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The concept of state-corporate crime developed during the late 1980s and early 1990s in a series of papers authored by Michalowski and Kramer (Kramer, 1990; Kramer & Michalowski, 1990; Michalowski & Kramer, 1987). They specifically define state-corporate crime as:Illegal or socially injurious actions that result from a mutually reinforcing interaction between (1) policies and/or practices in pursuit of goals of one or more institutions of political governance and (2) policies and/or practices in pursuit of goals of one or more institutions of economic production and distribution. (Michalowski & Kramer, 2006a, 2006b, p. 15)

This chapter examines how deregulatory fiscal policies undermined federal legislation intended to reduce racial and economic inequality through measures that included wider access to home loans among minority populations. We focus specifically on structural tensions that existed between fostering the goals of economic and racial equality within a political structure that also serves the needs of finance capitalism. The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), typically considered a triggering point for the financial meltdown by conservative commentators, was passed to address racial and economic inequalities, yet financial deregulation and the growth of the subprime mortgage industry ended up completely subverting these goals. The unprecedented growth and evolution of the subprime mortgage industry that occurred largely outside of the law's reach helped minorities and other economically disadvantaged groups enter into the housing market. However, a crime-facilitative environment brought on by inadequate regulation resulted in a significant degree of fraud by lenders. While this expanded homeownership among minorities, it eventually pushed them into default and brought chaos to the entire U.S. economy. This chapter details how the collapse of the subprime industry disproportionately impacted minority populations, and exposes how deregulatory policies subverted the effectiveness and reach of the FHA and CRA. The history of the CRA provides a clear example of the contradictory tensions within the U.S. legal system that espouses equality yet ultimately fails those it was designed to help as a consequence of unfettered capitalism.

Studies of Depression-era financial remediation have generally focused on federal deposit insurance and the provision of equity to banks by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC). This paper broadens the concept of financial remediation to include other programs – RFC lending, federal guarantees of farm and home mortgages, and the elimination of interest on demand deposits – and other intermediaries – savings and loans, mutual savings banks, and life insurance companies. The benefits of remediation or the amounts potentially at risk to the government in these programs are calculated annually and allocated to the various intermediaries. The slow remediation of real estate loans (two-thirds of these intermediaries' loans) needs further study with respect to the slow economic recovery. The paper compares Depression-era remediation with efforts during the 2008–2009 crisis. Today's remediation contrasts with the 1930s in its speed, magnitude relative to GDP or private sector nonfinancial debt, the share of remediation going to nonbanks, and emphasis on securities markets.

The main purpose of this paper is to study the effect of consumer expertise on mortgage loan prices. We argue that consumer expertise should affect price due to two reasons: (1) loan mortgage prices in non-price-regulated settings are usually the result of a bank-customer negotiation process; and (2) a mortgage loan is a complex product.

Data on mortgage loan prices were used for a sample of 1,055 households for 2005 (Bank of Spain Survey of Household Finances, EFF-2005).

The regression results indicate that consumer expertise-related metrics are highly significant as predictors of mortgage loan prices. Findings also indicate that cost-related variables and a measure of risk with low discrimination power (i.e. having a permanent employment contract, which accounts for 70 per cent of contracts in Spain) affect price. Surprisingly, more sophisticated measures of credit risk do not have such a significant impact on mortgage prices.

Empirical results refer to the credit conditions prior to the financial crisis and could shed some light on the factors that led to it.

Findings seem to indicate that, in the period under study, bank managers prioritized capturing new business in the short-term against normative prescriptions, which suggest that price should be credit-risk adjusted (financial literature) and long-term consumer potential adjusted (marketing literature). The post-2008 difficult economic situation of Spanish banks (linked to an excessive portfolio of mortgage loans granted at very low prices) shows that these strategies were wrong.

An uncommon perspective was adopted. The importance of consumer expertise-related variables on price has been underemphasized by prior research. The effect of consumer expertise is assessed by using a large and comprehensive database.

