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This study investigates the relation of bank loan delinquencies to Fed Survey delinquency data from 2003 to 2017. Bank-generated loans have lower delinquencies than all Fed Survey loan types. Survey mortgage and auto loan delinquencies are positively related to bank loan delinquencies indicating complimentary delinquency decisions for borrowers. Conversely, student loans delinquencies are negatively related to bank loans, consistent with borrowers substituting student loan payments for bank debt for the entire sample period. Student loan delinquencies are negatively related to per-capita bankruptcy, and all other types of debt have a positive relation. The relation between Fed Survey loan delinquencies and bank-generated loan delinquencies is time varying and changed after the financial crisis in 2008.

Seemingly Unrelated Regression is used to study delinquencies for three bank loan types and whether or not they are related to Fed Survey loan delinquencies. The sample is split into pre-financial crisis before 2008 and post-crisis after 2008.

Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) results show that bank delinquencies for second mortgages and “Other” loan types are consistently complementary to Fed Survey mortgage loan delinquencies. Fed Survey auto loans delinquencies are also consistent with a complimentary relation, and these results are largely driven by the relation after the financial crisis of 2008 since pre-crisis regression results are not significant for every dependent variable. Credit card loan delinquencies have a negative and substitute relation with bank-generated first mortgage loan delinquencies prior to the crisis in 2008, and with bank-generated second mortgages after the crisis. Conversely, student loan delinquencies from the Fed Survey are negatively and significantly related to bank mortgages for the entire sample period, but only with bank-generated first mortgages after 2008. The student loan delinquency results are consistent with income smoothing, on average, although this is not explicitly tested at the micro level since this study uses macro-level data and not borrower-specific data. These findings are also consistent with conventional wisdom that student loans provide “financial slack” and borrower flexibility.

A limiting factor is this study uses macro-level data and not borrower-specific data.

Empirical findings are consistent with prior research that student loans provide income smoothing and “financial slack,” and borrowers with payment challenges will pay other debt before student loans.

Borrowers in financial trouble tend to be delinquent for all debt, and more so for student debt.

To investigate whether Fed Survey delinquencies of auto loans, first mortgages, student loans and credit card loans from all sources have complementary or substitution effects with bank debt at a macro level. The study investigates whether bank debt follows “market trends” as a complementary effect, or if bank debt has a negative relation to other debt indicating a substitution effect.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a cohesive review of the major findings in the literature concerning the Global Financial Crisis.

Papers published in top-rated finance and economics journal since the crisis up to the present were reviewed. A large number of these were selected for inclusion, primarily based on the number of citations they had received adjusted for the amount of time elapsed since their publication, but also partly based on how well they fit in with the narrative.

Much has been done to investigate the causes of the Global Financial Crisis, its effects on various aspects of the financial system, and the effectiveness of regulatory measures undertaken to restore the financial system. While more remains to be done, the existing body of research paints an interesting picture of what happened and why it happened, describes the interrelationships between the mortgage markets and financial markets created by the large scale securitization of financial assets, identifies the problems created by these inter-linkages and offers possible solutions, and assesses the effectiveness of the regulatory response to the crisis.

This study summarizes a vast amount of literature using a framework that allows the reader to quickly absorb a large amount of information as well as identify specific works that they may wish to examine more closely. By providing a picture of what has been done, it may also assist the reader in identifying areas that should be the subject of future research.

This case study analyzes Countrywide Financial’s responses to its recent financial crisis and illustrates the use of communication theory and image restoration strategies by utilizing several crisis response frameworks. The study uses a critical analysis methodology to examine the communication strategies employed by Countrywide, a large mortgage lending company in order to attempt to restore its image. The authors look at excerpts from media stories, carefully examine the language used by company representatives in response to the banking crisis, and categorize the corporate communications into various strategies as defined in the crisis communication literature. Countrywide faced several crisis situations during the period of this study, including the subprime mortgage crisis, public criticism of its CEO’s executive compensation package, allegations of insider trading, and financial difficulties. Corporate responses are critical in determining what amount of damage is done to the firm’s image during a crisis. Countrywide responded to these situations most often using the strategies of image bolstering, reducing the credibility of its accuser, and minimizing the crisis (Benoit, 1995). Through these communications, the company attempted to appear well established and untarnished. It also criticized the media, the courts, and the regulators in an attempt to reduce their credibility. Countrywide made no deliberate attempt to admit fault or to take measures to prevent the problem from reoccurring.

The 2000–2006 housing market bubble conformed to a classic boom–bust scenario that triggered the most serious and costly financial crisis since the Great Depression. The 2008 subprime mortgage collapse leveraged a financial system that privatizes profits and socializes risks. Several factors converge to set up the subprime mortgage market as an easy target for industry insiders to exploit. Enabling legislation expanded the potential pool of borrowers eligible for subprime mortgages and structured incentives to lenders willing to assume the risks. The securitization of subprime mortgages transformed bundles of high-risk loans into mortgage-backed securities that were in demand by domestic and foreign investors. Pressure to edge out competition produced high-risk loans marketed to unqualified borrowers. The final piece in the setup of the subprime lending crisis was a move from an origination model to a distributive model by many financial institutions in the business of lending. We find that the diffusion and totality of these business practices produced a criminogenic opportunity structure for industry insiders to profit at the expense of homebuyers and later investors.

