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The article looks at the different distributional patterns of two alternative ways of reforming relief for owner‐occupation in UK, namely the reintroduction of income tax on imputed rent (the optimal reform, assuming housing is an investment good) or the withdrawal of tax relief for mortgage interest payments (possibly the more likely political reform). Inland Revenue data show that removal of mortgage interest relief (exclusive of the Option Mortgage) would be the more progressive measure. Removal of relief at higher rates of tax would be one possible step on the road to reform of mortgage interest.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a simple formula for determining a borrower's APR for mortgage loans after including the effects of mortgage interest tax deductions.

This formula is derived by adjusting the APR provided by the lender for the length of the mortgage, the amount of discount points, the mortgage interest rate, and the borrower's tax rate.

From this formula, it is found that the tax‐adjusted APR is not only lower but also more informative than the traditional APR.

The tax‐deductible items of a mortgage loan used in this formula for after‐tax APR are based on those stipulated under US tax law. However, this formula can easily be adapted to other internal rate of return methods such as the annual effective rate of return (AER). In addition, further research is needed to develop a formula when a mortgage loan is the result of a refinance. Under this situation, mortgage discount points are no longer tax‐deductible in the year of their occurrence. Rather, the deduction of points must be amortized over the life of the loan.

The tax‐adjusted APR formula developed in this paper is tailored to each mortgage applicant by providing a more realistic assessment of the applicant's true cost of borrowing.

Even though it is known that the after‐tax APR decreases as an individual's marginal tax rate increases, no explicit formula existed for determining the after‐tax APR. This is the first such formula. Thus, this formula will help the consumers in the mortgage market to be more informed in their decision‐making process.

This study aims to identify and establish effective housing financing concepts to be adopted by government in achieving its mandate of providing sustainable affordable housing for the poor to decrease the building of shacks, as well as proposing solutions to the housing deficit in South Africa. A rise in demand and shortage in supply of housing calls for the need to address issues of affordable housing in South Africa, and developing countries in general, to ensure a stable and promising future for poor families.

Literature has revealed that the South African government, at all levels, accorded high priority to the provision of low-cost housing. Thus, government has adopted subsidy payment as a method of financing affordable housing to ensure that houses are allocated free to the beneficiaries. This also addresses the historically race-based inequalities of the past, but unfortunately, this has not been fully realised. This study uses a sequential mixed method approach, where private housing developers and general building contractors were the research participants. The qualitative data were analysed using a case-by-case analysis, and quantitative data were analysed using a descriptive statistical technique on SPSS.

The results of the qualitative analysis reveal a gross abuse of the housing subsidies system by the beneficiaries of government-funded housing in South Africa. This is evident from illegal sale of the houses below market value. This has led to a continual building of shacks and an increased number of people on the housing waiting list instead of a decrease in the housing deficit. The results from quantitative analysis affirm the use of “Mortgage Payment Subsidies, Mortgage Payment Deductions, Down-Payment Grant and Mortgage Interest Deductions” as viable alternatives to subsidy payment currently in use to finance affordable housing projects by the South African Government.

At the moment, the focus of the South African National Government is continual provision of free housing to the historically disadvantage citizens, but the housing financing method being used encourages unapproved transfer of ownership in the affordable housing sector. This study thus recommends the use of an all-inclusive housing financing method that requires a monetary contribution from the beneficiaries to enable them take control of the process.

The relational interface model proposed in this study will reduce pressure on government budgetary provision for housing and guarantee quick return of private developers’ investment in housing. Government must, as a matter of urgency, launch a continuous awareness programme to educate the low-income population on the value and the long-term benefits of the housing.

As financial markets move toward increased globalization, it becomes worth considering whether inherent differences in financial markets across different countries will diminish. For two countries more similar than different in terms of geography, location, government and culture, Canada and the USA remain strikingly different in terms of housing finance. Public policy objectives toward housing followed quite different paths over the past 70 years and fundamental differences in banking practices have led to considerably different outcomes in terms of mortgage finance instruments in the two countries. Examines some of the differences in policy and in competitive practices between Canada and the USA in an attempt to illuminate why differences in rates and terms across the two countries still exist. While a part of the difference remains due to legal constraints concerning the finance of the domestic housing sector, focuses on the economics and public policy choices that have led to the observed differences rather than on an analysis of the legal structure.

Since 2005, Belgian housing prices have strongly increased. As the timing coincides with the implementation of a new fiscal package in order to stimulate homeownership, our study attempts to provide an understanding whether the mortgage interest and capital deduction (MICPD) policy has had the side-effect of increasing housing prices while, at the same time, controlling for key housing price determinants.

A fixed-effects regression model is used on a panel dataset of the three Belgian regions over the period 1995–2015.

