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The current criminal justice system is pledged to serve and protect society while preserving the rights of those who are accused. The purpose of this paper is to explore the premise of “innocent until proven guilty” and examine whether this assumption truly prevails under the current criminal justice system, or be modified to accommodate a sliding continuum of virtuosity.

This paper is a conceptual paper which relies heavily on the current literature about criminal justice and related ethical issues.

The paper argues that today’s criminal justice system fails to meet the standards of the virtuous continuum and that those who oversee that system need to rethink how the system operates and is perceived by the public if they wish the criminal justice system to be perceived as just, fair, and ethically responsible.

Because this paper is a conceptual paper it does not present research hypotheses.

This paper suggests that “virtue” and “ethics” must be the foundation upon which the criminal justice system is evaluated, and criminal justice must incorporate an ethical standard which is virtuous and fair to all parties and leaders who oversee that system must meet the standards suggested by the virtuous continuum.

This paper is among the first to identify the viewpoint of the virtuous perspective, moral perspective, amoral perspective, and immoral perspective in the criminal justice system.

This research uses identity theory to examine the individual variability in moral behavior for acts of commission (committing a bad act) and omission (failing to do a good act). Most research using identity theory has examined behavior in the active sense as in doing something while neglecting behavior in the passive sense as in not doing something. Doing something may carry more information as to who one is than not doing something. Thus, behavior in the active sense may be more likely to implicate the self and thus activate the identity process than behavior in the passive sense. I investigate this by placing individuals in the moral dilemma of a testing situation in which they have the opportunity to cheat (an act of commission) (Condition 1) or not report that they were over-scored on a test (an act of omission) (Condition 2). Participants' moral identities and emotions are obtained. The results reveal that the identity process helps explain moral behavior and emotions for an act of commission but not an act of omission. The results suggest that compared to an omitted act, a committed act generates more cognitive processing as to who one is thereby activating the identity process. Furthermore, in omission, individuals may not see themselves as responsible for an outcome, thus failing to frame the situation in moral terms – as having done a bad thing.

The purpose of this paper is to hypothesise that business theory and education suffer from having been systematically de-philosophised over the last 200 years. Viewed through this lens the economistic narrative can be understood and new and integrated solutions to theoretical and pedagogical problems can be debated.

This paper is a theoretical exploration based on a literature review and philosophical analysis.

Going back to a social science philosophy would fundamentally affect how management is conceptualised, done and taught. The paper focuses on outlining the impact a re-philosophisation would have on management education.

If one agrees that philosophy plays a too small role in management, it would change how scholarship is currently defined and how management education functions. Business schools would have to fundamentally change in every respect.

Current criticism of the management mainstream focuses on either the political/ethical or the epistemic level. The paper argues that the epistemic and the ethical are connected and by making an integrated argument the debate can be re-energised and solution strategies become obvious. I am not aware of any other contribution making this argument. Ghoshal (unwittingly) used the same reasoning but without using the clear frame of reference (philosophy) that this paper proposes.

The purpose of this paper is to explore a framework for considering moral K‐12 instructional technology. It seeks to examine the extent that development of technology policies consider and respect affected parties' interests.

Interpreting morality as an economic concept that involves a reconciliation of societal members' diverse needs and wants, the authors describe moral instruction technology use as a negotiation of administrative, teaching and learning needs along five continua defined by Mason, in 1986 and Peace and Hartzel in 2002: property, freedom of speech, privacy, accessibility, and accountability. The paper commences with observations concerning research into technology‐based empowerment and associated ethical issues. It then describes the five continua of ethical instructional technology challenges within the contexts of K‐12 settings.

The authors encourage research through observational and survey studies to clarify understandings of these continua. Although presented separately, they acknowledge that these dimensions overlap and interact to comprise a mesh of moral dilemmas. If morality represents a concept designed to balance societal powers, then implementation of moral instructional technology processes respects the views of all educators. The authors argue that how educators interpret technology's placements along these moral continua have important consequences for practice. They encourage research that interprets these relationships and how they may best support classroom processes.

The paper presents an exploratory framework, offering insights into ethical issues in instructional technology.

The purpose of this paper is to explain the importance of virtuous leadership and identify six characteristics that are necessary for the modern leader to be effective in an increasingly challenging and competitive world market.

Theory development.

The authors suggest that virtuous leaders possess an uncommon level of commitment to those employees whom they serve, to their customers, to their shareholders, and to society at large, the authors extend the concept of the moral continuum and identify the importance of a virtuous perspective in honoring the obligation to optimize wealth creation and enriching outcomes and relationships, and the authors suggest ten propositions about virtuous leadership that may be empirically tested by both scholars and practitioners who are interested in studying and/or applying virtuous leadership to improve relationships and build organizations.

Original article.

It is no longer merely far-fetched science fiction to think that robots will be the chief combatants, waging wars in place of humans. Or is it? While artificial intelligence (AI) has made remarkable strides, tempting us to personify the machines “making decisions” and “choosing targets”, a more careful analysis reveals that even the most sophisticated AI can only be an instrument rather than an agent of war. After establishing the layered existential nature of war, we lay out the prerequisites for being a (moral) agent of war. We then argue that present AI falls short of this bar, and we have strong reason to think this will not change soon. With that in mind, we put forth a second argument against robots as agents: there is a continuum with other clearly nonagential tools of war, like swords and chariots. Lastly, we unpack what this all means: if AI does not add another moral player to the battlefield, how (if at all) should AI change the way we think about war?

