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The purpose of this research is to identify five lessons of the Trinko decision and apply them to internet access issues.

The research identifies five lessons and then relates these lessons to access issues involving the internet.

Based on application of the lessons of Trinko, it is likely that access to the public internet will be maintained but it is uncertain as to what the nature of access requirements will be, if any, for private internets.

The research provides an economic analysis of the milestone legal decision in Trinko and applies the lessons of Trinko to access issues involving the internet.

Examines the process of systemic disintegration in the USSR brought about by perestroika, demokratizatsiya and glasnost. Places Soviet economic crises in a broader political and nationalities context. Concludes that liberalization and democratization led both to the break‐up of the Communist system and that of the imperial state.

This paper aims to examine whether labour unions influence labour conflicts and this mechanism is different in China compared with other countries.

This paper uses the data from the China Employer–Employee Survey that interviewed 1,208 firms and 10,087 workers in 2016 as the measurement of variables, and it uses Logit regression model to do the empirical research.

Unions cannot significantly influence labour conflicts. More active unions and unions whose leaders are appointed by the firms’ management are associated with a higher incidence of labour conflicts.

This paper finds a new mechanism that explains the relationship between unions and labour conflicts. The existing literature states that unions may increase labour conflicts via “monopoly power” and may also mitigate labour conflicts via “voice mechanisms”. This paper’s findings show that the positive correlation between unions and labour conflicts may be explained by the lack of “voice mechanism” rather than “monopoly power”. The findings imply that labour unions should represent the interest of workers to mitigate the increasing labour conflicts.

Economists usually shy away from talking about power. They assume an economy comprised of many small and medium-sized firms, each competing for consumer dollars. This circumvents the problem of economic power. John Kenneth Galbraith, however, refused to ignore power. It stood at the center of his economics, and he saw it as a key reason the US economy thrived in the years following World War II (WWII). This chapter examines Galbraith’s changing views regarding economic power. American Capitalism explains how countervailing power, or power on the other side of the market, solves the problem of economic power. In The New Industrial State, scientists and educated managers within the firm (the technostructure) mitigate the negative consequences of economic power wielded by large firms. The Affluent Society and Economics and the Public Purpose look to the government as the main check on corporate power. It does this through labor legislation or programs such as the New Deal and Fair Deal. This chapter then evaluates the different solutions Galbraith proffered to the problem of economic power. It contends that Galbraith got three things right when analyzing economic power. First, we no longer live in a world of scarcity due to oligopolistic firms. Second, capitalism was different in the post-WWII era because the US economy thrived and gains were shared widely. Third, Galbraith understood that power was unequally distributed – both between the public and private sectors and within the private sector itself. On the other hand, Galbraith was overly optimistic in believing the market economy or the public sector could counter corporate power.

The purpose of this paper is to retrace some of the key factors leading to the enactment of competition law in the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the prevailing debates for such laws to be enacted in Hong Kong (HK). The regulatory journeys of one country under two different administrations is another interesting dimension, where one is a modern economy under a quasi‐democratic government, the other is a developing one, labelled as a “market economy with socialist characteristics” under a centralised socialist government.

The authors begin with a brief introduction to the PRC Anti Monopoly Law (AML), followed by an overview of the act, and then address the uncertainties in various provisions as well as enforcement issues. The next part devolves into the debates in enacting competition law in HK, which has yet to become law.

Despite the detailed proposal transplanting many ideas from the laws of other modern economies, there are some provisions that are either weak or that continue to safeguard the interest of monopolies in selective sectors. Central to the experiences for both administrations is to balance between conventional wisdom in economic laws and domestic economic interests.

Since, the laws in PRC are newly enacted and HK is still in the drafting process, the arguments highlighted in this paper tend to address the current concerns.

The value of this comparative paper is to reveal the choice of regulatory strategies in HK and PRC.

The concept of light-handed regulation, including light-handed approaches to the regulation of airport services, is discussed. The rationale for the economic regulation of airport services and the traditional approaches used for economic regulation of airport charges are summarized. The evolution of international practice of light-handed regulation is outlined, including the experience with minimal regulation across monopoly industries in New Zealand and the acceptance of “negotiated settlements” in utility industries in North America. General reasons for moving to light-handed regulation of airports include the disadvantages of the price cap approach in practice and the benefits of facilitating greater negotiation between airports and users. Comparisons are made between alternative approaches to light-handed regulation of airport services, including price and quality of service monitoring, information disclosure regulation and negotiate-arbitrate regulation, approaches that have been applied to airport services in Australia and New Zealand. The role and nature of the incentives under each approach are discussed. The chapter concludes that whether light-handed regulation provides a suitable alternative approach to direct regulation depends on the market circumstances and the design characteristics of the light-handed approach.

The electric power industry has been moving from a regulated monopoly structure to a deregulated market structure in many countries. The purpose of this study is to comprehensively review the existing markets to study advantages, issues involved and lessons learnt to benefit emerging electricity markets.

The paper employs a comprehensive review of existing competitive electricity market models in USA (California), UK, Australia, Nordic Countries (Norway), and developing country (Chile) to analyze the similarities, differences, weaknesses, and strengths among these markets based on publically available data, literature review and information.

Ongoing or forthcoming electricity sector restructuring activities in some countries can be better designed based on lessons learnt from existing markets and incorporating their own political, technical and economical contexts. A template for design of successful electricity market has also been presented.

This study is limited to a comparative analysis of five markets and can be extended in the future for other existing and emerging electricity markets.

The discussed weaknesses and strengths of existing electricity markets in this study can be practically utilized to improve the electricity industry market structures leading to several social benefits including lower electricity cost.

The comprehensive review and analysis of five existing markets, physically located in different continents, may be used as an assistance or reference guide to benefit the emerging electricity markets in other countries.

With the establishment of Competition Commission of India (CCI), Competition law-class actions, especially with regards to abuse of dominance by monopolists, are slowly becoming unhappy realities with both government-owned as well as private companies. This case used Coal India Limited (CIL), a public monolith which was penalized recently by CCI, as a subject of analysis to delve deeper into various conceptual understandings related to public sector functioning, such as public versus private provisioning, natural versus designed monopoly, dominance versus abuse of dominance, corporate governance versus government mandated governance, and finally natural resource allocation.

This essay is a response to Zak Cope’s defense of the “labor aristocracy” theory of working class reformism and conservatism. Specifically, the essay engages Cope’s claims that British colonialism, imperialist investment, and transnational “monopoly” corporations have accrued “surplus-profits” that have underwritten the existence of a “labor aristocracy” historically, and that “unequal exchange” today has transformed almost the entirety of the working classes of the global North into a labor aristocracy. We conclude with a presentation of an alternative explanation of working class reformism and conservatism.