Estimations are carried out separately for different house types, being useful as our empirical analysis ascertains a significant price-increasing effect for ordinary houses and apartments but a significant price-reducing effect for villas. In addition, we find, among other things, that interest rates' influence has been less substantial than commonly thought.

These results are relevant for all governments willing to stimulate homeownership through fiscal stimuli.

Social scientists have long been interested in how political institutions affect economic performance. Nowhere are these effects more apparent today than in the current U.S. financial meltdown. This article offers an analysis of the meltdown by showing how government regulation among other things helped cause it. Specifically, the article shows how regulatory reforms closely associated with neoliberalism created perverse incentives that contributed significantly to the increased lending in the mortgage market and increased speculation in other financial markets even as such behavior was becoming increasingly risky. The result was the failure of mortgage firms, banks, a major insurance company, and eventually the market for short-term business loans, which triggered a general liquidity crisis thereby thrusting the entire economy into a severe recession. Implications for future research are explored. The article also offers a few policy prescriptions and an assessment of their political viability going forward.

Transaction costs, responsive housing supply, rent controls, tenant protection, and access to credit affect residential mobility – these different parts of housing policy are included in what has been defined as housing regimes, which embrace regulations, laws, norms, and ideology as well as economic factors. In this chapter, we investigate how these regimes change by using institutional theories of path dependence. We use Sweden as an example and study three Swedish housing market reforms during the past decades that may have affected residential mobility, each related to one of the main institutional pillars of housing provision: tenure legislation, taxation, and finance. More precisely, we study the development of the rental regulation since the late 1960s, the tax reform in 1991, and the new reforms on mortgages since 2010. What caused these reforms? What were the main mechanisms behind them, and why did they occur at the time they did? We argue, besides affecting residential mobility, these reforms have the common feature of including interesting elements of path dependence and forming critical junctures that have led the development on to a new path. Institutions of tenure legislation, housing finance, and taxation are often claimed to have effects on residential mobility. Although they are seldom designed with the explicit aim of supporting (or counteracting) residential mobility, they may sometimes do so as more or less unintended consequences.

This paper uses two studies to examine taxpayers' knowledge of tax incentives for charitable giving and also explores the consequences of this knowledge on charitable giving decisions. The first study surveys 600 US taxpayers to establish a baseline understanding of how making a charitable contribution affects taxpayers. In the second study, we conduct an experiment with 201 US taxpayers in which we manipulate the knowledge of taxpayers by providing an educational intervention; we also measure, if, how much is donated in a hypothetical scenario under various tax deductibility conditions. The first study indicates fewer than half of participants understand the basic principles of how charitable donations affect tax liability. Our second study reveals that a short educational video is extremely effective at improving taxpayers' understanding and helping them accurately estimate the tax benefit associated with charitable giving. However, through moderated mediation analysis, we also show that participants who received this educational intervention and accurately estimated the tax benefits in turn decreased their charitable giving. We conclude that the majority of US taxpayers do not understand whether they benefit from certain deductions and may be overestimating the benefit they receive from charitable giving, resulting in giving more than they intend.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the key regulatory, market, and political failures that led to the 2008‐2009 US financial crisis and to suggest appropriate recommendations for reform.

The approach is to examine the underlying incentives that led to the crisis and to provide supporting data to support the hypotheses.

While Congress was fixing the savings and loan crisis, it failed to give the regulator of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac normal bank supervisory power. This was a political failure as Congress was using government sponsored enterprise (GSE) resources and the resources of narrow constituencies for their own advantage at the expense of the public interest. Second, in the mid‐1990s, to encourage home ownership, the Administration changed enforcement of the Community Reinvestment Act, effectively requiring banks to use flexible and innovative methods to lower bank mortgage standards to underserved areas. Crucially, this disarmed regulators and the risky mortgage standards then spread to other sectors of the market. Market failure problems ensued as banks, mortgage brokers, securitizers, credit rating agencies, and asset managers were all plagued by problems such as moral hazard or conflicts of interest.

The paper focuses on the political economy reasons for why Congress and US administrations provided these perverse incentives to the GSEs and banks to lower mortgage standards. It also proposes some innovative methods of improving bank regulation that address the regulatory capture problem.

The concept of state-corporate crime developed during the late 1980s and early 1990s in a series of papers authored by Michalowski and Kramer (Kramer, 1990; Kramer & Michalowski, 1990; Michalowski & Kramer, 1987). They specifically define state-corporate crime as:Illegal or socially injurious actions that result from a mutually reinforcing interaction between (1) policies and/or practices in pursuit of goals of one or more institutions of political governance and (2) policies and/or practices in pursuit of goals of one or more institutions of economic production and distribution. (Michalowski & Kramer, 2006a, 2006b, p. 15)