing on various industries and the extent to which it is related to employment and unemployment rates is essential for future research. Moreover, this research can be applied to different countries and compared based on similarities and differences in implementing mortgage-related policies.

The government must encourage investment in various ways and establish a stable structure that ensures market stability and finds a balance between supply and demand.

This study reflects the importance of real estate financing not only to individuals and governments but also to investors and business workers, and it is essential to analyze the impact of real estate financing on various industries, as well as the extent to which it is related to employment and unemployment rates. This research can be applied to different countries and compared based on similarities and differences in the implementation of mortgage-related policies.

This study contributes to testing this study’s hypothesis: that mortgage positively impacts the real estate market of Saudi Arabia.

The transmission of monetary policy rates to lending rates is viewed as a crucial path of monetary policy. As an integral part of the financial system and the recent financial crisis, securitized assets have the potential to affect the interest rate pass-through process and monetary policy effectiveness. This paper aims to investigate the influence of securitization on the transmission of policy rate changes to lending rates and how rate transmission has changed since the recent financial crisis. Emphasis is placed on differences among the mortgage, consumer credit and business loan securitization markets and between agency and private-label securitization transactions.

The empirical framework is an error-correction model augmented to directly measure the influence of securitization. Monetary policy effectiveness is measured by the size and speed of transmitted policy rate changes to lending rates. An efficiency measure of relative adjustment accounts for differences in the size of long-run responses across loan markets and changes in efficiency from securitization within loan markets.

The size and speed of interest rate pass-through tend to increase with securitization. Liquidity, capital relief and funding from securitization help to make lending rates more responsive. Increases in pass-through with securitization are less in the consumer credit and business loan markets after the recent financial crisis relative to before the crisis. In contrast, mortgage markets tend to have larger pass-through after the financial crisis. Differences in rate transmission after the recent financial crisis point to the role on nonbanks in consumer credit and business loans and asset purchase programs of the Federal Reserve in mortgage markets. Securitization tends to make the adjustment process more efficient, and gains in efficiency from securitization are larger after the financial crisis.

A key contribution of the study differentiates securitization across markets and types to determine the effects on the interest rate pass-through process. The results show that increases in the efficiency of the adjustment process from securitization tend to be greater in mortgage markets and for all private-label securitized assets. These findings have implications for proposed government-sponsored entity (GSE) reform to reduce the role of GSEs in the housing market, promote private-label mortgage credit and strengthen securitization deals.

The purpose of this study is to investigate barriers to accessing mortgages in Nigeria’s urban housing markets with the main focus on Kaduna State. The objective was to establish the diverse factors that constitute barriers to urban households’ access to mortgages for homeownership from the perceptions of households, mortgage lenders and the Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria.

The study used cross-sectional survey with triangulation of results. To enable the triangulation, three new samples were developed from 450 surveys with households and 10 completed by lenders, both in Kaduna State and one survey undertaken by the Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria. Data were collected with questionnaires designed on five-point Likert model. Data analysis utilized descriptive statistics and one-sample t-test. Triangulation enabled cross-validation of the results.

The barriers include low incomes and savings which constrain households’ ability to pay mortgage instalments and deposits, respectively, high interest rates, poor access to land, inability of potential borrowers to provide certificates of occupancy on their land, inadequate loanable funds and inadequate number of mortgage lending institutions.

The study has the potential to provide a basis for mortgage market reforms. Mortgage market reforms should be encompassing because it requires action in some other sectors.

The social implication of the study is the possibility of motivating actions to deal with the diverse barriers to accessing mortgages which have constituted deterrents to households from realizing their homeownership aspirations and enjoying the benefits of homeownership and consequently contributing to inadequate housing and poor living conditions.

The study provides distinctive insight into Nigeria’s mortgage market by integrating the views of various stakeholders on a subject of social and economic significance. It contributes to the evidence-base around mortgage market reforms in Nigeria.