Shows that loan loss expectation plays an important role in determining credit rationing. Shows that the optimal loan size depends on the marginal loan loss, and not on the initial portfolio position of the bank. While an increase in loan administrative costs leads to a larger optimal loan size, restricting the loan size is used to minimize default risks. Also shows that under conditions of uncertainty when default risk is present, and if absolute risk aversion is increasing in wealth, a rise in wealth of the bank will lower the amount of asset to be allocated in risky loans even if credit can be properly priced.

The transmission of monetary policy rates to lending rates is viewed as a crucial path of monetary policy. As an integral part of the financial system and the recent financial crisis, securitized assets have the potential to affect the interest rate pass-through process and monetary policy effectiveness. This paper aims to investigate the influence of securitization on the transmission of policy rate changes to lending rates and how rate transmission has changed since the recent financial crisis. Emphasis is placed on differences among the mortgage, consumer credit and business loan securitization markets and between agency and private-label securitization transactions.

The empirical framework is an error-correction model augmented to directly measure the influence of securitization. Monetary policy effectiveness is measured by the size and speed of transmitted policy rate changes to lending rates. An efficiency measure of relative adjustment accounts for differences in the size of long-run responses across loan markets and changes in efficiency from securitization within loan markets.

The size and speed of interest rate pass-through tend to increase with securitization. Liquidity, capital relief and funding from securitization help to make lending rates more responsive. Increases in pass-through with securitization are less in the consumer credit and business loan markets after the recent financial crisis relative to before the crisis. In contrast, mortgage markets tend to have larger pass-through after the financial crisis. Differences in rate transmission after the recent financial crisis point to the role on nonbanks in consumer credit and business loans and asset purchase programs of the Federal Reserve in mortgage markets. Securitization tends to make the adjustment process more efficient, and gains in efficiency from securitization are larger after the financial crisis.

A key contribution of the study differentiates securitization across markets and types to determine the effects on the interest rate pass-through process. The results show that increases in the efficiency of the adjustment process from securitization tend to be greater in mortgage markets and for all private-label securitized assets. These findings have implications for proposed government-sponsored entity (GSE) reform to reduce the role of GSEs in the housing market, promote private-label mortgage credit and strengthen securitization deals.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the merits of a full privatization policy of the HDB concessionary rate mortgage loans. It is believed that price competition among domestic banks will be infused and sustained, resulting in improved efficiency for the banking sector and the economy.

This paper first compares the loan interest rates of the domestic banks for HDB flat buyers to the HDB concessionary interest‐rates. Then it investigates the performance of the HDB, by assessing whether its mortgage yields are able to meet the requirements set forth by means of HDB's hurdle rates.

The findings suggest that HDB's mortgage yields are insufficient in meeting the performance standards set by the HDB, reflected by the hurdle rate. In conclusion, it is recommended that the HDB should further delegate this part of business to the private sector, where better financial performances are expected among domestic banks under competitions.

This paper is confined to mortgages subject to constant interest rates over time, despite, firstly, the availability of floating‐rate mortgages on the market, and, secondly, the quarterly revised fixed rate mortgages offered by the HDB.

While sharing some structural similarities with the USA on mortgage finance, disparities in the degree of government involvement in the mortgage market of Singapore makes it worth studying. Also, it sheds light on further studies on other nations with similar features, such as the presence of strong government support in the mortgage finance sector.

This paper aims to evaluate the business activities, financial reports, and management compensation practices of Countrywide Financial Corporation (Countrywide) in the period preceding the company's financial distress and leading to its eventual takeover by Bank of America in 2008. This analysis provides a number of insights into the risks that Countrywide was exposed to which may guide future research and financial management.

Case study evaluating the failure of Countrywide Financial Corporation.