The twenty-first century has seen a wave of white-collar and corporate crime scandals and the economic crisis associated with the home mortgage foreclosure debacle is but one prominent example. Understanding who is to blame for this crisis and what steps can be taken in the future to limit a reoccurrence are important topics of inquiry. Similarly important is understanding public perceptions associated with the mortgage foreclosure crisis, especially since public sentiments are potentially important in influencing crime control policy. Using data from a random sample survey of American adults, this chapter examines the degree to which the public blames banks/lenders as opposed to individual homebuyers for the American foreclosure problems as well as the extent to which they favor specific control and prevention strategies such as government limitations on executive pay or bonuses and legislation aimed at increasing the regulation of business.

This paper aims to study the financial vulnerability of the Spanish households derived from their primary residence mortgage debt payments. This paper shown as the economic and financial crisis triggered after the burst of the housing bubble brought an unemployment shock and a fall in the disposable family income, which alarmingly aggravated the financial vulnerability of the mortgaged households. Consequently, the number of financially vulnerable households almost doubled.

Econometric model of discrete election.

The most vulnerable households – and therefore those with a higher risk of mortgage payment default – are those whose family head is a married and self-employed female. In contrast, in social housing the mortgaged households have been less vulnerable in the context of economic and financial crisis and unlike what would have been initially expected, higher education levels have not acted as a protective factor against households’ financial vulnerability.

There is a great need to understand how the financial health of the mortgaged families that bought their primary residence has deteriorated in a context of significant changes in macroeconomic conditions. This need is specially pressing in a country such as Spain which is one of the OECD’s countries with a higher rate of household property and which shows a sector of highly mortgaged households.

The purpose of this study is to demonstrate that the conventional mortgage system is not appropriate for household finance because it encourages equity extraction and excessive leverage during housing boom and leads to negative equity during a housing bust, a situation that translates into mortgage defaults and foreclosures. Home financing could alternatively be structured as a diminishing partnership preventing the homeowner from ever having negative equity.

Using Johansen’s cointegration test, the authors provide evidence of a long-run relationship between the delinquency rates, volume of refinancing and the change in house price index (HPI) during the 1994–2019 period. To unravel the short run dynamics between these variables, the authors used a Granger causality test that concludes that the volume of refinancing and the change in the HPI Granger cause default rates.

The authors provide evidence that under the current conventional mortgage system, excessive refinancing opportunities and equity extraction that are the main factors determining delinquency rates leading to a non-sustainable homeownership.

If mortgages were such that they do not incentivize defaults and foreclosures during a housing downturn, the recovery of the housing market always leads to capital gains. Therefore, disincentivizing refinancing and equity extraction would lead to a more sustainable homeownership.

Households would be encouraged to pursue sustainable homeownership through a partnership-based model with long-term wealth accumulation for themselves and their heirs rather than short-term home ownership through the conventional mortgage system, leading to negative equity and defaults when the housing market slumps.

Policymakers ought to rethink the mortgage design by promoting partnership-based finance to protect the equity a household accumulates over a lifetime and thereby enhancing stable and sustainable homeownership.

Before the 2007 financial crisis, securitized products accounted for half the credit market. Once regarded as one of the biggest financial innovations of the last century, securitization is now viewed as a contributory factor to the crisis. Until recently research has focused on the post-1970s mortgage securitization market. In this paper, I trace the earlier origins of securitization, from the 12th century Genoese compera through to early 20th century efforts. The historical examples highlight unifying themes on risk allocation and complexity. As the future securitization market remains uncertain, it is important to consider lessons to be learned from these historical episodes.

This is primarily a survey article that utilizes historical documents to compare/contrast features of securitization with the recent crisis.

Improved disclosure is the key element to address recent securitization flaws, but disclosure does not really matter if the entire process is not understood. An examination of historical episodes can be instructive. Forging ahead, any securitization reform needs to address why securitization markets formed, why they failed and how the securitization market can be improved.

As the future securitization market remains uncertain, it is important to consider lessons to be learned from these historical episodes.

To the best of my knowledge, this is one of the first research papers that surveys the history of securitization as far back as the twelfth century.

This paper aims to examine how the exogenous shock of the global financial crisis has had a differential impact on the housing markets of the USA and UK.

The paper begins by examining the nature and dynamics of the global financial crisis. It presents a detailed comparison of institutional and housing market characteristics in each country. A particular focus is the differences in mortgage funding and subprime lending trends over the decade leading up to the financial crisis.

The analysis demonstrates the distinctiveness of the recent housing cycles and the geography of the downward price adjustments. Relative unemployment rates play a key role in these outcomes. Despite the different dynamics of the boom and bust, there is a common legacy in terms of the collapse of house building, repossessions/foreclosures and falling home ownership rates. The short-term policy responses by both governments addressed the same target issues in alternative ways but with different outcomes. Longer-term solutions are still being debated in both countries.

Innovatory insights are provided by the comparison of the sub-national spatial pattern of the recent house price cycle in two countries.

The current crisis in the mortgage securitization industry highlights significant failures in our models of how markets work and our political will, organizational capability, and ideological desire to intervene in markets. This article shows that one of the main sources of failure has been the lack of a coherent understanding of how these markets came into existence, how tactics and strategies of the principal firms in these markets have evolved over time, and how we ended up with the economic collapse of the main firms. It seeks to provide some insight into these processes by compiling both historical and quantitative data on the emergence and spread of these tactics across the largest investment banks and their principal competitors from the mortgage origination industry. It ends by offering some policy proscriptions based on the analysis.