The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, it derives the optimal loan-to-value (LTV)-ratio for a mortgagor that maximizes the return to home equity when considering the capital structure of housing investment. Second, it analyses the demand-side contribution to mortgage market variability across monetary policy regimes.

The paper endogenizes both the relation between the LTV ratio and the mortgage rate and the relation between LTV and the rate of appreciation. When we consider LTV-variance and the demand-side contribution to mortgage market variability, three stylized regimes is considered.

The paper finds an intuitive ranking of the optimal LTV-ratios across regimes, and the optimal LTV-ratio peaks during a housing boom. When, however, monetary policy ignores asset inflation the demand-side contribution to market variability is highest during normal market conditions. Hence, there is a potentially hump-shaped relation between the risk exposure of individual mortgagors and the demand-side contribution to mortgage market variability.

The paper finds a potentially hump-shaped relation between the risk exposure of individual mortgagors and the demand-side contribution to mortgage market variability, which, to the best of our knowledge, is novel. The paper shows how macro-prudential and monetary policy are complementary tolls for preserving financial stability.

The downturn in the residential housing market in Northern Ireland (NI) has been the most pronounced of any UK region, with house prices contracting circa 40 per cent between 2007Q3 and 2009Q4. The downturn at first glance appears to have increased the “ability to afford” however this is nonetheless a “false dawn”. Significant deposit levels coupled with a more prudent lending culture has ensured that housing affordability remains a primary policy concern. The purpose of this paper is to empirically analyse the interrelationships between mortgage liquidity and housing affordability in NI during the boom‐bust cycle in the residential property market.

The paper analyses mortgage‐lending statistics for NI in the period 1993‐2009, using time series panel data. House price data are drawn from the University of Ulster House Price Index over the same time series. To facilitate analytical interpretation and outcome analysis, quantitative evaluation is applied within a first‐time buyer (FTB) affordability framework.

This study finds that the relationship between mortgage finance and affordability has been driven by deregulation of the mortgage market contributing to the rise in house prices and affordability pressures during the market up cycle. More recently, ongoing liquidity constraints within the financial sector are impairing recovery in the residential property market culminating in heightened concerns of both purchase and “deposit gap” affordability. The key findings suggest that the new significant capital requirement needed to access the housing market will inevitably prolong affordability pressures for the foreseeable future.

This paper contributes to affordability debate in two ways. First, it examines the effect of both liberalised and contracted patterns of mortgage finance on affordability and argues that conventional approaches appear to present a “false dawn” for FTBs in NI. Second, the paper demonstrates that affordability post‐financial crisis has shifted in genre towards a purchase and deposit gap (lag time) issue.

Social scientists have long been interested in how political institutions affect economic performance. Nowhere are these effects more apparent today than in the current U.S. financial meltdown. This article offers an analysis of the meltdown by showing how government regulation among other things helped cause it. Specifically, the article shows how regulatory reforms closely associated with neoliberalism created perverse incentives that contributed significantly to the increased lending in the mortgage market and increased speculation in other financial markets even as such behavior was becoming increasingly risky. The result was the failure of mortgage firms, banks, a major insurance company, and eventually the market for short-term business loans, which triggered a general liquidity crisis thereby thrusting the entire economy into a severe recession. Implications for future research are explored. The article also offers a few policy prescriptions and an assessment of their political viability going forward.

Why did the United States experience a housing and mortgage market boom and bust in the 2000s, while analogous Canadian markets were relatively stable? Both US and Canadian markets are replete with government interventions. In this paper, I account for the US and Canada’s different experiences by arguing that government interventions are not created equal. Some government interventions prevent market participants from pursuing actions that ex ante are reckoned beneficial. Alternatively, other interventions lead to the pursuit of actions that turn out to be costly ex post. It is the latter type that we expect to manifest in crises. The US case is one where government interventions in the mortgage markets led to actions that appeared ex ante beneficial but were revealed to be costly ex post. Alternatively, Canada’s mortgage market was and remains essentially a regulated oligopoly. Regulatory capture makes for a sclerotic market that likely imposes costs on Canadian borrowers in the forms of limited financing options and higher interest rates. However, this sclerosis also lends itself to stability. This market structure made the Canadian mortgage market relatively insusceptible to a bubble.