First, Countrywide was highly reliant upon the securitization of mortgage loans to finance its activities and this was apparent in the financial reports. Second, these securitization transactions exposed Countrywide to significant financial risks, including the risk inherent in the uncertain values of residual interests and warrantees. Problematically, these risks were not transparently reflected in the financial reports, as confirmed by the lag in the timing of stock price responses. This untimely market response suggests the equity market was not aware of Countrywide's risk exposures until shortly before the company's solvency crisis. Third, the compensation practices of Countrywide encouraged and rewarded management for exposing the firm to significant risks.

This paper provides insights into financial management that are relevant for researchers and professionals.

This paper provides insights for researchers and practitioners relating to the impact of asset securitization on business risk and how these business activities and risks are disclosed in the financial reports.

This paper aims to answer how effective the loan-to-value (LTV) regulation has been since 2011 for conventional and Islamic (participation) banks in Turkey in terms of curbing mortgage loan growth and delinquency[1].

The authors first use unit root tests and tests of difference in loan and property price data in pre-LTV and post-LTV period. Second, the authors follow Chow test and ordinary least squares regression analyses to test for a structural break when sensitivity of mortgage loan and delinquency growth changes to property price changes considered.

The authors find that two periods are statistically different, while the significance level is lower for Islamic banks. Moreover, loan growth has become less responsive to property price increases; delinquency sensitivity to property price changes has significantly increased in the post-LTV period for conventional banks, while this is not the case for Islamic (participation) banks.

This paper not only increases empirical evidence regarding the effectiveness of LTV ratio policy but also fills the gap in the literature by providing a comparison between conventional banks and Islamic (participation) banks.

This study investigates the relation of bank loan delinquencies to Fed Survey delinquency data from 2003 to 2017. Bank-generated loans have lower delinquencies than all Fed Survey loan types. Survey mortgage and auto loan delinquencies are positively related to bank loan delinquencies indicating complimentary delinquency decisions for borrowers. Conversely, student loans delinquencies are negatively related to bank loans, consistent with borrowers substituting student loan payments for bank debt for the entire sample period. Student loan delinquencies are negatively related to per-capita bankruptcy, and all other types of debt have a positive relation. The relation between Fed Survey loan delinquencies and bank-generated loan delinquencies is time varying and changed after the financial crisis in 2008.

Seemingly Unrelated Regression is used to study delinquencies for three bank loan types and whether or not they are related to Fed Survey loan delinquencies. The sample is split into pre-financial crisis before 2008 and post-crisis after 2008.

Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) results show that bank delinquencies for second mortgages and “Other” loan types are consistently complementary to Fed Survey mortgage loan delinquencies. Fed Survey auto loans delinquencies are also consistent with a complimentary relation, and these results are largely driven by the relation after the financial crisis of 2008 since pre-crisis regression results are not significant for every dependent variable. Credit card loan delinquencies have a negative and substitute relation with bank-generated first mortgage loan delinquencies prior to the crisis in 2008, and with bank-generated second mortgages after the crisis. Conversely, student loan delinquencies from the Fed Survey are negatively and significantly related to bank mortgages for the entire sample period, but only with bank-generated first mortgages after 2008. The student loan delinquency results are consistent with income smoothing, on average, although this is not explicitly tested at the micro level since this study uses macro-level data and not borrower-specific data. These findings are also consistent with conventional wisdom that student loans provide “financial slack” and borrower flexibility.

A limiting factor is this study uses macro-level data and not borrower-specific data.

Empirical findings are consistent with prior research that student loans provide income smoothing and “financial slack,” and borrowers with payment challenges will pay other debt before student loans.

Borrowers in financial trouble tend to be delinquent for all debt, and more so for student debt.

To investigate whether Fed Survey delinquencies of auto loans, first mortgages, student loans and credit card loans from all sources have complementary or substitution effects with bank debt at a macro level. The study investigates whether bank debt follows “market trends” as a complementary effect, or if bank debt has a negative relation to other debt indicating a substitution effect.