Traditionally, philosophers have ascribed moral agency almost exclusively to humans (Eshleman, 2004). Early writing about moral agency can be traced to Aristotle (Louden, 1989) and Aquinas (1997). In addition to human moral agents, Aristotle discussed the possibility of moral agency of the Greek gods and Aquinas discussed the possibility of moral agency of angels. In the case of angels, a difficulty in ascribing moral agency was that it was suspected that angels did not have enough independence from God to ascribe to the angels genuine moral choices. Recently, new candidates have been suggested for non‐human moral agency. Floridi and Sanders (2004) suggest that artificially intelligence (AI) programs that meet certain criteria may attain the status of moral agents; they suggest a redefinition of moral agency to clarify the relationship between artificial and human agents. Other philosophers, as well as scholars in Science and Technology Studies, are studying the possibility that artifacts that are not designed to mimic human intelligence still embody a kind of moral agency. For example, there has been a lively discussion about the moral intent and the consequential effects of speed bumps (Latour, 1994; Keulartz et al., 2004). The connections and distributed intelligence of a network is another candidate being considered for moral agency (Allen, Varner & Zinser, 2000). These philosophical arguments may have practical consequences for software developers, and for the people affected by computing. In this paper, we will examine ideas about artificial moral agency from the perspective of a software developer.

A proposed typology of moral exemplars in business highlights instances selected to illustrate standards for inclusion. The typology distinguishes among champions, heroes, and saints as different kinds of business exemplars. The typology reflects variations in both specific decision conditions and moral value emphases of business actors. The typology also differentiates moral exemplars from moral neutrals (i.e., amoral actors) and moral sinners (i.e., moral value scofflaws). The objective is to advance understanding of moral character and moral courage in business settings.

The methodology combines original conceptual argument and brief case summaries taken from available literature. The chapter is not a systematic survey of literature but cites key works. Construction of the typology involved iteration between conceptual development and case interpretation.

The chapter separates business cases into private business and public business, and applies Adam Smith’s distinction between citizenship and good citizenship. An additional distinction is made between extreme conditions and normal conditions. Moral heroism in business is restricted to life-and-death or strongly analogous situations in extreme conditions such as hazardous whistleblowing. Moral sainthood in business involves extreme maximization of a single value going far beyond simple compliance with legal requirements and typical ethical norms – Smith’s definition of citizenship. Moral championing in business concerns some degree of lesser self-sacrifice in defense of important values reflecting Smith’s definition of good citizenship.

The chapter is a selection of literature undertaken in iteration with the conceptual development effort. The original research aspect of the chapter is thus quite limited. The author is not positioned to judge the accuracy of published information, for or against a particular instance. The classifications thus depend on whether the instance would, if the generally reported facts are basically accurate, serve as a reasonable illustration of standards for inclusion. Criticisms have been made concerning some of the instances discussed here.

The emphasis is on providing standards for defining moral exemplars for business to suggest how much can be accomplished in business through moral influence.

The conceptual contribution is original, although drawing on the philosophical literature debate about saints and heroes. The chapter treats exemplar as the overarching construct, separated into three kinds: heroes, saints, and champions. Sinner is implicit in the notion of saint. The chapter adds moral champions and moral neutrals to isolate moral heroism. The cases exist in the literature, but have been combined together here for the first time.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the role of consumers’ moral preferences between moral and economic benefits and consumers’ moral and rational behaviour intentions based on moral decision-making models of previous studies.

Respondents were asked to answer a questionnaire measuring moral and economic benefits, consumers’ moral preferences and moral and rational behaviour intention after reading a stimulus describing imaginary fashion brand A’s unethical activities.

Moral and economic benefits directly and significantly affect moral and rational behaviour intention. Homo economicus evoked by an economic benefit had a negative effect on moral behaviour intention.

This study focused only on a moral benefit and an economic benefit as factors evoking consumers’ moral preferences. This study was also conducted only in a Korean context and considered a specific industry. In future research, the results of this study should be extended to design the “possibility of punishment” to encourage moral behaviour by discouraging the effect of homo economicus. The results have implications for companies such as social enterprises and charities that want to promote consumers’ moral behaviour.

This study provides evidence on why ethical consumers do not always make ethical decisions by confirming that homo economicus has a significant influence on not only rational behaviour intention but also moral behaviour intention.

When developing and justifying courses of study in business ethics the designer will be interested in setting benchmarks reflecting his/her understanding or appreciation of the moral views of participating members. Such considerations are often complicated by the fact, relevant in many Australian institutions of higher learning, that most of the cohorts contain overseas students from a variety of Asian countries. If insights into the ethical perceptions of students with differing ethnic origins could be measured in some objective fashion, then curriculum planners might take such matters into account when developing strategies for courses involving business ethics. This paper reports the findings of a questionnaire survey that examined the ethical perceptions of 407 second and third year students completing business courses at two Western Australian universities. Two country groupings, Australian and Malaysian students, were identified and their responses examined to ascertain whether relevant demographic factors relating to age and gender could be used to explain the strong differences in perceptions which were noted with respect to issues involving questionable practices involving consumers. Demographic factors failed to explain observed differences and a subsequent examination of the underlying constructs, using factor and cluster analyses, resulted in the realisation that the two groups demonstrated significantly variant patterns of ethical predisposition.