The current crisis in the mortgage securitization industry highlights significant failures in our models of how markets work and our political will, organizational capability, and ideological desire to intervene in markets. This article shows that one of the main sources of failure has been the lack of a coherent understanding of how these markets came into existence, how tactics and strategies of the principal firms in these markets have evolved over time, and how we ended up with the economic collapse of the main firms. It seeks to provide some insight into these processes by compiling both historical and quantitative data on the emergence and spread of these tactics across the largest investment banks and their principal competitors from the mortgage origination industry. It ends by offering some policy proscriptions based on the analysis.

This paper seeks to examine the role that regulation and regulatory agencies played in the creating of the subprime mortgage market, and the subsequent crash of the mortgage market. The paper has two goals. First, it seeks to document the degree to which the US housing markets, and the US housing finance market, were regulated prior to the crash. Second, it seeks to show that regulatory bodies set policies which created both incentives and explicit requirements for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as well as depository institutions, to enter the subprime market.

The paper examines the regulatory environment of the subprime market. It uses regulatory filings and other documents as primary sources.

The popular perception that the subprime mortgage market arose because housing finance was largely unregulated is incorrect. In point of fact, the housing finance market was very heavily regulated. Indeed, the paper shows that the creation of the subprime market was a formal goal of the federal government, and that federal regulatory agencies explicitly required participation by the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs).

The paper's primary implication is that incentive conflicts within the US housing finance system significantly contributed to the mortgage crisis. These incentive conflicts were not just within private firms, but also extend to the GSEs and regulatory agencies. Regulatory agencies not only failed to anticipate the crisis; they actively encouraged the policies which created it. As a result, the primary focus of reform efforts should be on identifying and eliminating such conflicts.

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the interaction between a profit maximising mortgagor and a newcomer to a mortgage market with Bertrand competition where the newcomer has a populistic entry strategy and undercuts mortgage market rates. The intention of the paper is to relate the populistic entry strategy to mortgage market characteristics and the strategic market position of both the established mortgagor and the newcomer in question.

The paper analyses a mortgage market by combining the behaviour of a profit maximising mortgagor with that of a newcomer to the mortgage market which has a populistic entry strategy and does not maximise profits. The short-run market solution provides comparative statics on the strategic market position of both the established mortgagor and the newcomer to the mortgage market during the entry phase both related to product differentiation and to price mirroring and undercutting of mortgage rates.

The model finds a mortgage market solution where a lower mortgage rate helps the newcomer gain a customer base. As the newcomer's strategy to mirror prices makes it unable to pass-through funding cost to its mortgage rate, the strategy is unsustainable over time. The established mortgagor has a strategically beneficial position as the mortgage market rates only relate to its funding cost. Unless the newcomer has a funding cost advantage, the established mortgagor has a higher interest rate margin. Differentiation impacts the newcomers’ interest rate margin positively. If the newcomer lacks a funding cost advantage, there is a critical mirroring rate that ensures it a higher interest rate margin. The higher the newcomers’ own funding cost, the higher is the upper bound for price mirroring, relating market entry to a small undercutting of mortgage rates and a mortgage market with weak competition. The funding cost of the established mortgagor pulls pricing in the opposite direction, allowing for a lower mirroring rate and tougher mortgage market competition during entry.

The paper aims to contribute to the understanding of market equilibrium in the absence of profit maximising behaviour. Framing a mortgage market in terms of a duopoly where a newcomer enters with a populistic entry strategy offering a lower mortgage rate and a mortgage product with a different loan-to-value (LTV) ratio, a novel mortgage market case comes about. The populistic entry strategy produces an augmented reaction curve, crucial for the mortgage market rates.